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Abstract

The impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress’s
authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to
restrict the President’s control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the Constitution rejected the “executive by committee”
employed by the Articles of the Confederation in favor of a ”unitary executive,” in
which all administrative authority is centralized in the President. More recently,
the debate has begun to turn towards historical practices. Some scholars have
suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have become such established features of the constitutional landscape as to preempt arguments in favor
of the unitary executive. Others, led by Bruce Ackerman, have suggested that the
New Deal represented a ”constitutional moment” that ratified major changes in
the distribution of power within the federal government. Still others have argued
that the increased policymaking functions of the modern administrative state justify permitting Congress to impose greater limits on presidential control over the
execution of the law. To date, however, a complete assessment of the historical
record has yet to appear.
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ABSTRACT
The impeachment of President Clinton has reinvigorated the debate over Congress’s
authority to employ devices such as special counsels and independent agencies to restrict the
President’s control over the administration of the law. The initial debate focused on whether the
Constitution rejected the “executive by committee” employed by the Articles of the
Confederation in favor of a “unitary executive,” in which all administrative authority is
centralized in the President. More recently, the debate has begun to turn towards historical
practices. Some scholars have suggested that independent agencies and special counsels have
become such established features of the constitutional landscape as to preempt arguments in
favor of the unitary executive. Others, led by Bruce Ackerman, have suggested that the New
Deal represented a “constitutional moment” that ratified major changes in the distribution of
power within the federal government. Still others have argued that the increased policymaking
functions of the modern administrative state justify permitting Congress to impose greater limits
on presidential control over the execution of the law. To date, however, a complete assessment
of the historical record has yet to appear.
This Article is part of a larger project that offers a comprehensive chronicle that places
the battles between the President and Congress over control of the administration of federal law
in historical perspective. It reviews the period between 1945 and 2001, beginning with the
Administration of Harry Truman, ending with the Administration of Bill Clinton, and paying
particular attention to the Clinton Impeachment. The record reveals that these Presidents
consistently defended the unitariness of the executive branch to a degree sufficient to keep the
issue from being foreclosed by history. In fact, the episodes discussed provide eloquent
illustrations of the legal and normative arguments supporting the unitary executive.
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The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2001
Christopher S. Yoo*
Steven G. Calabresi**
INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the separation of powers.
Supreme Court decisions striking down the legislative veto,1 the line item veto,2 and
congressional attempts to control federal spending through the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act3 triggered a wave of academic commentary on the proper roles of both Congress and
the president in exercising control over the execution of federal law.4
Much of the scholarship has focused on the constitutionality of the so-called
independent agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal
Communications Commission, which theoretically operate outside of direct presidential
control.5 But the most dramatic flash point for debates about Congress’s ability to limit
presidential authority over the execution of the law has been the use of independent

*

Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
2
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
3
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
4
Professor Calabresi has been a leading participant in these debates. See Steven G.
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L. J. 541 (1994);
Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1377 (1994); Steven G.
Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
5
See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers After Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV.
19, 31-36; Geoffrey Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41; Peter M. Shane, Independent
Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 596, 608-23
(1989); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of Independent Agencies After
Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779; Symposium, The Independence of Independent Agencies, 1988
DUKE L.J. 215; Symposium, The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies, 36 AM. U.
L. REV. 277 (1987).
**
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counsels.6 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the independent counsel
statute in Morrison v. Olson7 notwithstanding Justice Scalia’s dire warnings that special
prosecutors could be manipulated for political purposes.8 The years that followed
appeared to bear out Justice Scalia’s predictions,9 eventually peaking during the
impeachment proceedings against President Clinton. Further controversy was forestalled
when the statute authorizing independent counsels was allowed to lapse in 1999.
The scholarly commentary has evolved into a debate over whether the
Constitution created a “unitary executive,” in which all executive authority is centralized
in the president. Participants in the debate have examined the Constitution’s text10 and
ratification history11 to determine whether it rejected of the plural executive employed by
the Articles of the Confederation and many state constitutions in favor of a structure in

6

For early commentary on the constitutionality of independent counsels, see TERRY
EASTLAND, ETHICS, POLITICS AND THE INDEPENDENT COUNSEL (1989); Stephen L. Carter, The Independent
Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105 (1988); Lee S. Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic
Perspective on Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (1989); Shane, supra note 5, at 598-608;
Charles Tiefer, The Constitutionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Legislative Power, 63
B.U. L. REV. 59 (1983).
7
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
8
Id. at 712-14, 727-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
9
See Archibald Cox & Philip B. Heymann, After the Counsel Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
1999, at A19; Benjamin Ginsberg & Martin Shefter, Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 11 J.L. & POL.
497 (1995). For an analysis of the impact of the political abuse of independent counsels for the separation
of powers, see Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV.
23, 90-95 (1995) [hereinafter Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments]; Steven G. Calabresi, Some
Structural Consequences of the Increased Use of Ethics Probes as Political Weapons, 11 J.L. & POL. 521
(1995).
10
Compare, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 4 (arguing that the Article II Vesting Clause,
bolstered by other constitutional provisions, represents a substantive grant of constitutional power);
Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4 (same); and Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 4 (same); with Lawrence
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 47-55, 119 (1994)
(disagreeing with Professor Calabresi’s views); and A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New
Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1346 (1994) (same).
11
Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 603-05 (arguing that the
preratification history supports the unitary executive); and Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of
Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 753-89, 808-12 (same); with Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1755-1810 (1996) (drawing the opposite conclusion); Abner S.
Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 138-53 (1994)
(same).
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which all administrative authority was concentrated in a single person.12 To the extent
that commentators have focused on the post-ratification history with respect to this issue,
they have tended to focus primarily on the practices during the presidential
administrations immediately following the Founding.13
Increasingly, commentators have looked beyond the Founding era and have begun
to assess the implications of the broader sweep of history. The few historical treatments
that currently exist typically suggest that, regardless of the underlying merits, arguments
in favor of the unitary executive have been foreclosed by the sweep of more than two
centuries of constitutional history.14 Others have offered the more limited historical
claim that nonunitariness has only been an established practice since the Supreme Court’s
1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.15 Some of those offering such
arguments have candidly acknowledged the incompleteness of the current literature and

12

It is interesting to note that the conclusion that the Constitution of 1787 established a
unitary executive has found general acceptance among courts, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
110-33 (1926); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1981); among historians, see JACK N.
RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 250-53, 25758 (1996); and even among leading critics of the unitary executive, see Strauss, supra note 5, at 599-601;
Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 432-33 (1987).
13
See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 635-63; Gerhard Casper, An Essay in
Separation of Powers; Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211 (1989); Gerhard
Casper, Executive-Congressional Separation of Power During the Presidency of Thomas Jefferson, 47
STAN. L. REV. 473 (1995); Kent Greenfield, Original Penumbras: Constitutional Interpretation in the
First Year of Congress, 26 CONN. L. REV. 79, 82-111 (1993); Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 5-84;
Prakash, supra note 11, at 789-800.
14
See FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY : AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY
180 n.35 (1994).(“more than 200 years of practice under the Constitution . . . render a strict separation [or
powers] impossible”); Flaherty, supra note 11, at 1816 (suggesting that a common law constitutionalist
would regard the past 200 years of practice under the Constitution “dispositive” in foreclosing the unitary
vision of the executive); Tiefer, supra note 6, at 103 (“From the creation of the government’s structure by
the First Congress, through the development of the modern agency, and down to the present, the status of
agencies has not been a unitary or monolithic one.”); see also Miller, supra note 5, at 83-86 (finding past
presidents’ failure to consistently oppose independent agencies problematic, but ultimately insufficient to
constitute acquiescence).
15
295 U.S. 602 (1935). See Strauss, supra note 5, at _; Marshall J. Breger & Gary J. Edles,
Established by Practice: The Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52 ADMIN. L. REV.
1111, 1236 (2000).
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have recognized the need for a more complete assessment of the historical record of
presidential control over the execution of the law.16
We have attempted to fill this void by embarking on a four-article series
examining the history of the president’s ability to execute the law. In The Unitary
Executive During the First Half-Century,17 we analyzed the first seven presidencies under
the Constitution to determine the view of presidential power held by the incumbents
between 1789 and 1837. In so doing, we paid particular attention to what is generally
recognized to be the first great clash between the president and Congress over control of
the administration of the law: Andrew Jackson’s removal of his Treasury Secretary
during his battle with the Bank of the United States.18 Writing in 1997, when the
institution of independent counsels still enjoyed broad support among both politicians
and academic commentators,19 we called for and predicted the demise of the independent
counsel statute.20
We continued our project in The Unitary Executive During the Second HalfCentury,21 beginning with Martin Van Buren’s presidency in 1837 up through the end of
the first administration of Grover Cleveland in 1889. In the process, we offered an
extended discussion of the second great conflict over the unitary executive: the

16

See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 84 n.334 (noting that “a full account of the
growth of presidential power” would allow consideration of “the enormously significant and self-conscious
changes in the role of the presidency from the period following Jackson through Franklin Roosevelt”).
17
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the First HalfCentury, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451 (1997).
18
Id. at 1538-59.
19
See Ken Gormley, Monica Lewinsky, Impeachment, and the death of the Independent
Counsel Law: What Congress Can Salvage from the Wreckage—A Minimalist View, 60 MD. L. REV. 97,
101-02 (2001) (noting that as of the end of 1997 the independent counsel statute still enjoyed broad support
and that the abruptness with which people abandoned it came as a shock).
20
Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1462.
21
Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the Second
Half-Century, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 668 (2003).
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impeachment of Andrew Johnson for violating the Tenure of Office Act.22 The period
closed with a series of landmark events, including the enactment of the Civil Service Act
of 1883, the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887 (the agency that
would eventually become the model for all subsequent independent agencies), and the
repeal of the Tenure of Office Act in 1887.23
In The Unitary Executive During the Third Half-Century,24 we continued our
survey of presidents from Benjamin Harrison through Franklin D. Roosevelt. In the
process, we offered a detailed analysis of FDR’s failed attempt to implement the
Brownlow Committee’s proposal to reorganize the executive branch, which is widely
recognized as a watershed moment in the history of the president’s authority over the
execution of the law.25 This period plays a critical role in arguments about the unitariness
of the executive branch. Many constitutional theorists, led by Bruce Ackerman, regard
the New Deal era to be a constitutional moment that implicitly ratified major changes in
the allocation of power within the federal government.26 This period also witnessed the
rise of the so-called independent agencies, which had been languishing in the aftermath
of the Supreme Court’s decision in Myers v. United States.27 We found that presidents
throughout this period consistently asserted the president’s role as the ultimate repository
of executive power. The anti-unitarian position did not receive any material support until

22

Id. at 746-58.
Id. at 788-89, 795-99.
24
Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi, & Laurence Nee, The Unitary Executive During
the Third Half-Century (forthcoming 2004).
25
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2274-75 (2001);
Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 84 n.334; Miller, supra note 5, at 79, 85.
26
See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105-08 (1991); Bruce
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 801, 845-96 (1995).
27
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
23
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1935, when the Supreme Court reversed decades of precedent and upheld the
constitutionality of congressionally imposed limitations on president’s power to remove
officers charged with executing the law in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States.28
Although Roosevelt was unable to undo the damage done by the Court’s ruling in
Humphrey’s Executor, his continued efforts to resist the move toward agency
independence was more than sufficient to foreclose any claims of presidential
acquiescence.
We believe that our prior work has shown that each of the first thirty-two
presidents—from George Washington up through Franklin D. Roosevelt—believed in a
unitary executive of the kind defended by many scholars in recent years. These thirtytwo presidents all asserted a broad presidential power to remove subordinate officials
exercising executive policy-making power for any reason, including policy
disagreements. We also showed that many of these thirty-two presidents also asserted
other presidential powers of control over law execution including the issuing of binding
orders to subordinates to take particular actions and the nullifying of particular actions
taken by subordinates. Finally, we showed that many of these thirty-two presidents had
construed the Vesting Clause of Article II to be a grant of power to the president, as
Professor Calabresi has previously argued in a debate with Professors Lawrence Lessig
and Cass Sunstein.29

28

295 U.S. 602 (1935). For our discussion of Humphrey’s Executor, see Yoo et al., supra

note 24, at _.
29

Compare Calabresi, supra note 4, at 1378-1400, 1403-05 (arguing that the Article II
Vesting Clause represents a substantive grant of constitutional power); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4,
at 563-64, 570-81, 612-13 (same); Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 4, at 1165-70, 1175-81, 1186-1206
(same), with Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 47-55, 119 (disagreeing with Professor Calabresi’s
views).
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We now pick up the survey where we left off in our three prior articles and
examine the presidencies during the fourth half-century of our constitutional history to
see the views expressed by presidents from Harry Truman to Bill Clinton regarding the
scope of the president’s power to execute the law. As in our previous articles, in
conducting our historical review of presidential practices, we employ the interpretive
method known as “departmentalism” or “coordinate construction.” This approach holds
that all three branches of the federal government have the power and duty to interpret the
Constitution and that the meaning of the Constitution is determined through the dynamic
interaction of all three branches.30 The relevant inquiry is whether a long-standing and
unbroken practice exists to which both Congress and the presidents have acquiesced.
Only if that is the case can a practice justifiably be regarded as an established part of the
structure of our government.31 In this respect, our methodology is the similar to the one
followed by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha,32 which relied on the fact that eleven
of thirteen presidents from Woodrow Wilson to Ronald Reagan had refused to accede to
the legislative veto in rejecting arguments that the legislative veto had become an
accepted feature under the separation of powers.33
Our historical account focuses primarily on the three devices generally viewed as
necessary to any theory of the unitary executive: the president’s power to remove
subordinate policy-making officials at will, the president’s power to direct the manner in

30

See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1463-72.
For the classic statement of this position, see United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459, 474 (1915). For other examples, see, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668-69, 686
(1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 679-83 (1929); Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 170-76 (1926); and Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803).
32
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
33
Id. at 942 n.13.
31
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which subordinate officials exercise discretionary executive power, and the president’s
power to veto or nullify such officials’ exercises of discretionary executive power.34
Where appropriate, we also discuss presidential exercises of the foreign affairs power,
which derives largely from the Article II Vesting Clause, the same constitutional
foundation as the president’s power to execute the law.35 We do not claim that there is
consensus among all three branches of government as to the president’s control of the
removal power and of the powers to direct and nullify. Rather, we claim only that there
is no consistent, three-branch custom, tradition, or practice to which presidents have
acquiesced permitting congressionally imposed derogations of the president’s sole
authority to execute the law.36 As a result, we reject claims that arguments regarding the
proper balance of power between the legislative and the executive branches have been
effectively foreclosed by history. Instead, we contend that such arguments must be
resolved on the basis of their legal and normative merits.
The years between from 1945 to 2001 represents a particularly interesting period
in the constitutional history of presidential power. The executive branch that emerges
during the second half of the twentieth century is a mammoth operation that dwarfs the
scale of administration during the time of George Washington. Indeed, the size of the
modern federal bureaucracy far exceeds even the burgeoning administrative state that had
emerged by the end of the New Deal.

34

Id. at 1458.
See Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign
Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 252-65 (2001); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1639, 1676-68 (2002).
36
Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1458.
35
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In addition, the modern presidency wields far more power and plays a far larger
role in setting and coordinating federal policy than in previous periods. The scope of
presidential power is perhaps demonstrated most dramatically by the fact that Harry S.
Truman’s accession to the presidency in 1945, which commences the period covered by
this installment of our series of articles, coincides with the beginning of the Atomic Age.
Ever since 1945, the fact that the president has possessed the power to deploy nuclear
weapons on a global scale if the circumstances call for it provides simply the most
dramatic demonstration of the increasing importance of the office.
Indeed, the presidency now far surpasses any other governmental institution in
terms of political leadership. Chief executives typically establish a direct relationship
with the American people and became the embodiment and the focal point of the national
will. Thus, presidents like Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Ronald Reagan
wielded more power and were more central to the life of the nation than were such
predecessors as Franklin Pierce or Benjamin Harrison. For better or worse, we have an
imperial presidency now.37
As a result, many non-formalist theories of constitutional interpretation contend
that the presidency of Franklin Roosevelt represents a turning point in the history of the
separation of powers in which the polity effectively sanctioned a fundamental
redistribution of power among the three branches. Interestingly, different scholars draw
starkly different normative inferences from this fact. Some scholars, such as Peter
Strauss, Abner Greene, and Martin Flaherty, have argued that the increased policymaking
functions of the modern administrative state justify permitting Congress to place greater

37

See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1989).
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limits on presidential control over the execution of the law.38 Others, including most
notably Lawrence Lessig and Cass Sunstein, have drawn the opposite conclusion, arguing
that the increase in discretionary, policymaking authority wielded by administrative
agencies has strengthened the case in favor of the unitary executive.39
We take issue with both approaches. Contrary to the prognosis of Ackerman and
Flaherty, presidents throughout the post-World War II era consistently asserted their sole
authority to execute the laws, often with the support of the judiciary. Indeed, the
reaffirmations of the unitariness of the executive branch that we discuss are part of a
seamless position that presidents have consistently advanced since the Founding. Thus,
from the standpoint of constitutional law, what we find singular is not the supposed
fundamental discontinuity that drives the constitutional moment envisioned by
Ackerman,40 but rather the consistency with which the executive branch has asserted its
vision of the proper scope of presidential power. From the standpoint of three-branch
constitutional interpretation, the conduct of presidents throughout the period running
from 1945 to 2001 stands as a strong reaffirmation of the unitariness of the executive
branch that is more than sufficient to vitiate any inference that the executive branch has
acquiesced to any encroachments upon its prerogatives.
We begin in Parts I through X below with a discussion of the eleven presidencies
between 1945 and 2001. In Part XI, below, we pay particularly close attention to the rise
and fall of the Ethics in Government Act, which created so-called independent counsels
to prosecute wrongdoing by senior executive branch officials. We shall see that the
38

See Flaherty, supra note 11, at 1816-21, 1823-24; Greene, supra note 11, at 153-95;
Strauss, supra note 5.
39
See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 93-106.
40
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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history of the Ethics in Government Act is strikingly similar to the history of the socalled Tenure of Office Act and would end in the Act’s demise, just as we predicted in
1997.41
I.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

Harry S. Truman succeeded Franklin Roosevelt as president at a time when the
whole world was consumed by war. With no time to prepare for his awesome
responsibilities, Truman would have to complete the Second World War, manage the
transition from a wartime to a peacetime economy, and formulate a new foreign policy to
contain Soviet communism. Truman’s biographer, Donald R. McCoy, observes:
Of elected presidents, only Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt
had assumed office under such pressure and with such complications.
They had been elected to their high estate, however; had had some time to
prepare to assume it; and were not obligated to carry on the policies of
their predecessors. Truman did not have the time, the prestige, the mental
preparation, or the luxury of concentrating on only one crisis. He had, in
fact, two major crises to resolve simultaneously—winning the war and
securing the peace—and the one complicated the other. And waiting in
the wings for him were the challenges of domestic and world
reconstruction.42
Fortunately, Truman’s character “enabled him to make much of his on-the-job
training as president. He was brisk, decisive, direct, industrious, practical, and tough.”43
Truman “exercised command vigorously”44 and on August 6, 1945, he dropped the first
atomic bomb on Hiroshima thus bringing World War II to an end.45 In general, Truman

41
42
43
44
45

Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 17, at 1462.
DONALD R. MCCOY, THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN 34 (1984).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 39.
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gets high marks as “a supremely tough, decisive leader”46 who was completely in control
from the start of his entire administration.
Truman immediately announced that he would continue FDR’s policies and that
he would “prosecute the war on both fronts, east and west, with all the vigor we possess
to a successful conclusion.”47 Despite his initial determination to continue Roosevelt’s
policies, he soon realized “there could be no Truman administration unless he had his
own people in office”48 and had a Cabinet that was “in entire sympathy with what I
wanted to do”49 Truman therefore acted swiftly to assemble his own White House staff.
Six months into his presidency Truman was left “with only three of the ten cabinet
members whom he had inherited.”50
Truman relied “more heavily on his top subordinates than had Roosevelt,”51 and
he “had daily meetings with his chief White House aides and at least weekly meetings
with cabinet members.”52 It would be a mistake to infer from Truman’s more
deliberative style that he exerted any less control over the execution of the law than did
Roosevelt. Truman’s determination to take full responsibility for the entirety of his
administration is evident in the rules he laid down for his cabinet on May 18, 1945.
Cabinet members were to help the president
carry out policies of the government; in many instances the Cabinet could
be of tremendous help to the President by offering advice whether he liked
it or not but when [the] president [gave] an order they should carry it out.
I told them I expected to have a Cabinet I could depend on and take in my

46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 65.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
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confidence and if this confidence was not well placed I would get a
Cabinet in which I could place confidence.53
And when cabinet members did not execute the law in accordance with Truman’s
wishes, he did not hesitate to remove them or force them to resign. For example,
Secretary of Defense Johnson was told to resign because of his “conflicts with other
officials, his verbal indiscretions, his chumminess with Republicans, and his slowness in
conforming to new policies during a war.”54 Even more dramatic was the forced
resignation of Attorney General J. Howard McGrath. The sequence of events that led to
McGrath’s undoing began on February 1, 1952, when he appointed Newbold Morris as a
special prosecutor to investigate alleged corruption in the Bureau of Internal Revenue and
the Department of Justice’s Tax Division, only the fifth occasion in history in which a
special prosecutor had been named. After Morris attempted to identify senior Justice
Department officials who might be taking bribes by preparing a lengthy questionnaire
intended to identify those officials’ whose lifestyles outstripped their salaries, McGrath
ordered that the questionnaires not to be distributed. When Morris then sought access to
McGrath’s official and personal records, McGrath fired Morris, which in turn prompted
Truman to fire McGrath later that same day.55 The investigation was then completed by
Judge James P. McGranery, who succeeded McGrath as Attorney General.
Truman’s willingness to remove McGrath for his attempt to interfere with the
activities of the special prosecutor illustrates the strength of Truman’s belief in his
authority over the execution of federal law. This is not to suggest that Truman thought
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Id. Quoting Harry S. Truman.
Id. at 236.
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that he had any less right to control the conduct of the special prosecutor than he had over
the Attorney General. The manner in which the special prosecutor conducted his
investigation revealed that he was completely subject to presidential direction. For
example, after meeting with Truman, Morris declared that he did not need the subpoena
power “because if I want something and can't get it, I can go to the President for it.”56
The fact that Morris was himself removed by McGrath, who was himself then removed,
further confirms that the Truman Administration did not regard the special prosecutor as
independent of the executive branch or as anything less than completely accountable to
the president. Truman disagreed with McGrath’s actions as a matter of policy; at no
point, however, did Truman suggest that McGrath lacked the authority to dismiss
Morris.57
As befitting a person with a plate on his desk proclaiming “The buck stops
here,”58 Truman also exerted direct supervisory control over other aspects of his
administration as well. Truman listened to and relied upon his White House staff and the
Bureau of the Budget, but it was always “clear he was the boss, the person on whose desk
‘the buck stops’. For all their influence, they were advisors, not executives or policy
makers.”59 Truman also “created the institution of the presidency”60 by refining the
structure of the White House staff and making increasing use of the Bureau of the
Budget, the Council of Economic Advisors, and the National Security Council. The
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Quoted in id. at 2331.
See generally KATY J. HARRIGER, INDEPENDENT JUSTICE: THE FEDERAL SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR IN AMERICAN POLITICS 15 (1992).
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MCCOY, supra note 42, at 315,
59
Id. at 147.
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Id. at 164.
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development of efficient means of using the White House staff to police the executive
branch greatly enhances the unitary executive.
Military and foreign policy matters continued to occupy a substantial part of
Truman’s time in his second term. Truman repeatedly asserted himself over the armed
forces, and he kept military expenses down. Truman “never let anyone forget who was
the commander in chief.”61 In addition, “[t]he Americans had developed and tested the
hydrogen bomb by November 1952” and had “begun work on atomic-powered
submarines and aircraft, as well as on guided missiles.”62
By the summer of 1950, Truman found himself being drawn into a major
undeclared war in Korea.63 This was a major exercise of executive power, and Truman
was to proceed on his own authority. It would also lead to one of the most dramatic
removals ever in American history when Truman relieved General Douglas MacArthur of
his command of U.S. troops in Korea for being insubordinate and for openly intervening
in the political arena. Truman believed that MacArthur’s action posed “a danger to the
fundamental principle of civilian supremacy over the military.”64 This very high
visibility removal illustrates dramatically why the removal power is so important for the
president if he is to be in charge of the executive branch.
Not only was Truman willing to exercise the removal power; he also vigorously
defended it against congressional attempts to place limits on its exercise, as evinced by
his continuation of the defense of the removal power in connection with the case of
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Id. at 140.
Id. at 194-95.
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Id. at 226-27.
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United States v. Lovett,65 begun during the Roosevelt Administration.66 The Lovett case
arose when Congress attached a rider to an appropriations bill specifying that no federal
funds could be used to pay Lovett and two other named executive branch employees
suspected of holding subversive views. In essence, the issue in Lovett was whether
Congress could use its spending power to in effect remove executive branch employees
whom the president wanted to retain. Although the Court of Claims had decided in favor
of the Administration’s position, it failed to provide the strong endorsement of the
removal power that the Administration sought. Dissatisfied with the Court of Claims’
disposal of the case on nonconstitutional grounds, the Attorney General successfully
petitioned for certiorari in early 1946.67
The Truman Administration’s brief on the merits primarily attacked the rider as
an impermissible infringement on the President’s power to remove,68 as did its
presentation during oral argument.69 The administration’s brief specifically said that
If the President is to perform his constitutional obligation to execute the
laws, he must have power to control the subordinate officers through
whom the executive function is administered. The principal control which
the President has over executive officers is his power to remove them, and
it has been said that he is . . . Chief of the Executive only through his
power of removing appointees who are recalcitrant and unwilling to
follow his wishes. Any exercise of the removal power by the legislative
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66 F. Supp. 142, 146 (Ct. Cl. 1945), aff’d, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _.
67
John Hart Ely, United States v. Lovett: Litigating the Separation of Powers, 10 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 23-25 (1975). The Attorney General’s decision to seek Supreme Court review is
telling because the outcome he desired had prevailed in the Court of Claims. Therefore the Attorney
General petitioned for certiorari not to change the result in the judgment below, but rather to change its
rationale.
68
The Administration’s brief devoted some forty-seven pages to its removal argument,
spending the remaining fifteen pages challenging the rider as a bill of attainder. Id. at 28-29 (citing Brief
for the Petitioner, United States v. Lovett (Nos. 809 to 811)).
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Id. at 30 & n.86 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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18

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

branch necessarily interferes with the executive power and tends to subject
the executive branch to the control and domination of Congress.70
The Truman Administration’s brief goes on to claim that in England the “power to
remove executive officers was vested in the Crown”71 and the brief specifically cites the
Vesting Clause of Article II as the source of the President’s removal power.72 The brief
concludes its argument against a congressional power to remove Lovett by showing that
the consistent practice from 1789 up through the 1940’s was of presidential not
congressional power to remove.73
Although the Supreme Court did reach the constitutional questions avoided by the
Court of Claims, it upheld the Administration’s position on the grounds that the statute
represented a bill of attainder without reaching the removal issue.74 As a result, none of
the arguments on the removal power in the administration’s brief found its way into the
Supreme Court’s opinion. For the purposes of this Article, however, it is of no
consequence that the Supreme Court chose not to base its resolution of the case on the
removal power. The fact that the Truman Administration strongly opposed congressional
infringement upon the removal power is sufficient to show that Truman did not acquiesce
to this deviation from the unitary executive.
Having failed in its attempt to use its control over appropriations to remove
certain executive officers, Congress tried to remove Commissioner of the Bureau of
Reclamation Michael W. Straus and Regional Reclamation Director Richard L. Boke by

70

Brief for the Petitioner at 15, United States v. Lovett (Nos. 809 to 811).
Id. at 19.
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Id. at 21.
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Id. at 32-48.
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328 U.S. at 307. The House considered refusing to allocate the money to pay Watson,
Dodd, and Lovett, but in the end voted 99 to 98 to appropriate the necessary funds. 93 CONG. REC. 297375, 2977, 2987-91 (1947); see also Ely, supra note 67, at 10 n.32, 31 n.93.
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arbitrarily changing the qualifications for their positions.75 Truman complained that this
provision, designed as it was to “effect the removal of two men now holding such
positions,” was “contrary to the spirit, if not the letter of those provisions of the
Constitution which guarantee the separation of legislative and executive functions.”76
However, because Congress had already adjourned, Truman felt that he “had no choice”
but to sign the bill. Truman indicated, however, that “had it been possible to veto this bill
without bringing the vital work of the Department to a standstill,” he would have done
so.77 Congress persisted the following year, attaching a provision to a continuing
resolution prohibiting the use of appropriated funds for paying Straus’s or Boke’s
salaries.78 Again Truman objected in much the same terms.79 Perhaps chastened by their
defeat in Lovett, Congress finally backed down the following month when it deleted the
changes in these offices’ qualifications without having forced Straus or Boke out of their
posts.80
That said, there were occasions on which Truman did not consistently support the
unitariness of the executive branch. Truman’s position was somewhat equivocal
regarding the President’s power to direct and overrule subordinate executive officials’
exercises of discretion, as evidenced by the attitude of his administration during the
consideration of the Reorganization Act of 1945. Although Truman’s initial proposal
would have included all of the independent agencies within the President’s reorganization
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Interior Department Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 80-841, 62 Stat. 1112, 1126 (1948).
Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President on the Interior Department Appropriation
Act (June 30, 1948), in 1948 PUB. PAPERS 390, 390.
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Temporary Appropriations Act of 1949, ch. 101, 63 Stat. 67.
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Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Temporary
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authority,81 Congress refused to comply and instead followed the pattern established in
the Reorganization Act of 193982 by specifically exempting certain specified agencies
from the Act altogether and by strictly limiting the degree to which certain other agencies
could be reorganized.83 Truman also implicitly condoned another deviation from the
unitariness of the executive branch when recommended that Congress incorporate the
legislative veto provision of the 1939 reorganization statute into the 1945 version.84
Congress of course took Truman at his word and included a two-house legislative veto
into the 1945 Act.85 Truman also tolerated the enactment of other legislative vetoes
throughout his first term.86
Truman began to offer greater resistance to such intrusions after he won reelection
in his own right. Building on the recommendations of the First Hoover Commission,87

81

Letter from President Truman to the Congress of the United States (May 24, 1945),
reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 971, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1945).
82
See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _.
83
Reorganization Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 70-263, § 5, 59 Stat. 613, 615-16; see also H.R.
REP. NO. 971, 79th Cong., 1st Sess 6, 10-11 (1945); S. REP. NO. 638, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1945).
84
Truman noted that under that arrangement, Anecessary control is reserved to the Congress
since it may, by simple majority vote of the two Houses, nullify any action of the President which does not
meet with its approval.” Letter from President Truman to the Congress of the United States (May 24,
1945), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 971, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1945).
85
§ 6(a), 59 Stat. at 616. The Senate even dallied with shifting to a one-house legislative
veto, S. REP. NO. 638, supra note 84, at 3, but in the end it backed down and retained the two-house veto.
Robert W. Ginnane, The Control of Federal Administration by Congressional Resolutions and Committees,
66 HARV. L. REV. 569, 581 n.46 (1953) (citing 91 CONG. REC. 10269-74, 10714 (1945)).
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For a discussion of other legislative vetoes accepted during Truman’s first term, see
Ginnane, supra note 85, at 583-86, 603-04. See generally H. Lee Watson, Comment, Congress Steps Out:
A Look at Congressional Control of the Executive, 63 CAL. L. REV. 983, 1019-21 (1975); Louis Fisher, The
Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Aut. 1993, at 273, 283 [hereinafter
Fisher, Legislative Veto]; Louis Fisher, Separation of Powers: Interpretation Outside the Courts, 18 PEPP.
L. REV. 57, 80 (1990) [hereinafter Fisher, Interpretation Outside the Courts].
87
The Commission called for a “clear line of control from the President to these department
and agency heads and from him to their subordinates.” COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE
BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, GENERAL MANAGEMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH: A REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS 1 (1949) [hereinafter FIRST HOOVER COMM’N REP. ON EXEC. BRANCH]. The Commission
elaborated:
Responsibility and accountability are impossible without authority—the power to direct.
The exercise of authority is impossible without a clear line of command from the top to
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Truman recommended in 1949 that Congress make the President’s authority to
reorganize the government permanent and extend it to cover all governmental agencies,
including the independent regulatory commissions. In Truman’s eyes, “the new
reorganization act should be comprehensive in scope; no agency or function of the
executive branch should be exempted from its operation.”88 Truman’s growing support
for the unitariness of the executive branch, however, was still incomplete: his
recommendation continued to condone the legislative veto procedure contained in the
Reorganization Acts of 1939 and 1945 “whereby a reorganization plan submitted to the
Congress by the President becomes effective in 60 days unless rejected by both Houses of
Congress.”89

the bottom, and a return line of responsibility and accountability from the bottom to the
top.
Id. Far from posing a threat to free and responsible government, “strength and unity in an executive make
clear who is responsible for faults in administration and thus enable the legislature better to enforce
accountability to the people.” Id. at 2 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)). However,
such lines of authority and accountability “has been weakened, or actually broken in many places and in
many ways.” As the Commission found:
That line of responsibility still exists in constitutional theory, but it has been worn away
by administrative practices, by political pressures, and by detailed statutory provisions.
Statutory powers often have been vested in subordinate officers in such a way as to deny
authority to the President or a department head.
Id. at 4; see also Letter from Herbert Hoover to Kenneth McKellar (Jan. 13 1949), reprinted in S. REP. NO.
232, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1949) (“[W]e must reorganize the executive branch to give it the simplicity
of structure, the unity of purpose, and the clear line of executive authority that was originally intended
under the Constitution.”). Therefore, the Commission recommended that all agencies be placed within
executive departments and that all independent authorities granted to subordinate executive officials by
statute or appropriations rider be eliminated. FIRST HOOVER COMM’N REP. ON EXEC. BRANCH, supra, at
32, 34. The Commission also recommended that Congress not exempt any agencies from the President’s
reorganization authority, including in particular the independent regulatory commissions. Furthermore
Congress should not place any limitations based on an agency’s “independent exercise of quasi-legislative
or quasi-judicial functions.” Such phrases are too “vague and of uncertain meaning” and would only
inhibit the President’s proper control over the executive branch. Id. at x,-i.
88
Message from President Harry S. Truman to the Congress (Jan. 17, 1949), reprinted in S.
REP. NO. 232, supra note 87, at 4, 5.
89
Id. at 5. In support of this proposal, the Attorney General’s Office issued a memorandum
repudiating Attorney General Mitchell’s formalist critique of the legislative veto. The memorandum
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Congress accepted the gist of Truman’s proposal and removed all of the
exemptions except for those governing the Comptroller General and the General
Accounting Office. Congress did exact a price for surrendering its ability to protect
specific agencies that were of special interest to its members: it added the requirement
that all proposed changes to certain agencies be contained in a single reorganization plan
unmingled with reorganizations affecting other agencies and broadened the two-house
legislative veto into a one-house legislative veto.90
Truman immediately used this authority to assert greater Presidential control over
the independent agencies. Again building off of the recommendations of the First
Hoover Commission,91 Truman submitted a reorganization plan on June 20, 1949,

reasoned that legislative vetoes did not represent “an improper legislative encroachment upon the Executive
in the performance of functions delegated to him by the Congress. . . . [T]he authority given to the
President to reorganize the Government is legally and adequately vested in the President when the
Congress takes the initial step of passing a reorganization act.” Thus Congress simply reserved “the right
to disapprove action taken by the President under the statutory grant of authority.” Letter and
Memorandum from Peyton Ford, Assistant to the Attorney General, to John L. McClellan, Chairman of the
Senate Committee on Expenditures (Mar. 17, 1949), reprinted in S. REP. NO. 232, supra note 87, at 18, 20.
In fact, the memorandum did not regard the legislative veto as being any more sinister than a
provision requiring that the executive branch report its intended actions to Congress and then wait for a
specified period of time:
It cannot be questioned that the President in carrying out his Executive functions may
consult with whom he pleases. . . . There would appear to be no reason why the
Executive may not be given express statutory authority to communicate to the Congress
his intention to perform a given Executive function unless the Congress by some stated
means indicates its disapproval.
Id. at 20.

90

Reorganization Act of 1949, ch. 226, § 6(a), 63 Stat. 203, 205. See generally Ginnane,
supra note 85, at, 581-82; Watson, supra note 86, at 1014 n.143.
91
Although the Commission stopped short of the Brownlow Committee’s challenge to the
independent agencies’ constitutionality, it still leveled several criticisms at their structure. First, it
complained that the independent agencies’ exercise of executive authority was cumbersome and badly
coordinated with the rest of the executive branch. Therefore, the Commission recommended that “all
administrative responsibility be vested in the chairman of the commission,” THE COMMISSION ON
ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, REGULATORY COMMISSIONS: A
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 5 (1949), and that a number of executive functions be transferred to Cabinet
Departments, id. at 12-13. Finally, the Commission’s task force recommended that the President be given
the authority to designate and remove at will which of the particular commissioners would serve as
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making sweeping changes to bring the United States Maritime Commission under more
direct control of the executive branch.92 The following year, Truman submitted a similar
series of plans proposing that the executive and administrative functions of all of the
independent agencies be centralized in the Chairman and that the Chairman be made
appointable and removable at will by the President.93 Congress’s response demonstrated
the legislative veto’s effectiveness in interfering with the proper functioning of the
executive branch: Even though Congress had dropped the specific exemptions for the
independent agencies from the Reorganization Act of 1949, it was still able to frustrate
Truman’s efforts to assert greater control over the ICC, FCC, and NLRB by exercising its
legislative veto over the plans to reorganize those agencies.94
Perhaps in response to the mischief caused by these legislative vetoes, Truman
began objecting to the legislative veto as an improper interference with the independence
of the executive branch. Truman’s first such protest arose when Congress revived the
provision that had drawn the wrath of both Presidents Wilson and Hoover several

Chairman. TASK FORCE REPORT ON REGULATORY COMMISSIONS [APPENDIX N] PREPARED FOR THE
COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT viii, 13-14, 31-33
(1949). For similar views, see ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 68384(1941).
92
Reorg. Plan No. 6 of 1949, 3 C.F.R. 1001 (1948-1953 compilation). Another plan
abolished the United States Maritime Commission and transferred its functions in part to the Secretary of
Commerce and in part to the newly constituted, semi-independent Federal Maritime Board within the
Commerce Department. Reorg. Plan No. 21 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1012 (1948-1953 compilation); see also
Itzhak Zamir, Administrative Control of Administrative Action, 57 CAL. L. REV. 866, 903 n.180 (1969).
93
Reorg. Plan No. 7 of 1950, H.R. DOC. NO. 511, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (ICC);
Reorg. Plan No. 8 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1005 (1948-1953 compilation) (FTC); Reorg. Plan No. 9 of 1950, 3
C.F.R. 1005 (1948-1953 compilation) (FPC); Reorg. Plan No. 10 of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1006 (1948-1953
compilation) (SEC); Reorg. Plan No. 11 of 1950, H.R. DOC. NO. 515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (FCC);
Reorg. Plan No. 12 of 1950, H.R. DOC. NO. 516, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (NLRB); Reorg. Plan No. 13
of 1950, 3 C.F.R. 1006 (1948-1953 compilation) (Civil Aeronautics Board).
94
_; see also Angel M. Moreno, Presidential Coordination of the Independent Regulatory
Process, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 461, 486 (1994) (citing MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 134-37 (1955)).
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decades earlier95 requiring that government publications be subject to the prior approval
of the Joint Committee on Printing.96 Truman signed this legislation, but objected to it as
an “invasion of the rights of the Executive branch by a legislative committee.”97
Although Truman acknowledged Congress’s right to establish printing policies and to
place limits on the printing activities of the executive branch, “restrictions imposed by the
Congress should be left to the executive agencies to administer.”98 Although Truman did
propose substitute legislation to eliminate this problem, Congress took no action on it.99
Truman offered even stronger resistance to subsequent congressional efforts to
control executive discretion. In 1951, when Congress attempted to enact a provision
similar to one that Roosevelt had previously tolerated100 requiring that all significant
military real estate projects be approved in advance by the Armed Services Committees,
Truman drew the line. Concerned by Congress’s increasing tendency to attempt to
influence the execution and administration of the laws, Truman vetoed the legislation.
As Truman reasoned, “Under our system of government it is contemplated that the
Congress will enact the laws and will leave their administration and execution to the
executive branch.”101 The House voted 312 to 68 to override the veto.102 The Senate,
however, took no action, and the veto stood. Four months later, however, Congress was
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See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _.
Act of July 5, 1949, ch. 296, 63 Stat. 405, 406.
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Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President on Government Printing and Binding (July
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able to frustrate Truman’s efforts to oppose the legislative veto by attaching an almost
identical provision to the Military Construction Act of 1951.103 Because of the urgent
need for the legislation, the President had no choice but to sign it.104
Truman continued his opposition to legislative vetoes the following year when he
pocket vetoed a bill which would have required the Postmaster General to “come into
agreement” with the Public Works Committees before consummating lease-purchase
contracts for the construction of post offices. Truman objected because the bill
“contain[ed] a provision which would infringe upon the functions of the executive branch
to such an extent that I feel I cannot give my approval.”105 According to Truman, it was
improper to “giv[e] committees veto power over executive functions authorized by the
Congress to be carried out by executive agencies.”106 Thus, by the end of his term,
Truman’s metamorphosis into a steadfast opponent of the legislative veto was complete.
Truman’s vigor as president was further illustrated by the frequency of his vetoes.
McCoy describes the veto as “a significant weapon in Truman’s arsenal” and says “he
was among the presidents who used this weapon most often.”107 He “employed the veto
twenty-one times in 1945 and thirty-three times in 1946,” and “Congress did not override
any of these vetoes.”108 In the tradition of that great Democratic president, Andrew
Jackson, Truman liked to portray himself as “the tribune of the people” and as “the
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people’s president.”109 Truman cast himself as the people’s champion against the special
interest groups that held such sway with Congress. In the 1948 campaign, he saw the
contest as being between “Truman—the world class champion of peace, prosperity,
democracy, and the people—fighting against special interests at home and
authoritarianism abroad.”110 As Truman said explicitly on September 18, 1948 at a
campaign stop: “The issue is the people against the special interests.”111
Another major exercise of the executive power occurred when Truman invoked
the authority vested in him “by the Constitution and the laws of the United States” and
issued a pair executive orders directing all cabinet secretaries to institute programs to
ensure nondiscrimination in federal employment112 and in the military.113 That these
orders were based on the president’s inherent authority appears to have been no accident,
as evidenced by the fact that Truman invoked specific statutory authority when issuing a
similar executive order mandating nondiscrimination in government contracting.114
McCoy reports that “by the time Truman left office, the work of this committee would
lead to substantial racial integration in the military and to fairer procedures for promotion
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Exec. Order 10308, 3 C.F.R. 837 (1949-53 compilation); see also Note, Executive Order
11,246 and Reverse Discrimination Challenges: Presidential Authority to Require Affirmative Action, 54
N.Y.U. L. REV. 376, 382-83, 387 (1979) (concluding that Truman’s order was issued under his the
“presidential war powers” and “national defense powers” rather than under any statutory authority); United
States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 466 (5th Cir. 1977) (concluding that Truman issued
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referencing several statutory bases). But see Andrée Kahn Blumstein, Note, Doing Good the Wrong Way:
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and training.”115 Black Americans saw these executive orders as “unprecedented since
the time of Lincoln.”116 “By the end of the Truman administration, the air force, the
army, and the navy were largely integrated racially and opportunities for equal treatment
had been very much enhanced.”117 One of the Truman administration’s final actions as it
left office was to file in December of 1952 an amicus brief in Brown v. Board of
Education.118
One of the most famous controversies of the Truman Administration came over
the President’s decision to seize the steel mills with led to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
famous Steel Seizure decision—a decision which limits executive power but in a way that
is wholly consistent with the theory of the unitary executive. The steel crisis “had been
brewing since late 1951”119 when it became clear the United Steelworkers wanted a large
wage increase. On April 8, 1952, Truman directed his Commerce Secretary Charles
Sawyer “to take over and continue the operation of the steel mills, because a ‘work
stoppage would immediately jeopardize and imperil our national defense.’”120
Resolutions calling for “Truman’s impeachment were introduced in the House, and
attempts were made in the Senate to restrict the use of federal funds for operating the
steel mills. Most significant, court suits were initiated to resolve the situation legally.”121
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The district court issued an order enjoining the seizure on April 29th, and the government
took the case directly up to the Supreme Court for its resolution.122
In its brief in the Steel Seizure case, the Truman administration vigorously pressed
the view that the Vesting Clause of Article II is a generalized grant of power to the
President. The administration’s brief explicitly said:
Section 1 of Article II provides that “the executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America.” In our view, this clause
constitutes a grant of all the executive powers of which the government is
capable. Remembering that we do not have a parliamentary form of
Government but rather a tripartite system which contemplates a vigorous
executive, it seems plain that Clause 1 of Article II cannot be read as a
mere restricted definition which would leave the Chief Executive without
ready power to deal with emergencies.123
The brief also pointed to the Take Care Clause as construed in Cunningham v.
Neagle124 and in In re Debs125 as justifying President Truman’s seizure of the steel
mills.126 The brief went on to note numerous actions by Presidents where property was
taken in wartime beginning with the War of 1812 and continuing “during the
administrations of Presidents Lincoln, Wilson, and Franklin Roosevelt.”127 And, it also
cited Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young128 and United States v. Midwest Oil Co.129 for the
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proposition that constitutional power “when the text is doubtful, may be established by
usage.”130
The Steel Seizure case involved a far more sweeping claim of executive power
than we assert when we say the Vesting and Take Care Clauses give the president power
over removals and law execution. Thus, for our purposes the fact the Truman
Administration also claimed those clauses enabled it to seize the steel mills means only
that Truman is another in a long line of presidents to read the Article II Vesting Clause as
a grant of power to the president. The Supreme Court, of course, rebuffed the Truman
Administration in the Steel Seizure case and, most damagingly of all, Justice Robert
Jackson explicitly said in his famous concurrence that the Article II Vesting Clause is a
mere designation of the title of the President and is not an affirmative grant of the
executive power.131 Other justices did not follow Jackson on this point, with Justice Felix
Frankfurter in his concurrence accepting the notion that long-established custom or usage
could be a “gloss on the executive power” filling in its meaning.132 Obviously, this series
of articles is premised on the notion that presidential construction of the Vesting and
Take Care Clauses as authorizing a presidential power over removal and law execution is
supported by a tradition of executive branch construction over the last 215 years.
We agree with the Court’s ruling in Youngstown that the president’s executive
power did not authorize a seizure of the steel plants on the facts presented in that case.
We think this does not change the fact, however, that the Vesting Clause of Article II is a
sweeping grant of power to the president as the Truman administration argued it was.
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Nonetheless, as McCoy observes, “Seldom had the Supreme Court so soundly rebuffed a
president.”133 Truman “had gambled badly, and he had lost badly.”134 Truman “did not,
however, defy the Supreme Court, for the government immediately relinquished control
of the steel mills.”135
Truman’s foreign policy was led Secretary of State George C. Marshall who had
been army chief of staff during World War II.136 Truman and Marshall announced a
program known as the Truman Doctrine under which the United States committed itself
to intervene with aid to assist peoples such as those in Greece and Turkey who were
resisting communist subversion. We saw in our earlier articles that major statements of
foreign policy such as Washington’s Neutrality Proclamation or the Monroe Doctrine
were treated as exercises of “the executive Power.” The Truman Doctrine was another
such exercise of power, and it was widely recognized” as representing “a major
reorientation of United States foreign policy.”137 As 1936 Republican presidential
nominee Alf Landon said, “We are in European power politics up to our necks, and in it
to stay.”138 The Truman Doctrine was followed up by the Marshall Plan to aid the war
ravaged countries of Western Europe so that they would not fall to communism.139 The
plan was fully backed by Truman but its identification with the “soldier-secretary of
state” made it easier to sell in a bipartisan manner on Capital Hill.140 The Truman
Doctrine and Marshall Plan marked “the end of the Pax Britannica, and the establishment
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instead of the Pax Americana over what was coming to be known as the ‘Free
World.’”141
Thus, by the end of his tenure in the White House, Truman had adopted a position
largely consistent with the unitary executive, strongly defending the President’s removal
power, using his reorganization powers to assert his control over the independent
agencies, and objecting to the legislative veto as an unconstitutional infringement on the
President’s power to execute the laws. Truman stopped short of condemning the
independent agencies as unconstitutional and did permit the enactment of a few
additional legislative vetoes without registering any objection.142 Yet Truman’s level of
opposition to congressional infringements on the unitary executive on constitutional
grounds was probably sufficient to preclude the inference that Truman acquiesced in
them for the purposes of coordinate construction.
II.

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

In sharp contrast to his immediate predecessors, Dwight D. Eisenhower did not
aspire to be an activist President. As a career soldier, he considered it his duty to remain
above politics, and he consistently strove to remain behind the scenes when guiding
national policy. As his biographers, Chester J. Pach, Jr., and Elmo Richardson, observe,
“At a time of widespread discontent with the ‘imperial presidency,’ restraint in the
exercise of presidential power looked far more attractive than it had a decade earlier.”143
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The general consensus of historians, however, is that Eisenhower “only appeared
to be a passive chief executive. He actually used his power vigorously and deftly, but
often behind the scenes, to achieve his goals.”144 One of the reasons why people believed
Eisenhower was not in control of his administration was because he would sometimes
deliberately duck questions at press conferences by pretending to garble his syntax. Pach
and Richardson note, “Critics seized upon such responses as evidence that the president
did not know what was going on in his own administration. Usually, he did, but his
spontaneous oral statements seemed to suggest otherwise.”145 Eisenhower’s penchant for
behind the scenes management of his administration has led political scientist Fred I.
Greenstein to label “this method of governing ‘hidden-hand leadership.’ Eisenhower
made the critical policy decisions, but he carefully muffled his responsibility.”146 Pach
and Richardson note that a cost of hidden-hand leadership is that “it created the
appearance that Eisenhower was not in charge of his own administration” even when he
was in fact highly skilled politically.147
Another reason Eisenhower was not perceived as being actively in charge of his
administration was his penchant for delegation. Eisenhower’s leadership style was very
much the product of his prior career as a general. Pach and Richardson report:
As supreme Allied commander and army chief of staff, Eisenhower
became highly experienced in managing large organizations, reconciling
divergent factions, choosing subordinates who could act responsibly, and
making decisions on the most vital issues. From his military career,
Eisenhower derived a set of beliefs—the importance of teamwork, the
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need for clear lines of authority, an abhorrence of partisanship—that
shaped his presidency.148
Eisenhower ran his Administration in much the same manner.
Rather than grapple with matters that puzzled or bored him, he acted as
any general would—he delegated the task to a subordinate. John Foster
Dulles thus handled foreign affairs; George M. Humphrey shaped
economic policy; Sherman Adams took responsibility for a host of
domestic matters. . . . The president presided over his administration, but
he did not run it.149
Eisenhower also relied heavily upon his Attorney General designate, Herbert Brownell,
Jr., and on his longtime friend and associate, Gen. Lucius D. Clay, in picking the other
members of his cabinet.150 He was also the first president to “accord[] cabinet status to
the director of the Bureau of the Budget, Joseph M. Dodge”151—an office created under
the Harding administration and moved to the White House by FDR.152
Eisenhower’s willingness to delegate responsibility should not be confused with a
lack of willingness to assert control over the conduct of his administration:
Contemporaries often misunderstood Eisenhower’s style of leadership;
they mistook, for example, his delegation of authority for his abdication of
it. Despite these misapprehensions, Eisenhower was in control of his
presidency from its inception. Indeed during the months between his
election and inauguration, he carefully organized an administration that
reflected his style of leadership and his assessment of the needs of the
nation.153
Eisenhower took several steps to enhance and assert his authority to direct and
review the actions of his subordinates. When Congress included a provision in the
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 requiring the Secretary of Defense to submit his
148
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reorganization plans directly to Congress without presidential oversight,154 Eisenhower
ignored the absence of such a provision and flatly instructed the Secretary to submit any
such plans to him before transmitting them to Congress.155 Eisenhower also
unsuccessfully backed the Second Hoover Commission’s recommendation that all federal
legal services be consolidated in the Department of Justice.156 Even without such
centralization, Eisenhower did not hesitate to intervene in the legal affairs of the federal
government, at one point even personally drafting part of the brief in Brown v. Board of
Education.157
Indeed, Brown set the stage for one of the most courageous examples of
presidential determination to enforce the law in our nation’s history. After the Court
handed down its landmark opinion in Brown, Eisenhower made it clear that his duty as
president and citizen was compliance with the Supreme Court’s order: “The Supreme
Court has spoken and I am sworn to uphold the constitutional processes in this country;
and I will obey.”158 Pach and Richardson note, “Indeed only a day after the decision,
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Eisenhower asked the Board of Commissioners of the District of Columbia to set an
example of peaceful desegregation.”159
In September of 1957, Little Rock, Arkansas, erupted in violent opposition to
court-ordered school integration. Eisenhower denounced the “mob of extremists” and
pledged to use “whatever force may be necessary . . . to carry out the orders of the
Federal Court.”160 Hours later, Eisenhower ordered “Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, the army
chief of staff, to dispatch 1,000 paratroopers from the 101st Airborne Division to Little
Rock” and federalized the Arkansas National Guard.161 Eisenhower felt a critical sense
of duty “to protect the Constitution and uphold federal law. Despite his own reservations
about the Brown decision, he could not turn his back on a mob that tried to substitute its
will for that of a federal judge. ‘If the day comes when we can obey orders of our Courts
only when we personally approve of them,’ he reminded Swede Hazlett, ‘the end of the
American system, as we know it, will not be far off.’”162
It was for this reason, that Dwight D. Eisenhower became the first president since
Ulysses S. Grant to send troops to the South to the civil rights of African Americans.163
The sending of U.S. troops to Little Rock “served notice that riotous obstruction of
federal court orders might provoke the armed intervention of the national government, a
possibility that had been unthinkable for eighty years.”164 Eisenhower further opposed
racial discrimination by renewing and extending the executive orders first initiated during
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the FDR and Truman Administrations165 prohibiting discrimination in federal contracting
and employment. Unlike his predecessors, Eisenhower explicitly based his orders on
statutory rather than constitutional grounds.166
The Eisenhower Administration also preserved the unitariness of the executive
branch through his policies with respect to the civil service system. As of the 1950s, the
civil service laws did not impose any substantive limits on the president’s removal
power.167 The governing statute provided that officials could be removed from the civil
service “only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service.”168 Although
on its face this language would appear to give federal officials covered by the civil
service laws substantive protections against dismissal, both the executive branch and the
courts had repeatedly construed this language as not placing any limits on the executive
branch’s unlimited discretion in determining what constitutes adequate cause for
removal.169 Congress had enacted the Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 giving veterans
certain procedural protections, providing them with written notice of removals, the right
to submit a reply, and the right to appeal adverse disciplinary actions to the Civil Service
Commission.170 The 1944 legislation did not alter the substantive standards governing
removal, and courts continued to construe it as not placing any restrictions on the
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exercise of the president’s removal authority.171 For example, in Bailey v. Richardson,172
the D.C. Circuit reviewed what it regarded as an unbroken 160-year history of judicial
noninterference in removals and concluded, “No function is more completely internal to a
branch of government than the selection and retention or dismissal of its employees.”173
The Civil Service Commission was thus limited to conducting informal investigations to
ensure compliance with procedural requirements,174 even decisions with respect to
procedural compliance were not made binding on agencies until 1948.175
The Supreme Court would acknowledge one narrow restriction on the president’s
removal power by protecting federal employees against dismissal for exercising
constitutionally protected activity.176 Such a limitation was concededly quite narrow177
and was also consistent with the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1883 preventing
supervisors from requiring federal employees to pay political assessments or engage in
political activity in order to keep their jobs.178 Most importantly, the Court would
subsequently make clear that the doctrine prohibiting removals for the exercise of

171

See Levy v. Woods, 171 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Asher v. Forrestal, 71 F. Supp. 470,
471 (D.D.C. 1947); Culligan v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 222, 223 (1946). See generally Yoo et al., supra
note 24, at _.
172
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
173
Id. at 58.
174
See Egon Guttman, The Development and Exercise of Appellate Powers in Adverse
Action Appeals, 19 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 331 (1970).
175
Act of June 22, 1948, ch. 604, § _, 62 Stat. 575, _. See Merrill, supra note 167, at 213.
176
The seminal case is Wieman v. Updegraff, 343 U.S. 183 (1952). See also Pickering v.
Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46, 69 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (Edgerton, J., dissenting), aff’d mem. by an equally divided Court, 341
U.S. 918 (1951).
177
See Gerald E. Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service
Employees?, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 942, 972-74 (1976). For example, it does not bar the limits on federal
employees’ political activities by the Hatch Act. See Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946).
178
See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _.

38

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

constitutionally protected activity did not apply to removals related to job performance.179
This would be demonstrated most eloquently by the Court’s decision in Cafeteria and
Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy,180 in which the Court “summarily denied” the
existence of limits on the removal power in cases involving “the Federal Government’s
dispatch of its own affairs.”181 The Court indicated that the executive branch had the
unfettered discretion to deny a security clearance to an employee of a government
contractor whose garrulousness posed a security risk.182
At times, the Civil Service Commission did seek a greater role in reviewing the
substance of agency removal decisions.183 This recommendation was effectively quashed
by the harsh criticism of it leveled by the Second Hoover Commission. As the
Commission noted:
A judicial proceeding . . . leads to the worst kind of supervisor-employee
relations because it requires the building of a written record and the
accumulation of formal evidence sufficient to stand up as a support for the
supervisor’s action. It relieves the employee of any necessity for
demonstrating his competence and usefulness to his department, and in
effect, guarantees him a job unless his supervisor can prove in a formal
proceeding that he is incompetent. This leads to working situations which
are intolerable. If the supervisor acts on his best judgment, he normally
disciplines or separates an employee as soon as the misconduct occurs or
the incompetence is evident. Bu, if he does o, he may be unable to
substantiate his action judicially because he has not waited to accumulate
documentary evidence.184
The Eisenhower Administration also strongly asserted the unitariness of the
executive branch by exerting control over the independent agencies. Drawing again upon
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the recommendations of the Second Hoover Commission185 and a report by Professor
Emmette Redford requested by the president towards the end of his administration, which
emphasized the need for greater presidential control over the independent agencies in
order to insure proper leadership and guidance in policy development,186 Eisenhower
employed a wide variety of means to influence the independent agencies, by conducting
policy studies on specific areas of agency jurisdiction; jawboning individual
commissioners; issuing policy statements and suggestions; and notifying the
commissions about his budgetary and legislative priorities.187 Eisenhower even tried to
turn the commission chairmen into executive officers by giving them second hats as
special assistants to the President. However, this “practice was soon eliminated because
of the jealousy of other agency members and opposition in Congress.”188 Although the
Eisenhower Administration did not completely ignore the agencies supposed
independence,189 there can be little question that it asserted sufficient control over them to
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foreclose any suggestion that Eisenhower acceded to this form of interference with the
unitariness of the executive branch.
The issue of presidential control over the independent agencies came to a head
when Eisenhower removed Myron Wiener and Georgia Lusk after they refused to resign
from the War Claims Commission, a body created to provide compensation to persons
injured by the enemy during World War II. Eisenhower based his actions solely on the
importance of presidential superintendence over the execution of federal law, noting that
he “regard[ed] it as in the national interest to complete the administration of the War
Claims Act of 1948, as amended, with personnel of my own selection.”190
Wiener brought suit in the Court of Claims challenging his removal, and the case
eventually reached the Supreme Court.191 In its brief, the Eisenhower Administration
defended its actions primarily on unitariness grounds.192 The brief began its summary of
argument section by stating:
A constitutional usage which goes back to the very first year in
which the Constitution became effective establishes that the President has
the unlimited power to remove all the “officers of the United States”
appointed by him, subject only to constitutional or statutory restrictions
with respect to non-executive officers.
The President’s removal power rests essentially on three
considerations: first, the canon of construction well known to the
Founding Fathers that the power to appoint carries with it the power to
remove; second, the President’s constitutional duty to take care that the
laws be faithfully executed—a duty which cannot be performed if the
President is unable to control the officers who carry out the laws; and
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third, the postulate of executive unity—i.e., that the President is the head
of the entire executive branch.193
The brief went on to argue two clearly correct propositions, both of which were
destined to be rejected by the Supreme Court. First, the brief argued that Wiener was a
core executive employee and that he was thus outside the ambit of Humphrey’s Executor
v. United States,194 which sanctioned congressionally imposed limitations on the
president’s removal power of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial officers. Second, the
brief argued that even if Wiener were seen as being a quasi-judicial employee, the case
was still outside the ambit of Humphrey’s Executor because Congress had been utterly
silent about removal in the statute setting up the War Claims Commission. In Shurtleff v.
United States,195 the Supreme Court had previously imposed a clear statement rule,
holding that it would not construe any statute as limiting the president’s removal power
unless Congress employed “very clear and explicit language” indicating that such was its
intent.196 Statutory language merely stating that an officer may be removed for
“inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance in office” was not sufficient.197 As the Court of
Claims had noted,198 the statute at issue in Wiener was completely silent as to removal,
providing only that the Commission wind up its affairs no later than three years after the
last claim was filed.199 Under Shurtleff, the government argued, the relevant statute
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should not be construed as limiting the president’s unfettered authority to remove
Wiener.
In a remarkably brief and thinly reasoned opinion by Justice Frankfurter, the
Supreme Court unanimously concluded that Eisenhower lacked the power to remove
Wiener even though, as the Court twice noted, the statute did not purport to place any
limits on the removal power.200 Instead, the Court inferred Congress’s desire to impose
such limits from the fact that War Claims Commissioners were quasi-judicial officers.201
In so holding, the Court took the remarkable step of implicitly reversing the presumption
acknowledged in Shurtleff against construing statutes as limiting the removal power, at
least when quasi-judicial officers were involved. To do so without any significant
analysis of the considerations that led the Shurtleff Court to erect the presumption in the
first place was quite unfortunate.
From the standpoint of politics, Wiener can be regarded as the converse of
Humphrey’s Executor. While Humphrey’s Executor represented an attempt by a largely
conservative Supreme Court to snub a president who was considerably more
progressive,202 Wiener represented a decision by a mostly New Deal Supreme Court that
rebuked a president seeking to take the administration of federal law in a different
direction. For purposes of this article, it matters little that the Eisenhower
Administration’s arguments in Wiener ultimately proved unsuccessful.203 What matters
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is that the Eisenhower Administration’s defense of the removal power effectively
undercuts any inference of acquiescence by Eisenhower to a non-unitary executive under
the principles of coordinate construction regardless of whether the other branches
eventually accepted Eisenhower’s position.
Just as Eisenhower was content to assume more of a background, supervisory role
in the conduct of executive affairs, Eisenhower was similarly measured in his direct
dealings with Congress, insisting that FDR and Truman “had upset the constitutional
equilibrium between the White House and Capitol Hill and promis[ing] to exercise
restraint in order to restore the balance.”204 His desire to rebalance the relationship
between the presidency and Congress should not be taken as reluctance to defend against
attempts to infringe upon the unitariness of the executive branch. As we shall see,
Eisenhower resolutely defended presidential prerogatives
Most notably Eisenhower exceeded the efforts of the Truman Administration in
opposing the legislative veto as an improper infringement on the president’s prerogative
to execute the law.205 Eisenhower’s first such objection appeared in his May 25, 1954,
veto of a bill that would have required the Secretary of the Army to “come into
agreement” with both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees before
transferring the Camp Blanding Military Reservation to the State of Florida. Eisenhower
vetoed the bill because “plac[ing] the power to make such agreement jointly in the
Secretary of the Army and the members of the Committees on Armed Services,” the bill
“violate[d] the fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers prescribed in

Form, Substance, and Administrative Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 750 (1987).
204
Id. at 50.
205
Watson, supra note 86, at 1021.
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articles I and II of the Constitution which place the legislative power in the Congress and
the executive power in the executive branch.”206 Eisenhower supported this conclusion
with a forceful exposition against placing executive functions outside of the executive
branch:
The making of such a contract or agreement on behalf of the United States
is a purely executive or administrative function, like the negotiation and
execution of government contracts generally. Thus, while congress may
enact legislation governing the making of Government contracts, it may
not delegate to its members or committees the power to make such
contracts, either directly or by giving o them a power to approve or
disapprove a contract which an executive officer proposes to make.207
Echoing Hamilton’s pronouncements in The Federalist No. 70, Eisenhower concluded
that “such a procedure destroys the clear lines of responsibility for results which the
Constitution provides.”208
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Dwight D. Eisenhower, Veto Message (May 25, 1954), reprinted in 100 CONG. REC.

7135 (1954).
207

Id.
Id.; see also Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86, at 283; Watson, supra note 86, at
1021. Other members of the Eisenhower Administration had already voiced their opposition to the
legislative veto during the debates on a proposal similar to the one pocket vetoed by Truman, see supra
notes 105-106 and accompanying text, that would have required the Administrator of General Services or
the Postmaster General to come into agreement with the Committees on Public Works before acquiring
property for the construction of post offices. H.R. 6342, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). The Justice
Department issued a memorandum objecting that such a provision would violate Article II of the
Constitution, which “vests the Executive power in the President and directs that ‘he shall take are that the
laws be faithfully execute.” Memorandum from J. Lee Rankin to Senator Knowland (Apr. 8, 1954),
reprinted in 100 CONG. REC. 4879 (1954). Although Congress could overturn a particular executive action
through formal legislation, “Congress may not through its committees administer or share in the
administration of a statute.” Id. Allowing Congress to interfere in this matter would represent “a departure
from our constitutional practice which, if systemically pursued, could result in a radical change in the
distribution of the powers of the Federal Government.” Id. After the Senate declined to delete this
provision by a vote of 60 to 8, 100 CONG. REC. 10017 (1954), the Justice Department transmitted an even
more detailed memorandum to the Chairman of the House Committee on Public Works. In response to
these objections and Eisenhower’s veto of the Camp Blanding legislation, the Conference Committee
struck the committee veto provision and replaced with a requirement directed at Congress prohibiting the
appropriation of any funds without prior approval had been given by the Public Works Committee. Act of
July 22, 1954, ch. 560, § 411, 68 Stat. 518, 519; see also Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act of
1954, ch. 676, § 2, 68 Stat. 666, 666 (applying similar provision to “works of improvement”). Since this
restriction was directed at Congress and not the executive, Attorney General Brownell advised Eisenhower
to sign the bill. See generally 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 300, 305 (1957); Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86,
at 284; Watson, supra note 86, at 1023 (HARRIS, supra note 99, at 231).
208
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Eisenhower continued his opposition to the legislative veto the following year in a
signing statement accompanying the Defense Appropriations Act of 1956.209 In an
attempt to thwart Eisenhower’s attempt to privatize many of the Department of Defense’s
functions, Congressmen whose districts contained military facilities likely to be adversely
affected attached a rider requiring that the Administration justify to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees that the “discontinuance is economically sound and the work
is capable of performance by a contractor without danger to the national security” before
transferring of work to a contractor and by subjecting all such transfers to a committee
veto.210 Eisenhower signed the bill even though he believed that the justification and
committee veto provisions were unconstitutional. In language reminiscent of his
objections to the Camp Blanding bill, Eisenhower acknowledged that “Congress has the
power and the right to grant or to deny an appropriation.”211 However, “once an
appropriation is made the appropriation must, under the Constitution be administered by
the executive branch of the Government alone, and the Congress has no right to confer
upon its committees the power to veto Executive action or to prevent Executive action
from becoming effective.”212 In so observing, Eisenhower embraced a strongly formalist
vision of the separation of powers: “The Constitution of the United States divides the

209

Defense Appropriations Act of 1956, ch. 157, 69 Stat. 301.
§ 638, 69 Stat. at 321.
211
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Special Message to the Congress upon Signing the Department of
Defense Appropriation Act (July 13, 1955), in 1955 PUB. PAPERS 688, 689 [hereinafter Eisenhower,
Defense Authorization Signing Statement]. In issuing this signing statement, Eisenhower relied upon an
opinion offered by Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., concluding that the legislative veto provision
violated Article II of the Constitution by “usurp[ing] power confided to the executive branch” and by
intruding into the authority “to engage in the administration and execution of the law” which “by
constitutional warrant, has been the responsibility and right of the executive branch since the founding of
our constitutional form of government.” 41 Op. Att’y Gen. 230, 231 (1955). Brownell also anticipated the
Supreme Court’s decision in Chadha by noting that the provision raised problems under Article I as well.
Id. See generally Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86, at 283-84.
212
Eisenhower, Defense Authorization Signing Statement, supra note 211, at 689.
210
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functions of the Government into three departments—the legislative, the executive, and
the judicial—and establishes the principle that they shall be kept separate. Neither may
exercise functions belonging to the others.”213 Accordingly, Eisenhower felt “bound to
insist that Executive functions be maintained unimpaired by legislative encroachment”
and refused “[t]o acquiesce in a provision that seeks to encroach upon the proper
authority of the Executive.”214 Therefore, Eisenhower insisted that “to the extent that this
section seeks to give to the Appropriations Committees of the Senate and House of
Representatives authority to veto or prevent Executive action, such section will be
regarded as invalid by the executive branch of the Government . . . unless otherwise
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.”215
Eisenhower’s announced refusal to enforce the provision touched off a
confrontation between the President and the Comptroller General. Recognizing his role
as “the agent of the Congress,” the Comptroller General informed Congress that he would
enforce the law and disallow any covered expenditure which did not gain committee
approval.216 Facing personal liability for issuing checks without the Comptroller
General’s approval, the Defense Department personnel ignored the President’s wishes
and complied with the committee veto provision. Further conflict was averted when the
provision was dropped the following year.217
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214
215
216

1955).

Id. at 688-89.
Id. at 689.
Id.
Porter Hardy, Jr., No. B-124985, 1955 WL 1368 ,1955 WL 2073 (Comp. Gen. Aug. 17,
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The withdrawal of this provision did not signal any acquiescence to the President’s
position by Congress. Congress intended to shift the committee veto from the Appropriations Committees
to the Armed Services Committees. However, the bill transferring the committee veto died in the Senate.
See generally Watson, supra note 86, at 1022-23 (citing HARRIS, supra note 99, at 229-30).
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Three days after signing the Defense Appropriations Act, Eisenhower vetoed yet
another bill because it contained two legislative veto provisions.218 As before,
Eisenhower indicated that such committee vetoes “would destroy the clear lines of
responsibility which the Constitution provides.”219 In response to the veto, Congress
changed the veto into a “report and wait” provision, which afforded executive action the
force of law, but delayed its effective date for a fixed amount of time so that Congress
could decide whether to enact formal legislation revoking the action.220 Because “report
and wait” provisions do not purport to give Congress the authority to effect a change in
the law without having to comply with the constitutionally required process for enacting
legislation, this amendment eliminated Eisenhower’s constitutional concerns. Congress
later returned to the legislative veto by enacting a provision requiring that all contracts
authorized by the Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956 be approved by a

218

Dwight D. Eisenhower, Veto of Bill Authorizing Certain Construction at Military
Installations (July 16, 1956), in 1956 PUB. PAPERS 596 (vetoing H.R. 9893, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 1956)).
Section 301 of the bill made the authorizations for the Talos missile program contingent upon an agreement
between the Secretary of Defense and the Armed Services Committees of each House. Section 419
imposed a similar requirement on contracts for the construction and acquisition of housing for military
families. Id. at 596-97.
219
Id. at 597. Eisenhower further noted:
While the Congress may enact legislation governing the making of Government
contracts, it may not constitutionally delegate to its Members or committees the power to
make such contracts, either directly or by giving them the authority to approve or
disapprove a contract which an executive officer proposes to make.
Two years ago I returned, without m approval, a bill . . . containing similar
provisions. At that time I stated that such provisions violate the fundamental
constitutional principle of separation of powers prescribed in articles I and II of the
Constitution which place the legislative power in the Congress and the executive power
in the executive branch.
Once again, I must object to such a serious departure from the separation of
powers as provided by the Constitution. Any such departure from constitutional
procedures must be avoided.
Id. Again anticipating Chadha, Eisenhower also challenged it as a violation of the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Article I, section 7, of the Constitution. Id.
220
Act of Aug. 3, 1956, ch. 939, § 419, 70 Stat. 991, 1018-19; see also Watson, supra note
86, at 1021 n.190.
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congressional committee.221 Eisenhower again registered his constitutional objections.
To the extent that committee vetoes could be regarded as an executive act, it constituted
an “an unconstitutional infringement of the separation of powers prescribed in Articles I
and II of the Constitution.”222 As Eisenhower further explained:
I do not believe that the Congress can validly delegate to one of its
committees the power to prevent executive actions taken pursuant to law.
To do so in this case would be to divide the responsibility for
administering the program between the Secretary of the Interior. Such a
procedure would be a clear violation of the separation of powers within
the Government and would destroy the lines of responsibility which the
Constitution provides.223
The Committee veto also violated Article II by itself. As Eisenhower noted:
[T]he negotiation and execution of a contract is a purely executive
function. Although the Congress may prescribe the standards and
conditions under which executive officials may enter into contracts, it may
not lodge in its committees or members the power to make such contracts,
either by giving them the power to approve or disapprove a contract which
an executive officer proposes to make.224
Eisenhower nonetheless “approved this bill only because the Congress is not in session to
receive and act upon a veto message and because I have been assured that the committees
which handled the bill in the Congress will take action to correct its deficiencies early in
the next session.”225 In the meantime, the President directed the Secretary of the Interior
to initiate the programs covered by the Act in the expectation that Congress would
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Small Reclamation Projects Act of 1956, ch. 7, § 4(c), 70 Stat. 1044, 1045.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President upon Signing the Small Reclamation
Projects Act of 1956 (Aug. 6, 1956), in 1956 PUB. PAPERS 648, 649.
223
Id. at 649-50. Alternatively, to the extent to which the committee veto exercised a
legislative function, “the section is open to the objection that it involves an unlawful delegation by the
Congress to its committees of a legislative function which the constitution contemplates the Congress itself,
as an entity, should exercise.” Id. at 649. See generally JOHN R. BOLTON, THE LEGISLATIVE VETO:
UNSEPARATING THE POWERS 11-12 (1977).
224
Id. at 650.
225
Id. at 649.
222
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remove or revise the objectionable section.226 As Eisenhower predicted, Congress
replaced the committee veto with a “no appropriation” provision the next session.227
Although Eisenhower did accede without objection to a few legislative vetoes,228
Eisenhower subsequently objected to a provision providing a two-house legislative veto
over TVA power projects,229 successfully called for the repeal of the provision enacted
during the Truman Administration giving a legislative veto to a single member of
Congress,230 and questioned the constitutionality of a provision subjecting the Attorney
General’s decisions to parole certain refugees into the United States to a legislative
veto231 that would eventually give rise to the decision in INS v. Chadha232
But Eisenhower’s most sustained opposition to the legislative veto was his
attempt to overturn the committee veto in the Military Construction Act of 1951 (to

226
227

Id. at 650.
Act of June 5, 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-47, § _, 71 Stat. 48, 49; see also Watson, supra note

86, at 1024.
228

Notably, Congress included a one-house veto in the Reorganization Act of 1957, Pub. L.
No. 85-286, 71 Stat. 611, and the Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-599, § 3, 72 Stat.
514, 514-58. In 1960, at the request of the General Services Administration, Congress also restored a
committee veto provision to the Public Buildings Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-249, § 7, 73 Stat. 479, 480;
see also Act of July 12, 1960, Pub L. No. 86-626, 74 Stat. 425, 431; Act of Sept. 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86722, 74 Stat. 821, 826. See generally Watson, supra note 86, at 1014. n.143, 1025 & nn.214-15.
229
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President Upon Singing a Bill Amending the
Tennessee Valley Authority Act (Aug. 6, 1959), in 1959 PUB. PAPERS 566 (objecting to Act of Aug. 14,
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-157, 73 Stat. 338); see also Joseph Cooper & Ann Cooper, The Legislative Veto and
the Constitution, 30 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 467, 471 n.11 (1962).
230
See Watson, supra note 86, at 1020 (citing HARRIS, supra note 99, at 1020).
231
Eisenhower noted:
The Attorney General has advised me that there is a serious question as to whether this
provision is constitutional. Nevertheless, in view of the short period for which this power
is given and the improbability that the issue will arise, it is believed that it would be
better to defer a determination of the effect of such possible action until it is taken.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President upon Signing Bill Providing for the Admission of
Refugees (July 14, 1960), 1960 PUB. PAPERS 579, 579. As the Chadha decision attests, Eisenhower was
wrong in his estimates both of the act’s limited duration and of the likelihood of conflict arising under it.
232
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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which Truman had acceded233) subjecting all major military real estate transactions to the
approval of the Armed Services Committees.234 Bolstered by the recommendations of
the second Hoover Commission235 and the criticism of other Administration officials,236
Eisenhower’s 1961 Budget Message directed the Secretary of Defense to “disregard the
section unless a court of competent jurisdiction determines otherwise.”237 Finally
Congress relented and converted the committee veto into a constitutionally permissible
“report and wait” requirement.238
Eisenhower took a number of other steps to defend the president’s sole authority
to execute the law. Eisenhower quietly opposed an amendment to the U.S. Constitution
proposed by Senator John Bricker designed to curb presidential power over foreign
affairs by barring the use of executive agreements and prohibiting the negotiation of any
treaty that abridged constitutional rights or affected “any other matters essentially within

233

See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
Military Construction Act of 1951, ch. 434, § 601, 65 Stat. 336, 365.
235
“The commission . . . questions the appropriateness of congressional committee
participation in the executive function of operation on the ground that it is an invasion of the executive by
the legislative branch.” COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT, REAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT 35-36 (1955); see also COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, TASK FORCE REPORT ON REAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
92-94, 99 (1955).
236
41 Op. Att’y Gen. 300 (1957); Letter from _ to Senator McClellan (Apr. 27, 1956), _.
237
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30, 1961, H.R. DOC. NO. 255, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. I, at M18 (1960).
238
Act of June 8, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-500, § 2662, 74 Stat. 166, 186-87; H.R. REP. NO.
1307, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 43-45 (1960). It was no coincidence that the vast majority of the legislative
veto provisions that Eisenhower blocked were aimed at the acquisition and disposition of military facilities.
See Watson, supra note 86, at 1023-25. As Professor Calabresi has noted, the incentives that members of
Congress face leave them little choice but to try to protect the interests of their local constituencies even
when those actions would be ill advised as a matter of national policy. See Calabresi, Some Normative
Arguments, supra note 9, at 34-35, 58-70. Thus it is unsurprising that Congress has most strenuously
attempted to inject itself into the execution of the laws in those situations where the consequences for local
constituencies were the greatest. As Professor Joseph Harris noted, AThe requirement of advance approval
by congressional subcommittees enables members of Congress to resist the closing of military installations
in their districts, and it cannot be doubted that the effect is to force the retention that in the interest of
economy should be closed.” HARRIS, supra note 99, at 223.
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the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.”239 Eisenhower steadfastly opposed the
amendment on the grounds that it would “cripple the Executive power to the point that
we [would] become helpless in world affairs.”240 On the issue of executive privilege
Eisenhower dealt Senator Joe McCarthy a “stunning blow by invoking executive
privilege to prevent congressional interrogation of members of the executive branch.”241
Pach and Richardson call this “the boldest assertion of executive privilege in the history
of the republic.”242
Like Harry Truman and James Monroe before him, Eisenhower also became
known for a major foreign policy position—the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine. Under
this Doctrine Eisenhower sought foreign aid money and was willing to deploy troops in
the general area of the Middle East to deter the forces of “International Communism.”243
“This program, which soon became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, would ‘give
courage and confidence to those who are dedicated to freedom and thus prevent a chain
of events which would gravely endanger all of the free world.”244 The president, over the
reservations of democratic senators, pushed a resolution through Congress indicating that
the U.S. was willing at the president’s behest to use its armed forces to protect any
Middle Eastern nation in repelling Communist aggression.245
Thus, by the end of his Administration, Eisenhower had defended the removal
power, had asserted his control over the executive branch and the independent agencies,
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97 CONG. REC. 8258, 8265 (1951).
Id. at 60.
Id. at 70.
Id.
PACH & RICHARDSON, supra note 158, at 161.
Id.
Id.
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had resisted congressional attempts to interfere with the execution of the laws through the
legislative veto, and had taken other actions to assert the unitariness of the executive
branch. Although he did waver at times in his opposition, these minor variations cannot
be said to have been sufficient to constitute acquiescence to a non-unitary vision of the
executive branch.
III.

JOHN F. KENNEDY

John F. Kennedy became the youngest elected president ever in American history.
Kennedy viewed his presidency as being “in the Democratic tradition of Woodrow
Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and Harry Truman.”246 Like those individuals, “[h]e sought
to be a strong, active president.”247 His splendid inaugural address immediately
demonstrated his talent for using the bully pulpit of the presidency. His call for national
service—“Ask not what you country can do for you, ask what you can do for your
country”248—helped to inspire a generation of Americans to commit themselves to
anticommunism abroad and the protection of civil rights at home. It also marked a return
to vision of the presidency as a leader and shaper of public opinion. James Giglio,
Kennedy’s biographer, reports:
John Kennedy was one of the most image-conscious presidents of his
century. The imagery sharpened during the presidential years. As
president he could better shape favorable symbols, realizing that personal
style could counter political frustration, mask ineptness, and create
popularity in a media oriented society. Much of the imagery centered on
family life.249
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JAMES N. GIGLIO, THE PRESIDENCY OF JOHN F. KENNEDY 29 (1991).
Id.
John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1961), in 1961 PUB. PAPERS 1, 3.
GIGLIO, supra note 246, at 255.
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Like Teddy Roosevelt, whose family and athletic prowess added greatly to his political
appeal, Kennedy created an image of athletic youthfulness that contrasted sadly with the
almost constant physical pain caused by his back problems throughout his presidency.
From the outset of his administration, Kennedy was determined to exercise full
control over the executive branch, illustrated most dramatically illustrated by his decision
to appoint his brother, Robert, to be Attorney General. Although the decision drew
significant criticism, the President “knew that in Robert Kennedy he had his most trusted
associate on board.”250 It would be hard for a president to do more to retain control over
the law execution function than by appointing his closest sibling and former campaign
manager to run his Justice Department.
In structuring his cabinet and White House staff, Kennedy was critical of the
extent to which Eisenhower had relied upon cabinet government. He saw this as “a
ponderous bureaucratic system, resulting in group or corporate decisions.”251 Giglio
notes, “Kennedy specifically objected to the extent to which Eisenhower had shared
power with the cabinet (which met weekly); the chief of staff, Sherman Adams; and the
National Security Council (NSC), created in 1947 to advise the president on foreign and
domestic policy.”252 Giglio reports, “As president, Kennedy proved less willing to
delegate power outside the Oval Office. His staff, far smaller than Eisenhower’s or
Johnson’s, consisted for the most part of loyalists from the Senate or his campaign staff,

250
251
252

Id. at 21
Id. at 30.
Id.

54

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

many of them still in their thirties. They remained completely devoted to Kennedy and
knew exactly what he wanted.”253
Kennedy was reluctant to meet regularly with the cabinet, “preferr[ing] to
communicate in less direct ways.”254 He received weekly written summaries from
cabinet department heads about their most significant activities, and he followed these up
with requests for additional information and by communicating with cabinet members
through his White House staff.255 Kennedy met frequently with certain favored cabinet
members, particularly his brother, Robert, who was his “lightning rod for untested ideas
and [his closest] personal adviser.”256 The most prominent removal during the Kennedy
Administration was Chester Bowles, the undersecretary of state, where “[i]deology and
personal displeasure” both played a role.257 Bowles was summarily handed a press
release indicating that George Ball would replace him.258
Kennedy’s dynamism made it all but inevitable that he would exert his authority
over the execution of the federal laws to its fullest. For example, Kennedy asserted his
authority to control the administration of federal law by following the practice adopted by
FDR, Truman, and Eisenhower of issuing executive orders requiring all federal officers
and government contractors not to discriminate on the basis of race, creed, color, or
national origin, now enforced by the newly created President’s Committee on Equal
Opportunity.259 These orders exceeded the scope of previous orders by requiring that all
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Exec. Order No. 10,925, §§ 101-204, 3 C.F.R. 448, 448-49 (1959-63 compilation); Exec.
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government contractors undertake “affirmative action to ensure that . . . employees are
treated during their employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national
origin.”260 In issuing these orders, Kennedy returned to the practice followed by FDR
and Truman and based the orders on “the authority vested in [the president] by the
Constitution and the statutes.”261 The Comptroller General acknowledged, “In this
instance the Executive order is not based on any Congressional directive. The authority
to issue the order must, therefore, stem from the general executive power under Article II
of the Constitution.”262 The Attorney General concurred, arguing that Congress’s failure
to object to this longstanding practice represented legislative acquiescence to the
president’s authority to issue nondiscrimination orders.263 Kennedy also opposed racial
discrimination by taking a leading role in helping two blacks register at the University of
Alabama over the opposition of Alabama’s segregationist governor, George Wallace.

Order No. 11,114, 3 C.F.R. 774 (1959-63 compilation).
260
Exec. Order No. 10,925, '§ _, 3 C.F.R. at _; Exec. Order No. 11,114, § _, 3 C.F.R. at _.
261
Exec. Order No. 10,925, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at pmbl; Exec. Order No. 11,114, pmbl., 3
C.F.R. at _.
262
40 Comp. Gen. 592, 593 (1961); see also Note, supra note 114, at 391 (suggesting that
the nondiscrimination orders might fall within the president’s implied authority to act in the absence of a
contrary statute (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
263
42 Op. Att’y Gen. 97, 106-07 (1961) (citing United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S.
459, 472-75 (1915)); William H. Speck, Enforcement of Nondiscrimination Requirements for Government
Contract Work, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 245-46 & n.17 (1963) (same). But see Farkas v. Tex. Instruments,
Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 632 n.1 (5th Cir. 1967) (concluding that “Executive Order No. 10925 was issued
pursuant to statutory authority”); Farmer v. Phila. Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3, 8 (3d Cir. 1964) (noting that the
defendant did not “maintain that the executive orders . . . were issued without statutory authority”);
Blumstein, supra note 114, at 927-29 (arguing against a constitutional foundation for the orders); James L.
Moeller, Comment, Executive Order No. 11,246: Presidential Power to Regulate Employment
Discrimination, 43 MO. L. REV. 451, 481-82 (1978) (same); Robert P. Schuwerk, Comment, The
Philadelphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 723, 726-32 (1972)
(same).
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“Kennedy federalized the Alabama National Guard, signaling Wallace that he intended to
enforce the court order militarily if necessary.”264
The Kennedy Administration also issued an executive order making procedural
changes to the civil service laws. As noted earlier, the applicable statutes did not provide
federal employees with any substantive protections against dismissal.265 Although some
lower court decisions offered some halting moves towards limits on the removal
power,266 such protections would not emerge in Supreme Court cases until the 1970s.267
Indeed, decisions from this era continued to reaffirm that a supervisor’s lack of
confidence in a subordinate was sufficient grounds for removal.268 Veterans, who
comprised roughly half of the federal workforce,269 did enjoy a greater degree of
procedural protection than nonveterans.270 This Kennedy eliminated this discrepancy by
issuing an executive order extending the procedural protections similar to those provided
by the Veterans Preference Act of 1944 to nonveterans as well by requiring that each
agency establish a system for hearings and appeals.271 Although this change did not
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Id. at 179-80.
See supra notes 167-184 and accompanying text.
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See Deak v. Pace, 185 F.2d 997 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Murphy v. Kelly, 259 F. Supp. 914,
917 (D. Mass.) (inquiring whether removal was arbitrary or capricious), aff’d mem., 388 F.2d 232 (1st Cir.
1966); Greenway v. United States, 163 ct. Cl. 72, 81 (1963) (ruling that removed employee is entitled to
“honest consideration based on the merits”); Gadsden v. United States, 78 F. Supp. 126, 127-28 (Ct. Cl.
1948) (indicating that a removed employee has the right to the “honest judgment” of the removing officer
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Coledanchise v. Macy, 265 F. Supp. 154, 162 (D.S.C. 1967) (
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See Frug, supra note 177, at 970-89; see also Charturvedi, supra note 167, at 330 (noting
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many courts continue to follow the doctrine Hennen and Eberlein).
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See Leonard v. Douglas, 321 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
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PAUL P. VAN RIPER, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE 436 (Greenwood
Press 1976) (1958).
270
See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text.
271
Exec. Order No. 10988, 3 C.F.R. 527 (1959-63 compilation). The executive order largely
adopted the recommendations of a presidential task force. PRESIDENT’S TASK FORCE ON EMPLOYEEMANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE, A POLICY FOR EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT
265
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place any substantive limits on the president’s authority to remove,272 it did attest to
Kennedy’s issuance belief in his authority to exercise control over the entirety of the
federal bureaucracy.
Kennedy also made clear that he believed his authority to control the executive
branch extended to the independent agencies when he included them in his executive
order imposing ethical standards on conflict of interest and ex parte communications.273
That Kennedy believed that he possessed the authority to direct the independent agencies
should have come as no surprise. After he was elected but before he had been sworn in,
Kennedy asked Professor James Landis prepare a report specifically on the independent
agencies. Landis concluded, among other things, that the lack of effective inter-agency
coordination was inhibiting federal policy development and required that the President
possess greater influence over all agencies, including the independent agencies.274
Calling the distinction between independent and executive agencies “meaningless,”275

COOPERATION IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE 24 (1951).
272
Kathleen V. Buffon, Comment, Removal for Cause from the Civil Service; The Problem
of Disproportionate Discipline, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 207, 212 (1979) (noting that the Civil Service
Commission did not exercise its authority under the executive order in a way that placed substantive
restrictions on the removal power).
273
Exec. Order No. 10939, 3 C.F.R. _ (1959-63 compilation); see also Redford, supra note
186, at 316.
274
STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON
REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT 24-31 (Comm. Print 1960) (authored by James Landis).
275
Id. at 4; see also id. at 30 (noting that there was “not too great a difference between the
allegedly ‘independent’ agencies and those technically a part of some Executive Department”). Landis also
concluded that “[t]he relationship of the agencies to the Congress generally speaking is that of any statutory
branch of the Executive to the Congress, with certain exceptions.” Id. at 33. The so-called exceptions to
which Landis pointed were not that exceptional. First, Landis stated that Congress should oversee the
independent agencies, except that they should not attempt to influence their decisions in particular
adjudicatory matters. Id. at 33-34. This caveat, however, applied with equal force to executive agencies.
Second, Landis opined that the independent regulatory agencies were responsible
to the Congress rather than solely to the Executive. The policies that they are supposed
to pursue are those that have been delineated by the Congress not by the Executive.
Departure from these policies or the failure to make them effective or their subordination
of legislative goals to the directions of the Executive is thus a matter of necessary

58

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Landis recognized that the President’s “constitutional duty to see that the laws are
faithfully executed” was “applicable to the execution of laws entrusted to regulatory
agencies, whether technically ‘independent’ or not.”276 Therefore, Landis recommended
that the informal controls that the President possessed over the independent agencies277
should be strengthened.278 That Landis would come to such a conclusion is nothing short
of remarkable. One of the primary architects of the New Deal, Landis had believed that
the simple tripartite form of government, wherein power is “divided neatly between

legislative concern.
Id. at 34. However, all agencies, whether executive or independent, are obligated to follow the policies
established by Congress and exceed their authority whenever their actions contravene legislative goals.
276
In particular, “[t]he patent failure of the Federal Power Commission to execute the laws
relating to natural gas production” was “rightly a matter of constitutional concern to him,” as was “[t]he
congestion of the dockets of the agencies, the delays incident to the disposition of cases, [and] the failure to
evolve policies pursuant to basic statutory requirements.” Id. at 32-33. As Landis later noted, “Presidential
concern, with the work of the agencies, is important . . . from the standpoint of the President’s duty to see
that the laws are faithfully executed.” Id. at 82.
277
The President could influence the independent regulatory commissions’ execution of the
law through appointments and removals (although statutes often provided that commissioners could only be
removed “for cause”); Bureau of the Budget clearance of commission budget proposals legislative
proposals; and the President’s power to appoint the chairman of all the commissions except the ICC and
perhaps the FPC. Id. at 30-31. The President could also influence commissions through less formal means,
either by engaging outside consultants to conduct surveys of their affairs or by consulting with
commissioners directly. Id. at 31-32.
278
Specifically, Landis recommended that the President be permitted to use his
reorganization powers to give the chairmen of the commissions authority over all administrative matters
and to make them removable at will. Id. at 65-66, 85; see also id. at 37-38 (ICC), 44 (CAB), 48 (SEC &
FTC), 58 (FPC). The administrative matters would include the preparation and review of budget estimates,
the distribution of appropriated funds, the appointment of personnel, and control over the commission’s
internal organization. Id. at 37-38, 85. Thus Landis returned to the vision that Truman had pursued in
1950, only to see it shot down by the legislative veto.
Also, recognizing that policy development required “a close and intimate relationship to the
President,” id. at 77, 80, Landis recommended the President create separate offices within the Executive
Office of the President to coordinate and develop transportation, communications, and energy policy as
well as an Office for the Oversight of Regulatory Agencies charged with preparing reorganization plans
specifically for the Federal Power Commission, Interstate Commerce Commission, Civil Aeronautics
Board, and Federal Communications Commission, id. at 85-87. See generally Moreno, supra note 94, at
587; Redford, supra note 186, at 312-14; Morton Rosenberg, Congress’s Prerogative over Agencies and
Agency Decisionmakers; The Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary
Executive, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 627, 697 (1989).
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legislative, executive and judicial,” was inadequate to deal with modern problems and
must give way to the exigencies of modern governance.279
Armed with these reports, Kennedy strongly asserted his control over the
independent agencies. The chairmen of all of the commissions except the Federal
Reserve Board submitted their resignations, and Kennedy replaced all of them except the
chairman of the Federal Maritime Board.280 Kennedy also sent a message to Congress on
“Regulatory Agencies” calling for greater presidential oversight of the commissions.281
Kennedy backed up his rhetoric by impressing upon his nominees the importance of
national policy coordination and expressed his hope that they would follow the declared
policies of his Administration, by conducting, numerous policy studies and conferences
to guide commission decisionmaking, and by requiring that the commissions send him
monthly reports.282 Moreover, Solicitor General Archibald Cox refused to let the FTC
present its own views to the Supreme Court.283 Clearly, Kennedy did not acquiesce to the
supposed “independence” of the independent agencies.
Kennedy, however, did show more tolerance of the legislative veto than did
Truman or Eisenhower,284 even going so far as to propose that an agricultural quota and

279

JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 1-2 (1938).
The omission of the Federal Maritime Board turned out to be insignificant since he
replaced the entire membership of the Federal Maritime Board with his own appointees when he
reorganized it into the Federal Maritime Commission. The plan also provided that “[e]ach Commissioner
shall be removable by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Reorg.
Plan No. 7 of 1961, § 102(a), 3 C.F.R. 876, _ (1959-63 compilation).
281
John F. Kennedy, Special Message to Congress on the Regulatory Agencies (Apr. 13,
1961), in PUB. PAPERS 267.
282
See Redford, supra note 186, at 314-18.
283
Brief for the United States at 10, St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208
(1961) (No. 47), quoted in Devins, supra note 156, at 270-71.
284
Kennedy failed to object to a provision subjecting reorganization plans to a one-house
veto. Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Pub. L. No. 87-297, § 47, 75 Stat 638 (1961). President
Kennedy did tolerate “no appropriation” provisions, see, e.g., Act of Aug. 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-578, 76
Stat. 335, 338; Act of Sept. 27, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-703, § 103, 76 Stat. 605, 608, as well as a provision
280
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income support program be subject to a committee veto.285 As his presidency progressed,
Kennedy began to show increasing opposition to the legislative veto. Acting on the
advice of the Attorney General, Kennedy challenged the constitutionality of a provision
in the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1963 subjecting changes
in economic assistance funds administered by the Agency for International Development
(AID) to a committee veto.286 Kennedy charged that “this provision is unconstitutional
either as a delegation to Congressional committees of powers which reside only in the
Congress as a whole or as an attempt to confer executive powers on the Committee in
violation of the principle of separation of powers prescribed in Articles I and II of the
Constitution.”287 In signing the bill despite these objections, Kennedy relied upon similar
practices undertaken by Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower.288 Accordingly,
Kennedy directed the Administrator of the Agency for International Development “to
treat this provision as a request for information.”289 Kennedy’s subsequent opposition to

requiring for “consultation” before executive action, Act of Oct. 11, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-796, 76 Stat. 904.
Kennedy also did not register any objection to a provision requiring that the President appoint members of
Congress as delegates to certain trade negotiations. Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794,
§ 243, 76 Stat. 872, 878. See generally Watson, supra note 86, at 1010 n.115, 1026.
285
John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Agriculture (Mar. 16, 1961), in
1961 PUB. PAPERS 192, 196. Even more remarkably, Kennedy endorsed private control of executive action
by proposing that the agricultural controls not to into effect until approved by a two-thirds majority of
authorized farmers. Id. at 195. Congress did not enact the proposal. Watson, supra note 86, at 988 n.12,
1026 (citing HARRIS, supra note 99, at 205).
286
Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 87-872, 76
Stat. 1163, 1164.
287
John F. Kennedy, Memorandum on Informing Congressional Committees of Changes
Involving Foreign Economic Assistance Funds (Jan. 8, 1963), in 1963 PUB. PAPERS 6.
288
Id.
289
Id. Curiously, the Administrator did not carry out the President’s request because “the
Comptroller General gave an opinion that it was in the act, unconstitutional or not, and we had to abide by
it as long as it was in the act.” Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations For 1964:
Hearings on H.R. 9499 Before the Sen. Comm. on Appropriations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 312-13 (1963).
See generally Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws: Reviving the Royal
Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 944 (1994); Watson, supra note 86, at 1026.
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the legislative veto critically weakens the precedential weight of his earlier concessions
for the purposes of coordinate construction.
Kennedy’s foreign policy record was dominated by crises over Cuba and over the
freedom of West Berlin. Kennedy’s role in the famous Cuban Missile Crisis is too well
known to require much discussion here. Suffice it to say it was the most famous
reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine in modern times,290 successfully banishing the former
Soviet Union from its efforts to deploy nuclear missiles targeted in Cuba. In Berlin,
Kennedy was to make one of his most famous statements from the bully pulpit of the
presidency, when he challenged those who denied there was a difference between the free
and Communist worlds to come to Berlin and to look at the Wall that the Soviets had
built there.291 He added that in the free world of his day the proudest boast a man could
make was “Ich bin ein Berliner.”292
Kennedy’s foreign policy was tainted by his support for attempts to assassinate or
overthrow foreign leaders including, of course, Fidel Castro of Cuba, and President Diem
of South Vietnam. While perhaps foolish and misguided as a matter of policy, neither
episode signaled any lack of willingness on Kennedy’s part to assert his authority over
the execution of the law. Aside from those events, Kennedy’s presidency was
“remarkably free of notable scandal and incompetence. Not since the New Deal was the
national government uniformly served so well.”293 Although evidence would later
surfaced regarding the personal indiscretions of the president and his brother with respect

290
291
292
293

GIGLIO, supra note 246, at 216.
Id. at 219.
Id. at _.
Id. at 287.
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to their private sex lives, such matters have more to do with Kennedy’s place in history294
and have essentially no larger implications for the separation of powers.
Despite its brevity, the Kennedy Administration emerges as a steady defender of
presidential prerogatives. His dominance over his cabinet, his executive orders on civil
rights, his claims of supervisory authority over the independent agencies, his aggressive
use of foreign policy to oppose communism, and his eventual determination to oppose the
legislative veto nonetheless place him squarely in the unitary executive camp. In fact, the
president and his brother waged a war on organized crime that was so effective that some
have speculated that it lead to the president’s assassination in Dallas on November 22,
1963. It is thus clear that there was no significant acquiescence in any diminution of the
unitary executive on John Kennedy’s watch.
IV.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Anyone familiar with Lyndon Johnson’s legendary personality would have little
doubt that he would emerge as a strong chief executive. That said, Johnson ascended to
the presidency under extraordinarily difficult conditions, having to succeed a charismatic
leader who, after having captured the imagination of the country, had died under tragic
circumstances. Having sworn to continue Kennedy’s vision, Johnson inherited a fully
staffed executive branch to which he could not make significant changes without seeming
to abandon Kennedy’s legacy.295 Johnson was respectfully slow to make significant

294

Interestingly, a recent survey of political scientists, legal academics, and historians
overwhelmingly designated Kennedy the most overrated president in U.S. history. See James Lindgren &
Steven G. Calabresi, Rating the Presidents of the United States, 1789-2000: A Survey of Scholars in
Political Science, History, and Law, 18 CONST. COMM. 583, 594 (2001).
295
VAUGHN DAVIS BORNET, THE PRESIDENCY OF LYNDON B. JOHNSON 25-27 (1983).
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changes to the administration. It would be a mistake to construe his reticence to change
personnel as any hesitancy to exert full control over the workings of the executive
branch. When Adlai Stevenson complained that he really wanted to be Secretary of State
rather than an errand boy, Walter Lippman quipped, “If you are Lyndon Johnson’s
secretary of state, you’ll be an errand boy.”296 Clearly, Johnson was confident that he and
he alone would determine the direction of his administration.
Johnson also strongly resisted attempts by Congress to limit his authority to
administer the laws. For example, Congress submitted legislation in 1966 that purported
to restrict the President’s authority to propose a financial plan for agricultural research for
fiscal year 1968.297 Johnson indicated that he would ignore the provision as an improper
infringement upon executive power. Johnson indicated:
The provision thus clearly intrudes upon the Executive function of
preparing the annual budget. In developing the budget for fiscal 1968, I
will give careful consideration to the view of Congress expressed in this
act—but I will propose an agricultural research program designed and
finance to make the best possible use of the resources available to us.298
Two months later, after the Secretary of Commerce exercised his authority under
the Export Control Act of 1961299 to impose export controls on leather and cattle hides,
Congress attached a rider to the Commerce Department’s appropriations bill prohibiting
the Department from using of any appropriated funds to enforce the export controls.300
Johnson complained that “in this rider . . . Congress attempts to control the manner in

296

Id. at 25.
Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-556,
80 Stat. 689, 690 (1966).
298
Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Department of
Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill (Sept. 8, 1966), in 1966 PUB. PAPERS 980, 981
(Department of Agriculture and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-556, 80 Stat. 689).
299
_.
300
_, Pub. L. No. 89-797, § 304, 80 Stat. 1479, 1497
297
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which the Export Control Act is to be administered.”301 These objections
notwithstanding, Johnson signed the bill; foreign demand for hides had fallen to the point
where the Secretary was planning on dropping the controls anyway. However, since
conditions might again require the imposition of export controls on leather, Johnson
directed the Secretary of Commerce and the Director of the Budget to submit legislation
removing this restriction.302
The following year, Johnson objected that three provisions of the Military
Construction Authorization Act of 1968303 were “inconsistent with the sound
management of America’s military establishment and raise questions concerning the
constitutional separation of powers.”304 First, the Act prohibited Johnson from closing
the Naval Academy’s dairy farm.305 Second, the Act froze the present geographic
boundaries and headquarters of the eleven Naval Districts.306 Third, the Act prohibited
the Department of the Army from closing a particular installation in Hawaii.307
Johnson’s signing statement dripped with sarcasm when he quipped, “Thus the Congress,
which has given the Navy Department authority over the world’s most powerful fleet, has
withdrawn the Department’s authority over 380 cows.”308 In the end, however, the dairy
remained open.309

301

Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Expressing Disapproval of Appropriation
Act Provision Relating to Export Control of Hides, Skins, and Leather (Nov. 8, 1966), in 1966 PUB. PAPERS
1351, 1351.
302
Id.
303
Pub. L. No. 90-110, 87 Stat. 279.
304
Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction
Authorization Act, 1968 (Oct. 21, 1967), in 1967 PUB. PAPERS 935, 935 [hereinafter Johnson, Military
Construction Authorization Act Signing Statement].
305
§ _ 81 Stat. at _.
306
§ _ 81 Stat. at _.
307
§ _ 81 Stat. at _.
308
Johnson, Military Construction Authorization Act Signing Statement, supra note 304, at
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Johnson also issued more general directives to the executive officers, for example
ordering them to continue the antidiscrimination and affirmative action programs begun
during the Kennedy Administration.310 Like Kennedy, Johnson did not rely upon his
defense or procurement powers as the basis for his actions, nor did he rely upon the
newly enacted Civil Rights Act of 1964. Instead, Johnson followed Kennedy’s example
and simply invoked “the authority vested in [him] as President of the United States by the
Constitution and statutes of the United States.”311 Courts and commentators have

935.

309

May, supra note 289, at 943-44.
This order expanded the Kennedy Administration’s program in two significant ways.
First it applied the antidiscrimination prohibitions to all of a contractor’s activities during the performance
of the contract, not just those activities connected with the contract. Second, it expanded the program to
include sex discrimination as well. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-65 compilation). See
generally Moeller, supra note 263, at 456-61.
311
Id. As noted earlier, the jurisdictional basis of the nondiscrimination executive orders has
traditionally been construed as resting on the executive power vested in the President by Article II. See
supra notes 112-114, 261-262 and accompanying text. Some courts nonetheless persisted in viewing
Executive Order 11,246 as being based on the procurement statute. United States v. New Orleans Pub.
Serv., Inc., 553 F.2d 459, 466-67 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 436 U.S. 942
(1978); Northeast Constr. Co. v. Romney, 485 F.2d 752, 760-671 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Contractors Ass’n v.
Sec’y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); Legal Aid Soc’y v.
Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125, 130 (N.D. Cal. 1974); United States v. Papermakers Local 189, 282 F. Supp.
39, 43 (E.D. La. 1968); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll. Dist., 249 N.E.2d 907 (Ohio 1969). See generally
Blumstein, supra note 114, at 930-32; James A. Hardgrove, Note, The Philadelphia Plan, 45 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 678, 685 (1970); Moeller, supra note 263, at 477-78; Note, supra note 114, at 383.
Enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 raised a whole new round of questions about the
propriety of these executive orders. Opponents of the executive order argued that in passing Title VII of
the Act, Congress had explicitly prohibited the use quotas and that that policy preempted the President’s
authority and that the House’s failure to pass an amendment explicitly authorizing the executive
antidiscrimination program suggested that it was unauthorized. The order’s supporters pointed out that the
failure of the Senate to pass an amendment that would have explicitly provided that Title VII constituted
the exclusive remedy for discrimination supported the imposition of additional antidiscrimination
protection. See, e.g., James E. Jones, Jr., The Bugaboo of Employment Quotas, 1970 WIS. L. REV. 341,
388-94; Earl M. Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the
Philadelphia Plan, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 84, 102-09 (1970); Blumstein, supra note 114, at 939-49;
Hardgrove, supra, at 687-95; Moeller, supra note 263, at 482-87; Schuwerk, supra note 263, at 733-38;
Karen Ann Sindelar, Note, Employment Discrimination—Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp.:
Does Title VII Limit Executive Order 11246?, 57 N.C. L. REV. 695 (1979); _, [Note], The Philadelphia
Plan: Equal Employment Opportunity in the Construction Trades, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 187, 22429 (1970); _ Note, Executive Order 11246: Anti-Discrimination Obligations in Government Contracts, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 596-600 (1969). Regardless of how this controversy is resolved, the fact remains that
Johnson’s actions clearly indicate that he believed he had the authority to direct the manner in which the
subordinate executive officers executed of the laws.
310
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struggled to determine whether Johnson issued the order pursuant to statutory authority or
under his implied powers as president.312
Johnson also pioneered what would emerge as a critical device in allowing the
president to control the execution of the law when he began using the oversight
responsibilities of the Bureau of the Budget to influence the development of important
agency regulations.313 Thus Johnson plainly had little doubt about his authority to control
the execution of the laws.
Johnson exerted his influence over the independent agencies as well. When he
met with the heads of the commissions shortly after taking office, his remarks indicated a
broad view of presidential responsibility and left little doubt that presidential intervention
would be forthcoming if and when the commissions failed to discharge their
responsibilities in a manner consistent with the President’s policies.314 Consistent with
this vision, Johnson directed the heads of three commissions involved in the regulation of
transportation to begin intra-agency consultations on their problems. A Bureau of the

312

Compare Contractors Ass’n v. Sec’y of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 171 (3d Cir. 1971) (holding
that even if not statutorily authorized, Executive Order No. 11246 falls within the president’s implied
authority to act in the absence of a contrary statute); with United States v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc.,
553 F.2d 459 466-68 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that that the order was authorized by statute); see also
Note, supra note 114, at 388-91 (arguing that the order could be upheld either as being authorized by
statute or as falling within the president’s implied authority to act in the absence of a contrary statute). But
see Cramer v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673, 680 (E.D. Va. 1976 (holding the order
foreclosed by statute); Blumstein, supra note 114, at 927-32, 939-49 (arguing that the order is not justified
either by the Constitution or by statute); Moeller, supra note 263, at 479-87 (same); Schuwerk, supra note
263 (same).
313
Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of
Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L.
1, 9 (1984).
314
Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks at a Meeting with the Heads of Independent Regulatory
Agencies in Cabinet Room (Dec. 3, 1963), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 18.
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Budget circular also established guidelines on the responsibilities of the FPC and other
executive agencies in the acquisition of water data.315
Furthermore, Johnson ardently opposed the legislative veto as an unconstitutional
infringement on the unitary executive. Rather than vetoing legislation, Johnson tended to
use signing statements to construe the legislation in a manner that preserved its
constitutionality. For example, within the first few weeks of his Administration, Johnson
criticized a provision of the Public Works Appropriation Act that prohibited the Panama
Canal Company from disposing of any real property without obtaining prior approval of
congressional committees.316 Condemning the committee veto as either “an
unconstitutional delegation to Congressional committees of powers which reside only in
the Congress as a whole, or an attempt to confer executive powers on the committees in
violation of the principle of separation of powers set forth in the Constitution,” Johnson
directed the Secretary of the Army to treat the provision as a request for information
rather than a formal committee veto.317 Similar signing statements followed.318

315

Circular No. A-67 (Bur. of Budget Aug. 28, 1964). See generally Redford, supra note

186, at 318-19.
316

Public Works Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 88-257, 77 Stat. 844, 847 (1963).
Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Approving the Public Works
Appropriations Act (Dec. 31, 1963), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 104, 104 & note.
318
In signing the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-638, 78 Stat. 1035, Johnson objected to two legislative veto provisions. One provision “seeks to give
either the House Committee on Agriculture and Forestry a veto power over certain proposed dispositions of
foreign currencies accruing from sales under Public Law 480. The other seeks to prevent the President
from making certain loans at interest rates below a specified level unless he has concurrence of an advisory
committee composed in part of Members of Congress and in apart of his own executive appointees.” Since
“[b]oth such provisions represented a clear violation of the constitutional principle of separation of
powers,” Johnson directed executive officials to keep Congress informed and consult with them on all
aspects of the law.” Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill Extending the
Agricultural Trade and Assistance Act (Oct. 8, 1964), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 1249, 1250.
Later that same month, Johnson signed legislation that required that the rules and regulations
prescribed by the Director of Central Intelligence for the establishment and maintenance of the retirement
system not take effect until approved by the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Armed
Services Committees. Act of Oct. 13, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-643, 78 Stat. 1043. Johnson noted that “[s]uch
317
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So strong was Johnson’s opposition to legislative vetoes that he refused to accept
provisions first enacted during the Eisenhower Administration prohibiting Congress from
appropriating funds for particular uses unless a particular committee had given its prior
approval on the grounds that they were the functional equivalents of legislative vetoes.319
When confronted with such a provision in the Water Resources Research Act of 1964,320
Johnson directed the Secretary of the Interior not to request any funds under the act.
Although Johnson acknowledged that such provisions were technically constitutional, he
still objected to them in principle and refused to implement the act until Congress
eventually amended the legislation to remove the committee approval provision.321
Johnson later went so far as to veto legislation containing such a provision, concluding
that such committee approval “seriously violates the spirit of the division of powers
between the legislative and executive branches” and “infringes upon the responsibilities
of the executive branch.”322 As Johnson reasoned, “The executive branch is given, by the
Constitution, the responsibility to implement all laws—a specific and exclusive
responsibility which cannot be shared with a committee of Congress.” Johnson
accordingly withheld his approval from the bill until the offending provision was

a provision attempts to confer executive powers on the members of the legislative branch, in violation of
the constitutional principle of separation of powers.” Accordingly, Johnson instructed the Director to “treat
the provision as a request for consultation with the named committee members.” Lyndon B. Johnson,
Statement by the President Upon Approving Bill Authorizing a Retirement System for Certain Employees
of the Central Intelligence Agency (Oct. 14, 1964), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 1336. See generally Watson,
supra note 86, at 1026-27.
319
Since Congress is of course free to establish its own rules of procedure and these
provisions only served to limit the discretion of Congress before it enacted legislation and did not limit the
discretion of the executive branch after legislation had been enacted, Eisenhower had accepted such
provisions as constitutional.
320
Pub. L. No. 88-379, § 200, 78 Stat. 329, 331.
321
Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Water Resources
Research Act (July 17, 1964), in 1963-64 PUB. PAPERS 861, 862. The provision was deleted by Act of Apr.
19, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-404, 80 Stat. 129. See generally May, supra note 289, at 939-40; Watson, supra
note 86, at 1027.
322
Lyndon B. Johnson, _ (June 5, 1965), in 1965 PUB. PAPERS _, _
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removed.323 Johnson entered similar objections throughout the balance of his
Administration.324
Finally, Johnson even objected to the one type of provision that every previous
President had agreed was constitutional: the “report and wait” provision. Although
Johnson indicated that he would accept “reasonable 30-day period of notification” to
congressional committees, the proposed Military Construction Act required that the
Administration wait 120 days. Although again not technically unconstitutional, Johnson
nonetheless vetoed the bill, condemning it as “repugnant to the Constitution” and “a
fundamental encroachment on one of the great principles of the American Constitutional
system—the separation of powers between the Legislative and Executive branches.”325
Johnson continued, “By the Constitution, the executive power is vested in the President.
. . . The President cannot sign into law a bill which substantially inhibits him from
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Id. at _.
Four months later, Johnson objected to a committee approval provision in the Omnibus
Rivers and Harbors Act, Pub. L. No. 89-298, 79 Stat 1073, _; concluding that acceding to such a provision
“would make the President a partner in the abdication of a fundamental principle of our Government—the
separation of powers prescribed by the United States Constitution” that “would dilute and diminish the
authority and powers of the Presidency.” Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the
Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Act (Oct. 26, 1965), in 1965 PUB. PAPERS 1082, 1082. Unlike the previous
provision, the provision contained in this legislation was optional rather than obligatory. Because nothing
in the Act prevented Johnson from signing it and then directing his Administration not to exercise of the
authority provided by the Act until the provision was removed, Johnson concluded that the better course
would be to sign the bill so that the remaining legislative provisions could be enacted. Id. at 1083. See
generally May, supra note 289, at 939; Watson, supra note 86, at 1027-28.
The following year, Johnson criticized a provision that prohibited Congress from appropriating
funds for rural renewal loans unless that loan had been approved by the Agriculture Committees. Act of
Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-796, 80 Stat. 1478 (1966) (amending Food and Agriculture Act of 1962, Pub.
L. No. 87-703, § 102(c), 76 Stat. 605, 608). Johnson called such provisions “repugnant to the Constitution.
They represent an improper encroachment by the Congress and its committees upon Executive
responsibilities, and dilute and diminish the authority and powers of the Presidency.” Therefore, Johnson
directed the appropriate Departments to submit corrective legislation and ordered his Administration not to
approve any loans which would require committee approval. Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the
President Upon Signing Bill Amending the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act (Nov. 8, 1966), in 1966 PUB.
PAPERS 1354, 1354.
325
Lyndon B. Johnson, Veto of the Military Authorization Bill (Aug. 21, 1965), in 1965
PUB. PAPERS 907, 907.
324
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performing his duty.”326 As a result, Johnson concluded that “[t]he limitations upon . . .
the executive branch of the government here sought to be imposed are a clear violation of
separation of powers. . . . The Congress enacts the laws. Their execution must be left to
the President.”327 It is “the President [who] is responsible . . . for the faithful execution of
the laws enacted by Congress.”328 Johnson supported his conclusion by quoting James
Madison’s statement during the Decision of 1789 and by noting that “Attorneys General
in unbroken succession since at least the time of President Wilson” had opposed the use
of such legislative vetoes.329 Johnson eventually signed corresponding legislation
containing a more modest, thirty-day waiting period.330 However, Johnson again
objected when Congress attempted to extend the waiting period to thirty days of
continuous congressional session.331 Johnson expressed his doubts as to whether such a
waiting period was reasonable and warned that his “responsibilities as President and
Commander in Chief will require [him] to seek prompt revision of the restriction if future
circumstances prove it to be inimical to the national interest.”332
Thus Johnson strongly opposed the legislative veto more vehemently than any
other previous President. When this opposition is combined with Johnson’s consistent
objections to congressional efforts to encroach upon his authority as well as the resolute
manner in which he asserted his control over all parts of the executive branch, the
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Id.
Id.
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Id. at 908.
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Id.
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Military Construction Authorization Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-188, 79 Stat. 793, 81819; Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction Authorization
Act (Sept. 16, 1965), in 1965 PUB. PAPERS 1003. See generally Watson, supra note 86, at 1028.
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Military Construction Authorization Act, Pub. L. No, 89-568, § _, 80 Stat. 739, _ (1966).
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Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement by the President Upon Signing the Military Construction
Authorization Bill (Sept. 12, 1966), in 1966 PUB. PAPERS 1008, 1008.
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conclusion that Johnson did not in any way acquiesce to a non-unitary vision of the
executive branch becomes inescapable.
V.

RICHARD M. NIXON

Notwithstanding the troubles that would eventually engulf his Administration,
Richard M. Nixon proved to be a stalwart defender of the President’s authority to execute
the laws.333 For example, Nixon protected the President’s removal power when he
successfully resisted Congress’s attempt to remove two executive officials by abolishing
their positions and reestablishing them subject to Senate confirmation.334 Nixon
complained that “[t]his legislation would require the forced removal by an
unconstitutional procedure of two officers now serving in the executive branch.”335 The
President’s “power and authority to remove, or retain, executive officers” was “deeply
rooted in our system of government.”336 Although Nixon did “not dispute Congressional
authority to abolish an office or to specify appropriate standards by which the officers
may serve,” Nixon vetoed the bill because “the power of the Congress to terminate an
office cannot be used as a back-door method of circumventing the President’s power to
remove.”337 Nixon eventually prevailed in his defense of the removal power when, after
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See Geoffrey P. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers in
the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 401, 401 (1989) (“The Nixon years were characterized by
aggressive assertions of presidential power vis-à-vis Congress . . ..”).
334
The officials involved were Office of Management and Budget Director Roy Ash and
Deputy Director Frederick Malek. Congress’s efforts were similar to the efforts during the Truman
Administration to remove to officials in the Bureau of Reclamation by changing the qualifications for their
offices. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
335
Richard M. Nixon, Veto of a Bill Requiring Senate Confirmation of the Director and
Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (May 18, 1973), in 1973 PUB. PAPERS 539, 539.
336
Id.
337
Id. Nixon closed by quoting James Madison’s ringing endorsement of the separation of
powers from the Decision of 1789. Id. at 540 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 581(1789)).
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failing to override Nixon’s veto,338 Congress amended the legislation the next year to
require Senate confirmation only of future OMB Directors and Deputy Directors.339
Nixon extended the policy initiated by Kennedy of extending the civil service
protection enjoyed by veterans to all federal employees. A pair of executive orders
giving nonveterans the right appeal adverse employment actions to the Civil Service
Commission340 and revoking the agency review process established by Kennedy in favor
of exclusive review by the Civil Service Commission341 in effect extended the procedural
protections Veterans’ Preference Act of 1944 to all federal employees, veterans and
nonveterans alike. This action is fully consistent with the unitary executive. As we have
noted, the procedural protections were not construed as placing any limits on the
president’s unfettered power to remove.342 In addition, the fact that the president had the
power to remove Civil Service Commissioners at will343 rendered any authority wielded
by Commission unproblematic from the standpoint of the unitary executive.
That said, we acknowledge that the Nixon Administration did bear witness to the
emergence of the first effective limits to the removal power. Interestingly, the impetus
behind these limits came not from Congress, but rather from the courts. The Supreme
Court began to recognize that the civil service laws gave federal employees a sufficient
property interest in their jobs to give them the benefit of procedural due process
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Although the Senate voted _ to _ to override the veto, _ CONG. REC. _ (May 22, 1973),
the House failed to follow suit, voting _ to _ to sustain the veto, id. at _ (May 23, 1973).
339
Act of _, Pub. L. No. 93-250, 88 Stat. 11 (1974). See generally LOUIS FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 78 (3d ed. rev., 1991) [hereinafter
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS]; LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER 51-55 (1975).
340
Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 22, 3 C.F.R. 254, 266 (1974 compilation).
341
Exec. Order No. 11,787, 3A C.F.R. 151 (1974).
342
See supra notes 167-175, 265-272 and accompanying text.
343
See Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 21, at 788; Frug, supra note 177, at 955.
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protections.344 And even then, such noted commentators as Gerald Frug criticized the
Court’s decisions as starkly ahistorical and inconsistent with the longstanding, judiciallyrecognized tradition of unfettered presidential removal.345 In any event, contrary to
popular belief, the idea that the civil service laws limit the president’s power to remove is
of fairly recent vintage. Given the Court’s acknowledgement in INS v. Chadha346 that the
fact that presidents since the Wilson Administration had consistently opposed a particular
practice was sufficient to keep a question open as a constitutional matter, it is hard to see
how this development could turn the civil service laws into an established derogation of
the unitariness of the executive branch.
Nixon also asserted his authority to direct federal officials’ execution of the laws
in a wide variety of ways. For instance, Nixon continued the program initiated by
Johnson’s executive order requiring that government contractors institute affirmative
action plans.347 After a series of opinions issued by the Comptroller General had
suggested that the order was unenforceable because it did not spell out the minimum
requirements of a satisfactory affirmative action program,348 Secretary of Labor George
Shultz issued a revised version known as the Philadelphia Plan that providing more
specific guidance on what was required.349 After the Comptroller General ruled that the
additional guidance provided by the Philadelphia Plan imposed quotas in violation of

344

See Arnett v. Kennedy; 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Arnett followed from the Court’s decisions
in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); and Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972), regarding
the dismissal of state employees.
345
Frug, supra note 177, at 977-89. As Professor Frug notes, both Roth and Sinderman
involved teachers who alleged that they were removed for their exercise of their constitutional rights to free
speech. As a result, they could have been resolved under Wieman and Pickering without having to resort to
judicial innovation. Id. at 977-78.
346
462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983).
347
See supra note 310 and accompanying text.
348
_.
349
_.
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,350 Attorney General John Mitchell issued an
opinion clarifying that the Plan involved mere goals, not quotas,351 and Shultz accepted
that construction.352 Finally, after a complicated series of legislative maneuvers,
Congress ended future questions about the Philadelphia Plan’s legitimacy in 1972 by
unequivocally approving the President’s authority to mandate affirmative action
programs.353 But until that point, Nixon, like Kennedy and Johnson before him, had
derived the authority to require such programs directly from his authority to control the
execution of federal law.
Nixon also asserted his control over the executive branch by expanding the
program of White House oversight of regulatory policy begun during the Johnson
Administration.354 Nixon’s program was initially restricted to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), which Nixon created by executive order in 1970,355 and began
on May 21, 1971, when OMB Director George Shultz sent a memorandum to EPA
Administrator William Ruckelshaus requiring OMB clearance for all EPA decisions that
350

49 Comp. Gen. 59 (1969).
42 Op. Att’y Gen. 405 (1969); John W. Mitchell, Legal Memorandum: Authority Under
Executive Order 11246 (June 24, 1969), reprinted in The Philadelphia Plan—Congressional Oversight of
Administrative Agencies (The Department of Labor): Hearings on the Philadelphia Plan and S. 931 Before
the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970).
The conflict between the Comptroller General and the Attorney General raised an interesting question
“whether the Executive branch of the Government has the right to act upon its own interpretations of the
laws enacted by Congress, and to expend and obligate funds approved by Congress in a manner which the
[Comptroller General’s] Office, as the designated agent of the Congress has found to be contrary to law.”
SENATE HEARINGS, [supra note 85, at 139 (Staats statement)], quoted in Note, supra note 311, at 229;
Schuwerk, supra note 263, at 748. Clearly, under the unitary executive theory, subordinate executive
officials are responsible only to the President for their execution of the laws, not to the Comptroller General
of Congress.
352
Jones, supra note 311, at 358-61, 364-73; Thomas D. Morgan, Achieving National Goals
Through Federal Contracts: Giving Form to an Unconstrained Administrative Process, 1974 WIS. L. REV.
301, 311-12; Schuwerk, supra note 263, at 745-46.
353
See Schuwerk, supra note 263, at 757. For a discussion of the maneuvering that led up to
the 1972 vote, see id at 747-57.
354
See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
355
Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 1072 (1966-1970 compilation), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1994), and 84 Stat 2086 (1970).
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were expected to have a significant impact on the policies of other agencies, impose
significant costs on non-federal sectors, or created additional demands on the federal
budget.356 Nixon later expanded this initiative into a larger program into termed “Quality
of Life” review,357 which required agencies to submit covered regulations thirty days
before draft publication, along with an analysis of the rule’s objectives, alternatives, and
expected costs and benefits. OMB then solicited comments from other agencies, which
were then forwarded to the agency proposing the rule. A similar process, focusing on
public comments and new issues raised during the rulemaking, was required twenty days
before the publication of final rules. Although the program was nominally extended to
all federal policy proposals involving consumer protection, public health and safety, and
occupational health and safety, in practice EPA remained the only agency routinely
required to submit its proposals to OMB.358 In addition, OMB theoretically only
facilitated inter-agency comments and mediated inter-agency conflicts; the issuing
agency ostensibly retained control over the final decision. In practice, OMB was able to
use Quality of Life review to effect significant changes in EPA policy.359 Nixon further
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Memorandum from George Shultz to William Ruckelshaus (May 21, 1971), quoted in 2
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, DECISION MAKING IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 91
(1977).
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Memorandum from George P. Shultz, Agency Regulations, Standards, and Guidelines
Pertaining to Environmental Quality, Consumer Protection, and Occupational and Public Health and Safety
(Oct. 5, 1971), cited in Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the
Environmental Protection Agency, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Aut. 1991, at 127, 128 n.4. For general
descriptions of Quality of Life Review, see Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory
Interpretation, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 221 (1993); Moreno, supra note 94, at 488-89; James T. O’Reilly
& Phyllis E. Brown, In Search of Excellence: A Prescription for the Future of OMB Oversight of Rules, 39
ADMIN. L. REV. 421, 424-25 (1987); Percival, supra, at 133-38; Caroline DeWitt, Comment, The
President’s Council on Competitiveness: Undermining the Administrative Procedure Act with Regulatory
Review, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 759, 769-70 (1993).
358
But see Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE
L.J. 451, 466 (1978) (describing OMB intervention in NHTSA rulemaking).
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Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-SoUnitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 988-89 (2001).
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strengthened his control over regulatory policy on July 31, 1972, when OMB Circular A19 required that agencies submit all proposed testimony, reports, and legislation for OMB
approval prior to their transmission to Congress.360 The extent to which Nixon
centralized administrative control in OMB is underscored by the fact that leading EPA
administrators were unable to obtain written assurances that they retained independent
decisional authority.361 It is true that these administrators sometimes threatened to resign
over their inability to obtain assurances that they would have the final say over EPA
regulations.362 Such threats are properly regarded as being consistent with the unitary
executive, rather than evidence of agency independence as some of suggested,363 since
resignation or removal is the natural outcome under our theory when an executive official
finds himself or herself out of step with administration policy.
Nixon also undertook efforts to dominate the independent agencies. Nixon’s
efforts were based on the conclusion of the Advisory Council on Executive Organization
(commonly known as the “Ash Council” after its Chairman, OMB Director Roy Ash) that
the commissions were “an anomaly in government structure.”364 Originally intended to
shield the regulatory process from partisanship of the executive branch, independence
had rendered “not sufficiently accountable to either Congress or the executive branch.”365

360

See Percival, supra note 357, at 137.
Id. at 989 n.154 (citing JOHN QUARLES, CLEANING UP AMERICA: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF
THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 119 (1976)).
362
See Percival, supra note 359, at 988-89 (citing Implementation of the Clean Air At
Amendment of 1970—Part I: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Sen.
Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong. 325 (1927) (statement of EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus);
and QUARLES, supra note 361, at 119).
363
See id.
364
PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 13 (1971) [hereinafter ASH
COUNCIL REPORT]. See generally Moreno, supra note 94, at 487-88.
365
ASH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 364, at 14. The report elaborated:
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Therefore, the Council concluded, “[i]f regulation is to be more responsive to the public
interest and coordinated with national programs, it must first be brought within the ambit
of elective government, with accountability to those officials to whom the public and the
regulated industries alike look for fair and constructive application of national policy.”366
To accomplish these goals, the Ash Council recommended that most independent
agencies be abolished and that their functions be transferred to newly created executive
agencies headed by single administrators serving the President’s pleasure.367 The
adjudicative-type review previously performed by the commissions would be conducted
by the Administrative Court of the United States.368 Only in that way could the President
fulfill his constitutional duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed”369 and his

Congress has conceived of these commissions as independent of executive branch
control, but in fact the commissions are almost as independent of Congress itself. Apart
from appropriations approval, periodic program review, and the intermittent interest of
one or several of its members, Congress does not exercise the degree of oversight with
respect to regulatory commissions that it does for executive departments and other
agencies of the executive branch. Congress has sought to preserve the independence of
the regulatory commissions, even as their activities increasingly affect the
implementation of national policy. The executive branch, responsible for carrying out
national policy, has been reluctant to support reforms needed to integrate regulatory
activities with executive programs because the President does not have sufficient
responsibility for commission direction.
Id. at 14-15.
366

Id. at 16. The Ash Council later noted:

Accountability is an essential element of democratic government. The Congress
and the President are accountable to the people for the performance of government. In
turn, agencies of government headed by appointed officials should be response and
responsible to the Congress, to the Executive, and through them, ultimately to the public.
...
Without clear accountability for performance to either Congress or the
President, it is not surprising that the agencies receive inadequate attention.
Id. at 40-41; see also id. at 15 (“Independence, and the resulting absence of regulatory accountability, has
transferred to a generally shielded arena those questions which should be settled in a more open forum.”).
367
Id. at 4-5, 20.
368
Id. at 6, 22.
369
The Ash Council noted, “The President is responsible under article I[I] of the
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role as the person to whom the American public “looks to . . . for leadership in pursuing
national policy goals, including those affected by the regulatory process.”370
Bolstered by these proposals, Nixon proposed a massive reorganization in which
all executive functions would have been consolidated into four new superagencies,
although this proposal was eventually engulfed by the Watergate scandal.371 Congress
defended its ability to control the independent agencies by considering a proposal to
make the commissions even more independent of presidential control by permitting them
to transmit their budget requests directly to Congress. Although this proposal eventually
failed, Congress did subsequently enact legislation authorizing a few agencies to submit
their budgets directly to Congress372 and granting independent litigating authority to the
FTC.373
Congress even considered a proposal to turn the Department of Justice into an
independent agency.374 The Administration challenged the constitutionality this proposal
through the testimony of Assistant Attorney General Robert G. Dixon, Jr. As Dixon
noted, the Article II Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause compelled two
conclusions: “First, the enforcement of the laws is an inherently executive function, and

Constitution to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed. That duty extends to the activities of the
regulatory agencies to assure that the laws enacted by Congress are carried out effectively and fairly.” Id.
at 16. The Ash Council also contended that the fact that previous Presidents had offered similar regulatory
reform proposals demonstrated that “these Presidents presumably felt that such recommendations were part
of their responsibility to oversee faithful execution of the laws.” Id. Furthermore, the inclusion the
independent regulatory commissions in the President’s reorganization power demonstrated that Congress
also “recognized the President’s role in the regulatory scheme.” Id.
370
Id. at 16.
371
Percival, supra note 357, at 133 & n.28.
372
See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 191-92.
373
Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576,
591-92 (1973). Nixon approved of this provision in return for the authorization of the Trans-Alaska Oil
Pipeline. See Devins, supra note 156, at 270-71.
374
Under this proposal, the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Solicitor
General would serve six-year terms and would be removable by the President only for “neglect of duty or
malfeasance of office.” S. 2803, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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second, the executive branch has the exclusive constitutional authority to enforce
laws.”375 Dixon also argued that making the Department of Justice independent was ill
advised as a matter of democratic political theory. As Hamilton recognized in The
Federalist No. 70, and the Landis Report and the Ash Council had recently reaffirmed, a
plural executive would tend “to conceal faults, and destroy responsibility.”376 Finally,
Dixon argued that “an ‘independent’ Department of Justice would be a constitutional
anomaly fundamentally inconsistent with the whole theory of a tripartite government
envision by the Founding Fathers and specified in the first three articles of the
Constitution.”377 Former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach agreed, arguing that the
president “is responsible for the administration of the law and should be, and can be, held
accountable for that stewardship.”378 Even Archibald Cox opposed the notion that the
Attorney General should be made independent of presidential control: “I believe in
focusing individual responsibility. There is no substitute for that responsibility. No
president should be relived of it—or of the consequences of default.”379 Indeed, any
attempt to insulate the Attorney General from presidential direction would have the effect
of erecting the “presumption that our Attorneys General cannot be trusted. The
presumption should be the other way, and they should be held responsible when they
were proved incompetent or unfaithful.”380

375

Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on S. 2803 and S. 2978, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 84 (1974) (testimony of Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel).
376
Id.
377
Id.
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Id. at 152-53.
379
Id. at 209.
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Id. at 211.
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Furthermore, Nixon also opposed congressional attempts to interfere with the
President’s execution of the laws through the legislative veto. Although he did not
continue Johnson’s opposition to “report and wait provisions” as well as committee
approval requirements directed at Congress,381 Nixon offered numerous objections to
provisions more properly regarded as legislative vetoes. For example, Nixon objected
that a provision of the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1972 that subjected
approval of three building projects to a committee veto.382 Such committee vetoes
“infring[ed] on the fundamental principle of the separation of legislative and executive
powers.”383 After Congress persisted in its efforts to include a committee veto,384 Nixon
announced that he would disregard it.385
The following months Nixon objected that a committee veto contained in the
Public Buildings Amendments of 1972,386 by “conditioning of the authority of the
executive branch upon an action by committees of the Congress,” was an unconstitutional
“infring[ement] upon the fundamental principle of the separation of legislative and
381

Early in his Administration, President Nixon announced that “this Administration will
interpose no objection to the procedures involved in the accomplishment of watershed projects under” the
Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Act and released the funds impounded by President Johnson. _. See
generally Watson, supra note 86, at 1028, 1029; Louis Fisher, The Politics of Impounded Funds, 15
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 374 (1970). Nixon subsequently approved a similar provision in the Public Buildings
Amendments of 1972, noting that “[t]he Congress regards this ‘no appropriation may be made’ provision as
internal Congressional rulemaking which does not affect the executive branch. This Administration has
acquiesced in that construction.” Richard M. Nixon, Statement About Signing the Public Buildings
Amendments of 1972 (June 17, 1972), in 1972 PUB. PAPERS 686, 687 (approving of Public Buildings
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-313, § 7(a), 86 Stat. 216, 221); see also Richard M. Nixon, Second
Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1972 (May 28, 1972), in 1972 PUB. PAPERS 627, 627 (“The Congress
regards this ‘no appropriation may be made’ provision, I understand, as internal Congressional rule-making
not affecting the executive branch, and this Administration has acquiesced in that construction.”). Nixon
thereafter signed numerous such provisions into law without comment. See generally Fisher, Legislative
Veto, supra note 86, at 284; Watson, supra note 86, at 1029.
382
Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-306, 86 Stat. 163, 175.
383
Nixon, Second Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1972, supra note 381, at 627.
384
Act of June 14, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-313, § _, 86 Stat. 216, 220.
385
Richard M. Nixon, Statement About Signing the Public Buildings Amendments of 1972
(June 17, 1972), in 1972 PUB. PAPERS 686, 687; see also Watson, supra note 86, at 1025 n.215.
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§§ 5(f), 7, 86 Stat. at 220, 221.
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executive powers.” Consequently, President Nixon directed the General Services
Administration to disregard those provisions and submit remedial legislation.387 Nixon
similarly vetoed the War Powers Resolution in part because of the legislative veto
provision it contained.388 Although Nixon did subsequently sign several legislative veto
provisions into law without comment,389 his previous objections were doubtlessly
sufficient to preserve his constitutional challenge for the purposes of coordinate
construction.
And perhaps most dramatically, Nixon asserted his right to control the execution
of the laws throughout the Watergate scandal. The issue first arose during the hearings
concerning Elliott Richardson’s confirmation as Attorney General. Richardson agreed in
principle that a special prosecutor should be appointed, but insisted on the importance
“that the Attorney General retain[] ultimate responsibility” for the special prosecutor’s
work.390 Alternatively, the special prosecutor could be responsible only to the chief
executive, since “executive power is vested in the President [by the Constitution] and
since it has been ruled by the Supreme Court that the conduct of investigations and

387

Nixon, Statement About Signing the Public Buildings Amendments of 1972, supra note

385, at 687-88.
388

Richard M. Nixon, Veto of the War Powers Resolution (Oct. 24, 1973), in 1973 PUB.
PAPERS 893, 893, 895 (objecting that the War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973),
violated the Constitution). Congress overrode Nixon’s veto. 119 CONG. REC. H9641-61, S20093-116
(daily ed. Nov. 7, 1973). See generally Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The Congressional Veto and Separation of
Powers: The Executive on a Leash?, 56 N.C. L. REV. 423, 428 & n.21 (1978); Watson, supra note 86, at
1016 n.160.
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E.g., Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat 103, 107 (1972); Act of Oct.
21, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-520, § 3, sec. 18(d)(4), 86 Stat. 1019, 1021; Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627. Nixon even proposed a legislative veto provision, but eventually
vetoed the underlying legislation on other grounds. See Watson, supra note 86, at 1016 n.160. See
generally id. at 1009, 1016 n.160, 1026 n.215, 1029.
390
Nomination of Elliot L. Richardson to Be Attorney General: Hearings Before the Sen.
Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1973).
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prosecutions as defined by the law are executive branch functions.”391 Richardson
insisted, “I know of no way constitutionally whereby any individual who has been vested
with prosecutorial responsibility can be removed from responsibility to a superior within
the executive branch.”392
Nixon’s belief in his sole authority to control the execution of the law was
demonstrated most dramatically by the “Saturday Night Massacre,” in which he directed
Attorney General Richardson and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus to
remove Archibald Cox as Watergate special prosecutor notwithstanding the Justice
Department order granting Cox the “greatest degree of independence that is consistent
with the Attorney General’s statutory authority” and providing that Cox would not be
removed “except for extraordinary improprieties on his part.”393 After Richardson
resigned and Ruckelshaus was removed over their refusal to fire Cox, the task fell to
Solicitor General Robert Bork. Although regrettable, the Saturday Night Massacre
remains a vivid, if controversial, assertion of Nixon’s belief in his authority to control the
execution of the law
The Nixon Administration continued to press its belief in the impropriety of
insulating executive functions from presidential control when opposing the welter of bills
seeking to authorize the appointment of temporary special prosecutors under the control
of the courts. In Senate hearings on the legislation, Acting Attorney General Bork
testified, “The executive alone has the duty and the power to enforce the laws by

391
392
393

Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 139. See generally EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 31-34.
38 Fed. Reg. 14688 (1973).
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prosecutions brought before the courts.”394 Giving such authority to another branch “is
simply not our system of government.”395 Bork offered a similar observation in his
testimony before a House subcommittee, arguing that “[t]o suppose that Congress can
take that duty form the Executive and lodge in either in itself or in the courts is to
suppose that Congress may by mere legislation alter the fundamental distribution of
powers dictate by the Constitution.”396
Over time, many leading figures have begun to question the conventional wisdom
that the Saturday Night Massacre demonstrated the need for a prosecutorial institution
operating independently of presidential control.397 The political uproar following Cox’s
dismissal forced Nixon to appoint another special prosecutor, Leon Jaworski, who
completed the Watergate investigation and drove Nixon out of office. The episode
demonstrates how political constraints can ensure the effectiveness of investigations of
high-level government misconduct without resort to constitutionally problematic
institutional arrangements. From this perspective, it is Jaworski’s successful completion
of the Watergate prosecution rather than Cox’s removal that represents the central lesson
with respect to the separation of powers. Regardless of where one comes down in this
debate, the fact remains that Cox’s removal and the administration’s opposition to
congressional attempts to authorize special prosecutors operating independently of
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presidential control represent prominent examples of Nixon’s steadfast insistence on the
unitariness of the executive branch.
VI.

GERALD R. FORD

When Gerald R. Ford came to the White House, he had every reason to expect
that he would be hard pressed to defend the prerogatives of the executive branch.
Watergate had effectively destroyed public confidence in the Presidency. Moreover,
having never run for national office, Ford lacked the mandate and the broad base of
political support needed for vigorous presidential action. More than any other postWorld War II President, Ford could have been expected to acquiesce to congressionallyimposed invasions on the unitariness of the executive branch. Ford’s biographer, John
Robert Greene, notes:
The 865 days of the Ford presidency tell a story of an administration
struggling to create itself, to escape the long shadow of the Nixon
administration by offering its own agenda to the American people. The
pardon, as we shall see, is the seminal event in the planning of both these
objectives as Ford sought to evict the ghost of Nixon past from his White
House and to begin anew, with a Ford administration.398
When Ford assumed office, “Political sagacity dictated that [he] fire the Nixon
people as quickly as possible and when he installed his own advisers that he steer clear of
a Haldeman-like chief of staff.”399 Ford immediately indicated that White House Chief
of Staff Alexander Haig could stay on for a short while, but that he would soon be
replaced by young turk Donald Rumsfeld.400 Rumsfeld’s strong personality guaranteed
that there would be at least some centralized control of White House operations. During
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the one month honeymoon period between Nixon’s resignation and Ford’s pardon of him,
“The idea of a strong cabinet” gained favor “[a]s most of the country had come to view
the Nixon White House as a fortress where access was forbidden and advice ignored.”401
Ford made some moves toward a stronger cabinet, but he did not totally buck the modern
trend toward strong White House staffs. “The pattern that actually emerged in Ford’s
administration fell in between these extremes of policy development. Ford’s style with
his cabinet was neither as heavy-handed as Nixon’s nor did it offer a collegial return to
cabinet government.”402
The first two major issues of the Ford presidency emerged one month into his
administration when he pardoned both former President Richard M. Nixon and many of
those individuals who had evaded the draft during the Vietnam War. These two pardons
“destroyed [Ford’s] honeymoon with the American people.”403 The pardon of the draft
evaders was a major decision about the execution of the laws based on Ford’s belief that
it was necessary to bring to an end the “‘long national nightmare’ of the sixties.”404 This
pardon helped to “cement Ford’s image as a conciliator,”405 and it was in accord with
previous exercises of the pardon power to bring the American people together after a
major war. The question of whether to pardon Nixon had “hung over the administration
like the sword of Damocles,” since it had been a major item of discussion at Ford’s first
cabinet meeting.406 Ford felt the pardon was appropriate both because of Nixon’s
precarious health—a trial might have killed him—and because he wanted to, in the
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language of the Preamble of the Constitution, “ensure domestic tranquility.”407
Obviously, the two pardons together were a major law enforcement decision made by
Ford personally about what degree of law enforcement would best serve the interests of
the nation. The fact that Ford made these two law enforcement decisions himself as the
nation’s chief law enforcement officer is telling support for the theory of the unitary
executive.
After the Nixon pardon, congressional power vis-à-vis the executive branch began
to grow enormously, continuing a trend that began in the Johnson and Nixon
Administrations. The public perception of the time was that there had grown up what
was called in Arthur Schlesinger’s words, an imperial presidency,408 and that the time had
come to restore some power to Congress. The “stinging” and “bipartisan” opposition on
Capitol Hill to the Nixon pardon began a long process of power flowing away from the
White House.409 “A new day had dawned, and Ford had to work in that new day—
clearly the locus of power in the federal government had shifted back from the White
House to Capitol Hill.”410
After two of Richard Nixon’s Attorneys General were convicted of crimes, it was
essential that Ford pick a person of impeccable character to serve in that role. Ford did
precisely that by turning to Edward Levi, then the president of the University of Chicago.
“Levi made it clear to Ford early in the nominating process that he would not take the job
unless Justice was made apolitical.”411 Ford and Levi together faced many crises,
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including the threat of violence attending school desegregation in Boston. “Ford was
ready to intercede if violence broke out. He had ordered the Department of Defense to
put fifteen hundred troops of the Eighty-second Airborne on an increased state of
readiness, which would allow them to be in Boston in nine hours.”412 This shows how
seriously Ford took his obligation faithfully to execute the laws.
Early in Ford’s presidency, major scandals broke linking the Central Intelligence
Agency to attempted assassinations in Cuba and in Vietnam. Ford responded to this
crisis on January 4, 1975, by creating a presidential Commission on CIA activities
headed up by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. Ultimately, Congress could not resist
forming its own Committee under Senator Frank Church to investigate the CIA, and that
Committee went quite a bit further than the Rockefeller Committee in arguably crippling
the CIA. Within the political constraints he was operating under, which were severe,
Ford did his best to maintain the CIA’s effectiveness. He also strongly resisted handing
over documents to the Church Committee seeking “to give the appearance of cooperation
without actually providing the committee with any substantive documentation.”413 Thus
did Ford defend executive prerogatives in the extremely trying months after the
Watergate scandal and the Nixon pardon.
In April of 1975, Ford’s situation became even direr as it became clear that the
governments of South Vietnam and Cambodia were going to fall to the communists
unless Congress appropriated money to help those countries defend themselves.
Scandalously, Congress cut off all funding whatsoever for the anticommunist efforts in
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Southeast Asia and even failed to appropriate money to evacuate those Cambodians and
South Vietnamese citizens whose lives would be in danger because of their past help for
the U.S. war effort in Indochina. Ultimately, Ford had to personally give the order for the
evacuation by helicopter from Saigon of as many people as the military could manage to
help get out.414
In May 1975, Ford presided as Commander in Chief over the rescue of American
passengers and crew on the Mayaguez, a ship that was captured by the Cambodians.
“Ford’s behavior was calm and rational throughout the crisis and his demeanor spread to
his team.”415 Ford felt he had a duty as president to rescue the captured Americans and
he fulfilled that duty.416 Ford took military action without consulting Congress under the
War Powers Act,417 and when members of Congress complained about his failure to
consult them he said, “It is my constitutional responsibility to command the forces and to
protect Americans.”418 Ford lived up to that responsibility and rescued the Mayaguez
crew and passengers.
On November 2 and 3, 1975, Ford made some major personnel changes in his
administration which showed he was not afraid to remove people when he thought it
necessary to do so. First, Ford asked for the resignations of Defense Secretary James
Schlesinger and CIA Director William Colby. He also removed the ailing Rogers Morton
as Commerce Secretary, and he stripped Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of his second

414
415
416
417
418

Id. at 140.
Id. at 145.
Id. at 144.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 148.

89

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art12

job as White House National Security Advisor.419 Colby was replaced at the CIA by
George Bush; Rumsfeld replaced Schlesinger at the Pentagon; while the young Dick
Cheney replaced Rumsfeld as White House Chief of Staff.420 All in all, it was a good
series of personnel moves, since the incoming figures—Bush, Rumsfeld and Cheney—all
proved exceptionally capable. The next day, it was announced that Vice President
Nelson Rockefeller would be dropped from the ticket when Ford ran for reelection in
1976. This was a move to reach out to conservatives then gathering around the White
House candidacy of Ronald Reagan, since conservatives detested Rockefeller and were
certain to be disappointed by Ford’s firing of Schlesinger.421 With these bold and
decisive personnel moves, Ford showed that he and he alone was firmly in control of the
executive branch.
There was one other prominent removal during the Ford years: the firing of
Agriculture Secretary Earl Butz in the middle of Ford’s reelection campaign. Butz
foolishly told off-color jokes to Rolling Stone Magazine correspondent John Dean that
were subsequently published in the national press to the great embarrassment of the
administration. “On Monday morning Butz met with Ford; around noon with tears in his
eyes, he went before the press and resigned. Ford’s assessment of Dean was entirely
predictable: ‘a low-down, no-good, son of a bitch. A sniveling bastard.’”422
Ford took other steps that demonstrated his willingness to take control of his
administration. For example, Ford did not hesitate to direct the actions of subordinate
executive officials, at one point directing the Department of Health, Education, and
419
420
421
422
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Welfare to suspend a rule so that it could be reexamined.423 Ford also continued the
Quality of Life program begun established by President Nixon, adding the requirement
that major rules include an “inflation impact statement” comparing the costs and
inflationary effects with the benefits of the rules.424 These statements would then be
reviewed by the newly formed Council on Wage and Price Stability, although such
review would only proceed after the proposed rule had been published in the Federal
Register and the Council had no power to mandate changes in the rules.425
Ford also rebuffed congressional attempts to impinge upon the president’s
authority to execute the law. Members of the Ford Administration testified against the
establishment of independent prosecutors. Attorney General Edward H. Levi testified
that the special prosecutor appointed by the judiciary was “constitutionally dubious.”426
Assistant Attorney General Michael M. Uhlmann challenged the constitutionality of the
proposal as well on the grounds that control of prosecution lay at “the very core of
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Provision for Special Prosecutor: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
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‘executive functions.’”427 Deputy Attorney General Harold Tyler, Jr., similarly criticized
the proposal as “constitutionally inappropriate” because “[u]nlike any other officer of the
Executive branch [the special prosecutor’s] removal would be beyond the discretion of
the President.”428
Ford instead offered a proposal in which special prosecutors would be appointed
by the president to three-year terms, confirmed with the advice and consent of the Senate,
and subject to the supervision and removal by the Attorney General.429 The Senate
approved Ford’s proposal by a vote of ninety-one to five, but House declined to do so on
the grounds that the creation of a permanent position would lead to the instigation of too
many special prosecutor investigations. Members of the House instead favored a
temporary special prosecutor appointed by a special panel of judges.430 In retrospect, it is
now clear that the House had it precisely backwards. It is the absence of executive
control rather than the permanence of the office that represents the greater danger.
However, the fact that Congress declined to enact this legislation does not weaken the
constitutional import of the president’s insistence that executive functions remain subject
to presidential control.
Furthermore, after a slow start,431 Ford began to challenge the legislative veto as
an impermissible invasion of the unitary executive. At first, Ford was only willing to
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question the device, issuing a signing statement challenging the legislative veto as
improperly “inject[ing] the Congress into the process of administering education laws”
and “attempting to stretch the constitutional role of the Congress.” Although Ford
acknowledged that “[t]he Congress can and should hold the executive branch to account
for its performance, but for the Congress to attempt to administer Federal programs is
questionable on practical as well as constitutional grounds.” Accordingly, President Ford
“asked the Attorney General for advice on these provisions.”432 Two months later,
Ford’s opposition to these provisions stiffened when he vetoed a bill because it contained
a two-house legislative veto.433
Ford objected twice more in 1975, calling the legislative veto “an unconstitutional
exercise of Congressional power.”434 In the latter of these two instances, Ford instructed
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare “to treat this provision . . . simply as a
request for information about the proposed standards in advance of their
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promulgation.”435 Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia tirelessly testified before
Congress in opposition to the legislative veto.436
But it was not until 1976 that Ford offered his boldest criticisms of the legislative
veto.437 Ford entered no fewer than six vetoes438 and five signing statements439 criticizing
the legislative veto. Ford based many of his objections on the unitariness of the executive
branch.440 As Ford at one point noted:

435

Ford, Statement on Signing a Bill Amending Child Support Provisions of the Social
Security Act, supra note 434, at 1149.
436
Dixon, supra note 388, at 428 n.22 (citing Congressional Review of Administration
Rulemaking: Hearings on H.R. 3658, H.R. 8231, and related Bills Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 373 (1975);
Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements—1975: Hearings on S. 632 and S. 1251 Before the
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 167, 17374, 183-87 (1975); Improving Congressional Oversight of Federal Regulatory Agencies: Hearings on S.
2258, S. 2716, S. 2812, S. 2878, S. 2903, S. 2925, S. 3318, and S. 3428 Before the Sen. Comm. on
Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 80-81, 124 (1976); Congressional Review of International
Agreements: Hearings on H.R. 4438 Before the Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs
of the House Comm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 182 (1976)); Symposium, Oversight
and Review of Agency Decisionmaking Part II, Morning Session, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 661, 684-95, 700-01
(1976) (remarks of Antonin Scalia)).
437
See Dixon, supra note 388, at 429-30 n.24 (noting Ford’s growing opposition to
legislative vetoes). Ford’s attack on the legislative veto occurred at a time when the House had passed a
proposal to subject all agency rules to a legislative veto. 122 CONG. REC. 31668 (1976); see also FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 142.
438
Gerald R. Ford, Veto of the Hatch Act Amendments Bill (Apr. 12, 1976), in 1976-77
PUB. PAPERS 1114; Gerald R. Ford, Veto of the Foreign Assistance Bill (May 7, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB.
PAPERS 1481, 1482; Gerald R. Ford, Veto of the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Bill (July 7, 1976), in
1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 1984; Gerald R. Ford, Veto of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Extension Bill (Aug. 14, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 2144; Gerald R. Ford, Memorandum of
Disapproval of the International Navigational Rules Act of 1976 (Oct. 10, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS
2481; Gerald R. Ford, Memorandum of Disapproval of the Agricultural Resources Conservation Bill (Oct.
20, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 2583. See generally BOLTON, supra note 223, at 10 n.24; Dixon, supra
note 388, at 429-30 n.24.
439
Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing the Department of Defense Appropriation Act,
1976 (Feb. 10, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 241, 242; Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing the Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 (May 11, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 1529, 1530; Gerald
R. Ford, Statement on Signing the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976
(July 1, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 1936, 1937; Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing the National
Emergencies Act (Sept. 14, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS 2249; Gerald Ford, Statement on Signing the
Veterans’ Education and Employment Assistance Act of 1976 (Oct. 15, 1976), in 1976-77 PUB. PAPERS
2538, 2539. See generally Dixon, supra note 388, at 429 nn.23-24.
440
Ford also challenged the legislative veto as a violation of Article I, section 7. See, e.g.,
Ford, Statement on Signing the National Emergencies Act , supra note 439, at 2249.

94

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

The exercise of an otherwise valid Executive power cannot be limited by a
discretionary act of a committee of Congress nor can a committee give the
Executive a power which it otherwise would not have. The legislative
branch cannot inject itself into the Executive functions, and opposition to
attempts of the kind embodied in this bill has been expressed for more
than 50 years.441
Ford later similarly objected that legislative veto provisions purported to involve
the Congress in the performance of day-to-day executive functions in derogation of the
principle of separation of powers, resulting in the erosion of the fundamental
constitutional distinction between the role of the Congress in enacting legislation and the
role of the executive in carrying it out.442 Ford repeatedly announced his support for
challenging the constitutionality of the practice in court.443
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Thus, even though Ford did at times tolerate the enactment of legislative
vetoes,444 there can be little doubt that Ford raised sufficient objections and exerted
sufficient control over his subordinates to overcome any suggestion that he acquiesced to
congressional interference in the execution of the laws. Despite all the handicaps that
Gerald Ford faced as an unelected president and as a result of the Nixon pardon, Ford still
emerged as a steady defender of the President’s authority to execute the laws.
VII.

JIMMY CARTER

The Administration of Jimmy Carter without doubt represents the nadir of
presidential power in the post-World War II era. Apparently unable to articulate a clear
vision for the country and beset by the oil and Iranian hostage crises, Carter ultimately
proved ill-suited to assume the strong leadership role taken by many of his
predecessors.445 His political weaknesses, however, did not translate into a willingness to
allow control over the execution of the law to be transferred from the White House to
Capitol Hill. On the contrary, in spite of its other problems, the Carter Administration
appears to have solidly defended the unitariness of the executive branch.
To some degree, the Carter Administration’s ability to resist encroachments on his
authority to execute the laws was limited by the shadow of Watergate, as demonstrated
by the fate of its constitutional objections to a troika of ethics reform proposals enacted
over a two-week span in 1978. The first was the Inspector General Act of 1978,446 which
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vested the existing audit and investigative authority in each of the executive departments
in an independent Office of Inspector General. Each Inspector General was required to
report the results of such audits or investigations to the head of the department and to
make general reports to Congress on a semi-annual basis.447 The statute also required
that the president communicates the reasons for removing any Inspector General to both
houses of Congress.448
John Harmon, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of Carter’s Office of
Legal Counsel, denounced this legislation as “making the Inspectors General subject to
divided and possibly inconsistent obligations to the executive and legislative branches, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.”449 For example, the provision
requiring that the Inspectors General report directly to Congress impermissibly interfered
with the President’s authority to control the execution of the laws. As the opinion
pointed out:
Article II vests the executive power of the United States in the President.
This includes general administrative control over those executing the laws.
The President’s power of control extends to the entire executive branch,
and includes the right to coordinate and supervise all replies and
comments from the executive branch to Congress.450
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[T]he Justice Department has repeatedly taken the position that continuous oversight of
the functioning of executive agencies, such as that contemplated by the requirement that
the Inspector General keep Congress fully and currently informed, is not a proper
legislative function. In our opinion, such continuing supervision amounts to an
assumption of the Executive’s role of administering or executing the laws.
Id. By providing for unlimited access to executive branch materials, the bill also risked infringing upon
executive privilege. Id. at 18.
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Moreover, the requirement that the President provide Congress with reasons for
any removal of an Inspector General constituted “an improper restriction on the
President’s exclusive power to remove Presidentially appointed executive officers.”451
Although the opinion acknowledged the exception created by Humphrey’s Executor and
Wiener for quasi-judicial or quasi-legislative officers, “the power to remove a subordinate
appointed officer within one of the executive departments is a power reserved to the
President acting in his discretion.”452 Furthermore, the Inspector General Act violated the
unitariness of the executive branch by authorizing the Comptroller General to prescribe
the audit standards that would apply to the executive branch.453
The second piece of legislation was the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,454
which grew out of a bill submitted by Carter proposing that the Civil Service
Commission be replaced by two newly created agencies. The Commission’s
administrative responsibilities would be transferred to the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM), while its appellate functions would be vested in the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) and its investigatory functions being lodged in an Office of
Special Counsel within the MSPB.455

While this legislation was pending before

Congress, Carter issued a reorganization plan456 and an executive order457 largely
implementing his legislative proposals.

451

Id. at 18.
Id.; see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 78.
453
See Charles J. Williams III, Comment, The New Separation of Powers Jurisprudence and
the Controller General: Does He “Execute the Law” Under the Federal Employees’ Retirement Act?, 9
GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 35, 41 (1986) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 584, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1977)).
454
Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111.
455
_ CONG. REC. _ (1978).
456
Reorg. Plan No. 2 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1978 compilation), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at
1577 (1994), and 92 Stat. 3783 (1978).
457
Exec. Order No. 12107, 3 C.F.R. 264 (1978 compilation), reprinted in . 5 U.S.C. § 1101
452

98

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

When Congress enacted the Civil Service Reform Act, it retained the same
standard for dismissal that existed in previous statutes, allowing removals “only for such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.”458 It added a list of prohibited
personnel practices, including among other things discrimination, political coercion,
nepotism, and retaliation against whistleblowers.459 In an apparent desire to limit the
range of adverse action that would be reversed on appeal,460 the Civil Service Reform Act
also scaled back some of the procedural protections promulgated by the Civil Service
Commission in the aftermath of Arnett v. Kennedy.461 It also provided for broader
judicial review of adverse personnel decisions by giving the courts jurisdiction to
overturn MSPB decisions that were arbitrary or capricious, obtained without the
applicable procedural protections, or unsupported by substantial evidence.462 The statute
did contain provisions exempting all officials who were appointed by the president; who
were confirmed by the Senate; who served in the foreign service or for the Central
Intelligence Agency; or who was determined by the president, a department head, or
OPM to occupy positions “of a confidential, policy-determining, policy-making or policy
advocating character.”463 By exempting all policymaking personnel, this provision in
effect limited the scope of the Civil Service Reform Act to purely ministerial officials.

app. at _.

458

5 U.S.C. § 7513(a). As was the case with the predecessor statutes, the legislative history
provides no help in interpreting this provision. See Stephen G. Vaskov, Judicial Review of Dismissals of
Civil Service Employees for Off-Duty Misconduct: The Approach of the Federal Circuit, 34 AM. U. L.
REV. 439, 458 (1985).
459
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)-(3), (6)-(7).
460
See S. REP. NO. 95-969, at 55 (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723 2777; Brewer
v. United States Postal Serv., 647 F.2d 1093, 1097 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
461
416 U.S. 134 (1974). For an review of these expanded protections, see Buffon, supra
note 272, at 212-23.
462
Id. § 7703(c).
463
Id. § 7511(b).
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As such, it did not represent a significant derogation from the unitariness of the executive
branch.
There were other provisions, however, that were more problematic. Unlike the
Civil Service Act of 1883, which made Civil Service Commissioners removable by the
president at will, and in contrast to the president’s initial proposal, which was silent on
the point and presumably would have allowed for unfettered removal of MSPB members,
the version of the Civil Service Reform Act actually adopted provided that MSPB
members “may be removed by the President only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.”464 In addition, the statute extended the same removal protections
to the Office of Special Counsel charged with investigating wrongful terminations.465
Harmon challenged the removal provisions, pointing out that “the functions of the
Special Counsel would be predominantly executive in character. . . . [S]ince, he will be
performing largely executive functions, [OLC] believe[s] that Congress may impose no
restrictions on the President’s power to remove him.”466
Most importantly, Harmon suggested that the provision of the Ethics in
Government Act467 that vested the power to remove special prosecutors in a special panel
of the D.C. Circuit raised “serious constitutional questions.”468 In addition, there seemed

464

5 U.S.C. § 1202(d).
5 U.S.C. § 1204.
466
Letter from John Harmon, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Sen.
Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs 6 (June 14, 1978), quoted
in Douglas W. Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary Executive, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 337, 340 (1993).
467
Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
468
Special Prosecutor Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1977). Congress responded in part to this
concern by amending the legislation to place the removal power in the Attorney General, but prohibiting
such removals except for extraordinary impropriety, physical disability, mental incapacity, or “any other
condition that substantially impairs the performance of such special prosecutor’s duties.” § 596, 92 Stat.
465
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to be serious questions about the need for such a statute. When allegations of presidential
misconduct surfaced regarding a money laundering scheme involving the Carter peanut
warehouse, Attorney General Griffin Bell had appointed his own special prosecutors,
subject to his supervision and removal, who successfully completed his investigation in
an exemplary manner that enjoyed widespread public confidence.469 Indeed, Carter’s
Attorneys General would emerge as leading critics of the Ethics in Government Act.470
Despite these misgivings about each of these statutes, in the aftermath of Watergate
Carter had little choice but to overlook these constitutional problems and accept this
legislation.471 Harmon’s discussion of the provision is a study in lawyerly
circumspection, noting that the Justice Department had no objections to the removal
provisions.472 Harmon noted that under Myers, Congress may not ordinarily impose
limits on the president’s power to remove, and it was not altogether clear whether the
qualification imposed by Humphrey’s Executor applied to special prosecutors. In light of
the extraordinary need to restore public confidence in the government, the Justice
Department was wiling to permit the experiment of a limitation on the president’s power
to remove.473

1869; see also EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 145 n.6; FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339,
at 77; FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 427, at 146.
469
See S. REP. NO. 97-496, at 5 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3537, 3541.
470
See Senate Committee Hearings, supra note 704. at 28 (testimony of former Attorney
General Griffin B. Bell); Benjamin R. Civiletti, Post-Watergate Legislation in Retrospect, 34 SW. L.J.
1043, 1051-56 (1981).
471
See Jimmy Carter, Ethics in Government Act of 1978: Remarks on Singing S. 555 into
Law (Oct. 26, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1854; Jimmy Carter, Ethics in Government: Message to the
Congress (May 3, 1977), in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 786, 788.
472
Nomination of Elliot L. Richardson to Be Attorney General: Hearings Before the Sen.
Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1973).
473
Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977; Blind Trusts and Other Conflicts of Interest
Matters: Hearings Before the Sen. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-17 (1977).
See generally EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 57-58.
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However, when the areas involved did not relate so directly to ethical abuses by
the executive branch, Carter’s was better able to defend the President’s authority to
execute the laws. In 1978, Carter vetoed a bill that would have required three Cabinet
officers to report to Congress whenever the President’s budget requests for certain
activities were less than the amounts authorized by Congress and to explain why the
higher amounts were not requested. Calling it an “unacceptable intrusion” on his
obligations and ability to make budget recommendations, Carter refused to comply.474
Moreover, the following year Carter refused to comply with a rider barring him from
closing ten specified United States Consulates,475 announcing in a signing statement that
he would treat the rider as a “recommendation and not a requirement.”476
Carter did not hesitate to intervene directly in legal matters of personal concern,
dictating the Administration’s position in Bakke477 and overruling Bell’s objection to the
use of public funds to pay the salaries of persons working in church schools.478 The
Carter Administration also centralized its control over federal litigation, emphasizing the
“Attorney General’s plenary power over governmental litigation.”479 Towards this end,
Carter created the Federal Legal Council to facilitate “coordination and communication

474

Jimmy Carter, Veto of the Sikes Act Amendments of 1978: Message to the House of
Representatives Returning H.R. 10882 Without Approval (July 10, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1250,
1250; see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 192.
475
Act of Aug. 15, 1979, Pub. L. No. § 108, 93 Stat. 395, 397.
476
Jimmy Carter, Department of State, International Communication Agency, and Board of
International Broadcasting Appropriations Bill: Statement on Singing H.R. 3363 into Law (Aug. 15, 1979),
in 1979 PUB. PAPERS 1434, 1434. Carter closed seven of the ten protected consulates by early the
following year. 126 CONG. REC. 21515-16, 28513 (1980); see also May, supra note 289, at 967.
477
See Devins, supra note 156, at 285 (citing inter alia GRIFFIN B. BELL & RONALD J.
OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 29-32 (1982); FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 427, at 286).
478
See Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of Legal Counsel, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
437, 449 (1993) (citing BELL & OSTROW, supra note , at 24-28).
479
4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 233, 234 (1980). It should be noted that Carter did permit the
agencies to present their own views before the Supreme Court. See Devins, supra note 156, at 289.
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among Federal legal offices” in order to “avoid inconsistent or unnecessary litigation by
agencies.”480 In addition, the Carter Administration shelved a proposal advanced during
the campaign to turn the Justice Department into an independent agency. Bell, who as
Attorney General was assigned the task of preparing the necessary legislation, expressed
“serious doubt as to the constitutionality of such legislation.”481 According to Bell, “[t]he
first sentence of Article II vests the executive power of the Government in the President
and charges him with the general administrative responsibility for executing the laws of
the United States.482 When combined with the Appointments and Take Care Clauses,
Bell concluded that “the President is given not only the power, but also the constitutional
obligation to execute the laws.”483 Moreover, the Court made clear in Myers v. United
States484 that “the President’s freedom to remove executive officials cannot be altered by
legislation.”485 This was particularly true for the Attorney General:
The Attorney General is the chief law enforcement officer of the
Untied States. He acts for the President to ensure that the President’s
constitutional responsibility to enforce the laws is fulfilled. To limit a
President in his choice of the officer to carry out this function or to restrict
the President’s power to remove him would impair the President’s ability
to execute the laws.
Indeed, the President must be held accountable for the actions of
the executive branch; to accomplish this he must be free to establish policy
and define priorities. Because laws are not self-executing, their
enforcement obliviously cannot be separated from policy considerations.
The Constitution contemplates that the Attorney General should be subject
to the policy direction of the President. As stated by the Supreme Court:
“The Attorney General is . . . the hand of the President in taking care that

480

Exec. Order 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409, 410 (1980 compilation); see also Devins, supra note
156, at 266, 268-69; Harvey, supra note 156, at 1584; Kristen A. Norman-Major, The Solicitor General:
Executive Policy Agendas and the Court, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1081, 1085 (1994).
481
1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 75, 75 (1977).
482
Id.
483
Id. at 76.
484
272 U.S. 52 (1926).
485
1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 76.
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the laws of the United States . . . be faithfully executed.” Removing the
Attorney General from the President’s control would make him
unaccountable to the President, who is constitutionally responsible for his
actions.486
Any limitation on the president’s power to remove the Attorney General, even if selfimposed by executive order, “would be restricting [the president’s] ability to fulfill his
constitutional responsibility to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. That
constitutional responsibility for the execution of the laws cannot be waived.”487 Thus,
Bell concluded, “there is no method, short of a constitutional amendment, to separate the
Attorney General from Presidential control.”488
Furthermore, in the face of continuing congressional interest in the legislative
veto,489 Carter also continued his predecessors’ practice of opposing the device as an
unconstitutional infringement of the President’s exclusive authority to execute ongoing
federal programs.490 Carter protested that the legislative veto had “the potential of
involving Congress in the execution of the laws, a responsibility reserved for the
President under the Constitution.” Therefore, in signing the bill, Carter noted his
“intention to preserve the constitutional authority of the President.”491 A month later,

486

Id. (alterations in original; citation omitted) (quoting Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S .254,

262 (1921)).
487

Id. at 77.
Id. See generally EASTLAND, supra note 6, at 43-44.
489
During the late 1970s, Congress extended the legislative veto into a wide range of new
areas, including the war power, national emergencies, impoundment, presidential papers, and federal
salaries. See Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86, at 284. In 1977, the House considered a proposal
similar to the one that passed the House during the Ford Administration that would have subjected all
agency regulations to a legislative veto. See Dixon, supra note 388, at 432 n.29.
490
For a summary of President Carter’s positions on legislative vetoes, see Peter E. Quint,
The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEX. L. REV. 785, 829-31 (1984); Fisher, Legislative Vetoes,
supra note 86, at 284-85; Dixon, supra note 388, at 431-32 nn.27-29. For lists of President Carter’s signing
statements opposing the legislative veto, see William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative
History: A Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 701 n.7, 718-19 (1991); May, supra note 289, at 934-35.
491
Jimmy Carter, International Security Assistance Act of 1977: Statement on Signing H.R.
6884 into Law (Aug. 5, 1977), in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 1431, 1432.
488
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Carter even more explicitly based his objection on the unitariness of the executive branch
by adding a key word to the language he used in his signing statement of August 5. The
execution of the laws was “a responsibility reserved exclusively to the President under the
Constitution.”492
Furthermore, in a general message to Congress issued on June 21, 1978, Carter
issued a sweeping condemnation of all legislative vetoes. In Carter’s eyes, legislative
vetoes unconstitutionally “inject[ed] the Congress into the details of administering
substantive programs and laws.” Such congressional participation in the execution of the
laws violated the Take Care Clause by “infring[ing] on the Executive’s constitutional
duty to faithfully execute the laws.”493 Although Carter noted that “the Attorney General

492

Jimmy Carter, Presidential War Powers Bill: Statement on Signing H.R. 7738 into Law
(Dec. 28, 1977), in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 2186, 2187 (emphasis added). President Carter also repeated his
objection based on Article I, Section 7, of the Constitution. Id. For other protests based on Article I,
Section 7, see Jimmy Carter, International Navigational Rules Act of 1977: Statement on Signing H.R. 186
into Law (July 28, 1977), in 1977 PUB. PAPERS 1374, 1375: Statement on Signing S. 791 into Law (Nov.
10, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1999, 2000; Jimmy Carter, Department of State, International
Communication Agency, and Board for International Broadcasting Appropriations Bill: Statement on
Signing H.R. 3363 into Law (Aug. 15, 1979), in 1979 PUB. PAPERS 1434, 1434-35; Jimmy Carter, Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act: Statement on Signing H.R. 10 into Law (May 23, 1980), in 198081 PUB. PAPERS 965; Jimmy Carter, International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980:
Statement on Signing H.R. 6942 into Law (Dec. 16, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 2813; see also Jimmy
Carter, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: Statement on Signing H.R. 8638 into Law (Mar. 10, 1978),
in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 500, 502 (challenging whether Congress could “overturn authorized executive actions
through procedures not provided in the Constitution”).
493
Jimmy Carter, Legislative Vetoes: Message to the Congress (June 21, 1978), in 1978
PUB. PAPERS 1146, 1147. Furthermore, legislative vetoes unconstitutionally “authorize[d] Congressional
action that has the effect of legislation while denying the President the opportunity to exercise his veto,”
effectively “circumvent[ing] the President’s role in the legislative process established by Article I, Section
7 of the Constitution.” Carter also objected to legislative vetoes on policy grounds, pointing out that they
contributed to administrative delays; tended to politicize the administrative process; and gave agencies
incentive to rely on case-by-case adjudication rather than issuing clear, uniform rules. Id. at 1147-48.
Carter did acknowledge one major exception to his position: legislative vetoes contained in reorganization
acts did “not involve Congressional intrusion into the administration of on-going substantive programs, and
it preserves the President’s authority because he decides which proposals to submit to Congress. The
Reorganization Act jeopardizes neither the President’s responsibilities nor the prerogatives of Congress.”
Id. at 1147; see also 43 Op. Att’y Gen. No. 10 (1977); Dixon, supra note 388, at 431-32 & n.27 (citing
Letter from Griffin Bell to President Carter (Jan. 31, 1977), reprinted in H.R. REP. NO. 105, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10-11 (1977); Letter from John Harmon to Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (Feb. 14, 1977); Letter from John
Harmon to Rep. Joshua Eilberg (Apr. 1, 1977)). Therefore, Carter entered no objection when signing the
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[was] seeking a definitive judgment” on the constitutionality of legislative vetoes, Carter
noted that “no immediate resolution is in prospect.”494 Therefore, Carter urged Congress
not to include legislative vetoes in future legislation and informed Congress that he
would treat all extant legislative vetoes as “report and wait” provisions. Furthermore, “if
Congress subsequently adopts a resolution to veto an Executive action, we will give it
serious consideration, but we will not, under our reading of the Constitution, consider it
legally binding.”495
As promised, Carter thereafter determinedly opposed the legislative vetoes,
refusing to sign at least two bills because they contained legislative vetoes496 and
announcing in numerous signing statements thereafter his intention to treat legislative
vetoes as “report and wait” requirements.497 Moreover, the Carter Administration, like

Reorganization Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 95-17, § 2, 91 Stat. 29, 29. See generally FISHER & DEVINS,
supra note 427, at 126-27, 136-37; Quint, supra note 490, at 830 n.233.
494
Carter, Legislative Vetoes: Message to the Congress, supra note 493, at 1147.
495
Id. at 1149. To say that the legislative veto is unconstitutional is not to give the President
license to ignore the wishes of Congress. The day after Carter’s Message to Congress was issued, Attorney
General Griffin Bell and White House Adviser Stuart Eizenstat each emphasized that, although the
President could not be bound by a legislative veto as a constitutional matter, as a matter of comity the
President nonetheless had every reason to accommodate the interests of Congress whenever possible.
Fisher, Legislative Vetoes, supra note 86, at 285; see also 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55, 55, 56, 58 (1980);
May, supra note 289, at 981. As Carter discovered throughout his tenure, the President disregards
congressional politics at his own risk.
496
E.g., Jimmy Carter, Veto of the Navajo and Hopi Relocation Bill: Memorandum of
Disapproval of H.R. 11092 (Nov. 2, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1925; Jimmy Carter, Veto of Legislation
Requiring a Study of Health Effects of Dioxin Exposure: Message to the Senate Returning S. 2096
Without Approval (Jan. 2, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 4.
497
Jimmy Carter, Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978: Statement on
Signing S. 9 into Law (Sept. 18, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1530, 1531; Amtrak Improvement Act of
1978: Statement on Signing S. 3040 into Law (Oct. 5, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1718; Jimmy Carter,
International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978: Statement on Signing H.R. 12222 into Law
(Oct. 6, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1721; Jimmy Carter, Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Appropriations Bill: Statement on Signing S. 1140 into Law (Aug. 29, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS
1592; Jimmy Carter, Coastal Zone Management Improvement Act of 1980: Statement on Signing S. 2622
into Law (Oct. 18, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 2335; Jimmy Carter, National Historic Preservation Act
Amendments of 1980: Statement on Signing H.R. 5496 into Law (Dec. 12, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS
2802, 2803; Jimmy Carter, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act Extension: Statement on
Signing H.R. 7018 into Law (Dec. 17, 1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 2814, 2815; see also Jimmy Carter,
National Parks and Recreation Act Amendments: Statement on Signing H.R. 3757 into Law (Mar. 5,
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the Ford Administration, challenged the constitutionality of the legislative veto in
court.498 These challenges were of more than passing interest to the President. In two
separate signing statements, he mentioned his intent to bring a judicial challenge to the
legislative veto.499 Moreover, after the Ninth Circuit struck down the legislative veto,500

1980), in 1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 432, 433 (instructing Secretary of the Interior to regard committee veto “as
advisory only”); Carter, Presidential War Powers Bill, supra note 492, at 2187 (issued prior to June 21,
1978, Message) (indicating that legislative would be treated as a “notify and wait” provision). In three
statements, President Carter specifically stated that congressional attempts to exercise a legislative veto
would be given serious consideration, but not regarded as legally binding. Carter, Marine Protection,
Research, and Sanctuaries Appropriations Bill, supra, at 1592; Jimmy Carter, Coastal Zone Management
Improvement Act of 1980, supra, at 2335; Carter, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act
Extension, supra, at 2815.
Four other signing statements effectively took the same position without referring directly to the
June 21, 1978, Message. Carter, National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, supra note 498, at 2000
(directing the Secretary of Agriculture to report actions to Congress and “listen to any concerns which may
be expressed by the specified congressional committees” with the understanding that the Secretary may
consummate any actions without committee approval); Carter, Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons
Act, supra note 492, at 965 (directing Attorney General to “carefully consider any congressional views that
are expressed” without “treat[ing] any resolution of ‘disapproval’ as binding”).
498
Although the Carter Administration challenged the constitutionality of the legislative veto
before the Supreme Court, Brief of the United States at _, Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425
(1977) (No. 75-1606), the Court declined to reach the question, noting only that “[w]hatever are the future
possibilities for constitutional conflict in the promulgation of regulations respecting public access to
particular documents, nothing in the Act renders it unduly disruptive of the Executive Branch and,
therefore, unconstitutional on its face.” 433 U.S. at 444-45. The Carter Administration also backed
challenges to the legislative veto in several courts of appeals with mixed results. Compare Chadha v. INS,
634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down legislative veto), and McCorkle v.
United States, 559 F.2d 1258 (4th Cir. 1977) (same); with Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl.
1977) (upholding legislative veto). See also Fisher, Interpretation Outside the Courts, supra note 86, at 82;
Fisher, Legislative Vetoes, supra note 86, at 284.
The Carter Administration did face some problems framing the legislative veto as an issue in a
justiciable controversy. Even though President Carter instructed the Secretary of Agriculture in 1978 that
he should proceed without following a certain legislative veto provision, Carter, National Parks and
Recreation Act of 1978, supra, at 2000, the Justice Department concluded that “in spite of the President’s
direction, the Department [of Agriculture] and the Forest Service should cooperate with . . . the Congress”
and advised the Department of Agriculture that it could voluntarily comply with the legislative veto
provision as a matter of policy. The Department of Agriculture ordered the Forest Service “to proceed as if
[the legislative veto provision] were applicable,” the President’s instructions notwithstanding. The Forest
Service complied with the Departments orders. May, supra note 289, at 944-45 (quoting Additions to the
National Wilderness Preservation System: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 244-45 (1979)).
499
Carter, Legislative Vetoes, supra note 493, at 1147; Jimmy Carter, Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Acts of 1980: Statement on Signing H.R. 2313 into Law (May 28, 1980), in
1980-81 PUB. PAPERS 982, 983.
500
Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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Carter issued a statement applauding the decision and urging the Attorney General to
“seek[] Supreme Court review of the decision as soon as possible.”501
In fact, the Carter Administration even went so far as to ignore Congress’s
attempt to exercise a legislative veto over a series of education regulations.502 Attorney
General Benjamin Civiletti advised the Secretary of Education that the legislative veto
provision violated the Constitution and that the Secretary of Education was “entitled to
implement the regulations in question in spite of Congress’ disapproval.”503 Civiletti
concluded, “only the executive branch can execute the statutes of the United States.”504
To recognize the legislative veto “as legally binding would constitute an abdication of the
responsibility of the executive branch, as an equal and coordinate branch of government
with the legislative branch, to preserve the integrity of its functions.”505 As a result,
“once a function had been delegated to the executive branch, it must be performed there,
and cannot be subjected to continuing congressional control except through the
constitutional process of enacting new legislation.”506

501

Jimmy Carter, Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Service: Statement on the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision (Dec. 24, 1980), in 1980 PUB. PAPERS 2836.
502
Like Nixon and Ford, Carter refused to follow the legislative veto procedures required by
the War Powers Resolution. However, Carter opposed the provisions as an infringement of his powers as
Commander in Chief, rather than his exclusive power to execute the laws. War Powers Resolution, 1977:
Hearings on the Operation and Effectiveness of the War Powers Resolution Before the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); see also CHECK Ely, 88 Colum. 1381 & n.8; May, supra
note 289, at 974-75.
503
4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 21, 22 (1980).
504
Id. at 29. The Executive had a duty to execute the law faithfully. However, the Attorney
General pointed out, the “duty to enforce the fundamental law set forth in the Constitution” at times
overrides its “duty to enforce the law founded in the Acts of Congress.” Because the legislative veto
“intrude[d] upon the constitutional prerogatives of the Executive,” the present case was such a case. Id. at
29.
505
Id.
506
Id. at 27.
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Despite Congress’s insistence that the Attorney General abide by the legislative
veto provision,507 the Secretary followed Civiletti’s advice and implemented the
regulations.508 Therefore, although the Carter Administration did tolerate the enactment
of a few legislative vetoes without comment,509 it is clear that Carter did defend the
unitariness of the executive branch by firmly opposing the legislative veto.
Carter did not merely react to congressional attempts to control the execution of
the laws: he also proactively asserted his control over the executive branch by continuing
the Nixon-Ford program of OMB review of proposed regulations.510 Upon assuming
office, Carter ordered agencies to continue to analyze the inflationary impact of
regulations and directed them to give more detailed consideration to their economic cost.
Carter supplemented these directives the following year with an executive order entitled
“Improving Government Regulations”511 that far exceeded previous regulatory review
efforts. This program required that executive agencies include a “Regulatory Analysis”

507

May, supra note 289, at 978 n.541 (citing Letter from Benjamin R. Civiletti to Sen. Max
Baucus (July 30, 1980), reprinted in Constitutionality of GAO’s Bid Protest Function: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 745 (1985)).
508
45 Fed. Reg. 22634, 22742, 23602, 27880 (1980) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 100d, 134,
161c, 161g (1980)); see also May, supra note 289, at 975-76. Congress did not give up without a fight.
The House attempted to enforce its legislative veto by adding an amendment to two key appropriations bills
providing that “none of the funds appropriated . . . by this Act shall be available to implement, administer,
or enforce any regulation” which had been vetoed by Congress. 126 CONG. REC. 19313 (1980) (House
enactment of the Levitas amendment to H.R. 7584, _ Cong., _ Sess. (1980)); Id. at 20507 (House
enactment of Levitas amendment to H.R. 7591, _ Cong., _ Sess. (1980)). The Office of Legal Counsel
responded with an opinion condemning the amendments as an attempt by Congress to place indirect
restrictions on the President which, if placed directly, would violate the Constitution. 4B Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 731, 733-34 (1980).
509
See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 143 (noting acceptance of
legislative vetoes in legislation governing the FTC and the Federal Election Commission); LOUIS FISHER,
THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 94-95, 106 (1981) (noting acceptance of legislative veto provisions
relating to arms sales, war powers, and gasoline rationing); Strauss, supra note 5, at 580 n.20 (noting
acceptance of legislative vetoes in legislation governing the FTC); Quint, supra note 490, at 829-30 n.232
(noting OMB support for legislative veto in Impoundment Control Act (citing STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON
RULES, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO 2 (Comm. Print 1980))).
510
For a general description of the Carter Administration’s regulatory review program, see
Percival, supra note 357, at 142-47; Bruff, supra note 425, at 547-49; DeWitt, supra note 357, at 771-72.
511
Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979 compilation).
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in all proposals of major rules outlining the major alternatives considered by the agency
and explaining why the agency chose the particular alternative it did.512 The order also
required that “agencies . . . publish at least semiannually an agenda of significant
regulations under development or review.”513 The order cited no specific authority as its
basis, relying simply on his authority as President of the United States.514 Although the
initial draft of the order clearly contemplated that it would apply to the independent
agencies as well as the executive departments,515 Carter decided in the end to avoid a
“confrontation with Congress over the applicability of the order to the independent
regulatory agencies”516 and opted instead to simply ask the chairmen of the commissions
to comply with the Order’s procedures voluntarily.517
Carter supplemented that order by creating the Regulatory Analysis Review
Group (RARG) to conduct an intensive review of ten to twenty major regulations a year
and to submit its findings during those regulations’ public comment periods. Carter also
created a Regulatory Council charged with keeping a calendar of forthcoming significant
regulatory proposals and to use it to identify and mediate interagency conflicts.518 The

512

Id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. at 154 .
Id. § 2(a), 3 C.F.R. at _.
514
Exec. Order No. 12,044, 3 C.F.R. 152 (1979 compilation); see also Bruff, supra note
358, at 465 & n.69.
515
The initial draft of Executive Order No. 12,044 was ambiguous as to whether it applied to
independent agencies, and the notice accompanying it sought public comment about whether it should be
so applied. 42 Fed. Reg. 59,740 (_). Carter was apparently advised that it had the authority to do so.
Strauss, supra note 5, at 592-93 n.20; see also Bruff, supra note 358, at 499; AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
COMMISSION ON LAW AND THE ECONOMY, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO REFORM 108 (1979). See
generally Moreno, supra note 94, at 494-95.
516
43 Fed. Reg. 12,670 (1978).
517
Jimmy Carter, Improving Government Regulations: Letter to the Heads of Independent
Regulatory Agencies (Mar. 23, 1978), 1978 PUB. PAPERS 563, 564; see also Frank B. Cross, The Surviving
Significance of the Unitary Executive, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 599, 706 (1990).
518
Jimmy Carter, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
Subject: Strengthening Regulatory Management (Oct. 31, 1978), in 1978 PUB. PAPERS 1905; see also
LAWRENCE J. WHITE, REFORMING REGULATION: PROCESSES AND PROBLEMS 21-22 (1981).
513
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Carter Administration also issued a circular laying out procedures for coordinating and
clearing agencies’ legislative recommendations.519 Finally, in 1980 Congress enacted
two statutes that further strengthened OMB’s control over agency regulations. The
Regulatory Flexibility Act required agencies to analyze the impact of their regulations on
small businesses;520 the Paperwork Reduction Act required that OMB review and clear all
information collection requests and created the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs (OIRA) to conduct regulatory reviews.521 In addition, the Executive Office of the
President reviewed a large number of the proposed regulations and intervened directly in
numerous regulatory decisions.522
Like the Quality of Life Review of the Nixon and Ford Administrations, President
Carter’s program stopped short of centralized supervision of the rulemaking process.
Although the President and OMB gave some guidance as to which rules should be
subjected to regulatory analyses and how regulatory analyses should be conducted,523 the
final decisions on those issues were left to the individual agencies.524 Furthermore,
RARG had no authority to block agencies from issuing proposed or final regulations and
did not begin its review until after the proposed regulation had been published in the

519

OMB Circular A-19 (July 31, 1972). This circular on its face applied to the independent
regulatory commissions, although it should be noted that several of the commissions’ organic statutes
provided that they were not subject to OMB circulars. Moreno, supra note 94, at 490.
520
Regulatory Flexibility Act, Pub. L. No. 96-354, 94 Stat. 1164 (1980).
521
Paperwork Reduction Act , Pub. L. No. 96-51, 94 Stat. 2812 (1980).
522
WHITE, supra note 518, at 221; Percival, supra note 357, at 146-47 & n.112; Cross, supra
note 423, at 495; Kenneth Culp Davis, Presidential Control of Rulemaking, 56 TUL. L. REV. 849, 951
(1982).
523
Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 3(a) & (b); Memorandum from Wayne G. Grandquist,
Associate OMB Director for Management and Regulatory Policy, to the Heads of Departments and
Agencies, Regulatory Analysis (Nov. 21, 1978), cited in Bruff, supra note 425, at 548; see also Cross,
supra note 423, at 495 n.62 (citing authorities).
524
Morton Rosenberg, Presidential Control of Agency Rulemaking: An Analysis of
Constitutional Issues that May Be Raised by Executive Order 12,291, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 1199, 1200 n.8
(1981); Cross, supra note 423, at 495 & n.63.
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Federal Register.525 Nonetheless, commentators have generally acknowledged that
Carter’s regulatory review program did enable the President to increase his control over
regulatory policy.526
Thus, despite Carter’s acceptance of certain pieces of post-Watergate legislation
that impinged on his authority to execute the laws, on balance Carter emerges as a
steadfast defender of the unitary executive. The fact that short-term political pressures
effectively precluded him from asserting the President’s prerogatives on those few
occasions does not rise to the level of acquiescence for the purposes of coordinate
construction.
VIII.

RONALD REAGAN

Ronald Reagan was, along with Franklin D. Roosevelt, one of the two most
important presidents of the Twentieth Century. Just as FDR won World War II and
pulled us out of the Great Depression, so too did Reagan win the Cold War and pull us
out of the malaise into which the nation had fallen during the Carter years.

525

Percival, supra note 357, at 144-45; Rosenberg, supra note 278, at 1200 n.8; DeWitt,
supra note 357, at 772. The fact that RARG review occurred after a rule had already been proposed
marked a significant change from Quality of Life Review, since it prevented reviewers from attempting to
influence regulations before they were proposed. Percival, supra note 357, at 144-45.
526
WHITE, supra note 618, at 221; Cross, supra note 423, at 495; Richard M. Neustadt, The
Administration’s Regulatory Reform Program: An Overview, 32 ADMIN. L. REV. 129, 141-42 (1980); Paul
R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 943, 949 (1980). Carter also exerted his authority by denying procurement contracts to companies
that failed to follow “voluntary” wage and price guidelines. Exec. Order No. 12,092, 3 C.F.R. 249 (1979
compilation), revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,288, 3 C.F.R. 125 (1982 compilation). Other similar steps
followed. The D.C. Circuit eventually upheld Carter’s actions as an exercise of his powers under the
general procurement statutes. AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 443
U.S. 915 (1979). Although this conclusion was quite a stretch, in the end it demonstrates that Carter’s
imposition of wage and price controls was an exercise of statutory authority and not an exercise of the
President’s power to control the execution of the laws. See generally Quint, supra note 490, at 791-98.
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Although the Reagan presidency’s political importance is unquestioned, its
position with regards to the unitary executive remains something of an enigma. While
the Reagan Administration was in power, many of its supporters and critics regarded the
unitary executive as one of the centerpieces of the Administration’s policy.527 As Charles
Fried, who served as Solicitor General under Reagan, has noted, “The Reagan
administration had a vision about the arrangement of government power: the authority
and responsibility of the President should be clear and unitary. The Reagan years were
distinguished by the fact that that vision was made the subject of legal, rather than simply
political, dispute.”528 Others have been more equivocal. As Reagan’s first Attorney
General, William French Smith, later observed:
If there was one area in which the White House was deficient during my
years in office, it was in the protection of presidential power. Decisions
there were made on the basis of the substance of individual issues. There
was no effective concern or review of the impact that issue or the position
taken with respect to it would have on presidential power. Nor was there
any effort to identify governmental activities elsewhere that, if developed,
would adversely affect the province of the executive. Nor to be candid,
was the bully pulpit used to provide leadership or defense of that vital
institution.529
In support of Smith’s criticism, other scholars have pointed out that President Reagan
never vetoed a bill on the grounds that it infringed upon the President’s authority.530

527

See Miller, supra note 333, at 410-12; Rosenberg, supra note 278, at 628-34; Shane,
supra note 5, at 596-97.
528
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION -- A FIRSTHAND
ACCOUNT 133 (1991).
529
WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 222
(1991), quoted in Nelson Lund, Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 B.Y.U. L. REV. 17, 38.
530
Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231,
1245-46 (1994); Lund, supra note 529, at 42. But see supra notes 543-551 and accompanying text (arguing
that Reagan pocket vetoed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988 in part to protect the unitariness of the
executive).
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As with many things, the truth may well lie somewhere in between.531 However,
regardless of how the debate whether the Reagan Administration defended the
President’s authority to execute the laws too strongly or not strongly enough is resolved,
it remains clear that it did protect the unitariness of the executive branch to a sufficient
degree as to overcome any inference of acquiescence to any deviations from the unitary
executive for purposes of coordinate construction.
The Reagan Administration began with “the most conscientious transition in
White House history,” headed up by longtime Reagan confidant, Edwin Meese III.532
That said, Reagan “could be ruthless when necessary” on personnel actions,533 as
evidenced by his decision not to give Meese the job he wanted most: White House Chief
of Staff, the job he coveted. Instead, that position went to James Baker, formerly of
George Bush’s presidential campaign, with Meese receiving a free floating White House
position as Counselor to the President. Reagan then made Michael Deaver the third
member of his White House troika for the first term, giving him the title of Deputy Chief
of Staff.534 Meese, Baker, and Deaver struggled for preeminence on the White House
staff during Reagan’s first term. This struggle for preeminence left Reagan able to pick
and choose from the policy options his three subordinates presented him with. The net
result was the augmenting of Reagan’s power and control.

531

Miller, supra note 333, at 401-02 (“In the Reagan years, the picture was mixed, with a
resurgent and aggressive presidency but with Congress not relinquishing the gains it had made.”); see also
id. at 410-12.
532
EDMUND MORRIS, DUTCH: A MEMOIR OF RONALD REAGAN 419 (1999).
533
Id. at 420.
534
Id. at 421.
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Reagan set aside regular time for cabinet meetings on Tuesdays and Thursdays at
2 p.m., but the time was not always used.535 Reagan was not hesitant in using the
removal power vigorously to further his administration’s goals. Early in the first term,
Reagan had his first major cabinet removal crisis when it became clear that Secretary of
State Alexander Haig was not working out very well. Just as he had been ruthless in
picking Baker over Meese as White House Chief of Staff, so too was Reagan ruthless in
forcing Haig to resign.536 In his first year in office, Reagan dramatically settled an airtraffic controllers strike by firing the striking air-traffic controllers to resounding popular
applause.537 During the second term, Reagan subtly forced the resignation of his White
House Chief of Staff Donald Regan because of his failure to detect the Iran-Contra
affair.538 Reagan also demonstrated his support for the unitary executive by the manner
in which he wielded his removal power to displace three members of the United States
Commission on Civil Rights in 1983539 and numerous other officials thought to be
insulated from presidential control.540 Although the courts did not always approve of
Reagan’s removals,541 the fact that Reagan did maintain his power to remove was
sufficient to uphold his power to remove for the purpose of coordinate construction.

535

Id. at 426.
Id. at 462-63.
537
Id. at 659.
538
Id. at 620-22.
539
The statute creating the Commission was silent about removals and established the
Commission “in the executive branch of the Government.” Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315,
§ 101(a), 71 Stat. 634, 634. For a full discussion of the debate over the Commission’s supposed
“independence,” see Entin, supra note 203, at 770-76.
540
For other examples of removals instigated by Reagan, see FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 78-79; Miller, supra note 333, at 411 & n.63, 414n.82; 6 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 1 (1982); 5 Op. Legal Counsel 337 (1981).
541
A district court enjoined Reagan from removing the Civil Rights Commissioners. On
appeal, the D.C. Circuit subsequently vacated the injunction as moot, since the statutory authorization for
the Commission had expired. Berry v. Reagan, 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 33,898 (D.D.C. Nov. 14,
1983), vacated as moot, 732 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Congress later reconstituted the
536
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Reagan also supported the unitary theory of the executive by opposing all three
post-Watergate ethics statutes reluctantly accepted by the Carter Administration. First, in
1981, Reagan removed a dozen Inspectors General without complying with the statutory
requirement that he inform Congress of the reasons for his removals. Instead, Reagan
simply explained that he wanted Inspectors General in whom he had total confidence.542
Second, Reagan pocket vetoed the proposed Whistleblower Protection Act of
1988, which would have amended the Civil Service Reform Act in ways that would have
derogated from the unitary executive.543 It would have moved the Office of Special
Counsel outside the MSPB and turned it into a freestanding independent agency.544
Other provisions would have given the Office of Special Counsel independent litigating
authority that was not subject to coordination by the Justice Department.545 It would also
authorize the Office of Special Counsel to transmit information to Congress “without
review, clearance, or approval by any other administrative authority.”546
Recalling the concerns first raised by John Harmon,547 Reagan objected that the
Act “creates an Office of Special Counsel and purports to insulate the Office from
presidential supervision and to limit the power of the President to remove his

Commission, this time requiring specific cause for the removal of its members. United States Commission
on Civil Rights Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-183, § 2(d), 97 Stat. 1301, 1301; see also Borders v. Reagan.
518 F. Supp. 250, 268 (D.D.C. 1981) (blocking Reagan’s attempted removal of a member of the D.C.
Judicial Nomination Commission). But see Kalaris v. Donovan, 697 F.2d 376 (D.C. Cir 1983.) (upholding
removals); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, 663 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same).
542
Ronald Reagan, Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the
Senate on the Inspector general Appointees of Certain Executive Agencies (Jan. 20, 1981), in 1981 PUB.
PAPERS 24, 25; see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 78.
543
For overviews of the history of this legislation from two very different perspectives, see
Kmiec, supra note 466, at 340-44; Rosenberg, supra note 278, at 662-88.
544
S. 508, 100th Cong., § 1211, reprinted in 134 CONG. REC. S15,330 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
1988).
545
Id. § 1212.
546
Id. § 1217.
547
See supra notes 466 and accompanying text.
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subordinates from office.”548 Reagan was also concerned about a second provision that
“purport[ed] to prohibit review within the Executive branch of views of the Office of
Special Counsel proposed to be transmitted in response to congressional committee
requests.”549 These provisions clearly raised “serious constitutional concerns.”550 But
Reagan reserved his sharpest criticism for the section of the bill that would have
authorized the Special Counsel to challenge the decisions of the MSPB in court.
Permitting two executive agencies to resolve a dispute in court “conflict[ed] with the
constitutional grant of the Executive power to the President which includes the authority
to supervise and resolve disputes between his subordinates.”551 Such a provision was
antithetical to the unitary theory of the executive branch.
Third, the Reagan Administration in due time came to oppose the Ethics in
Government Act as an impermissible infringement on the unitariness of the executive
branch. Although the Reagan Administration did not enter any objections when the
Ethics in Government Act was first reauthorized in 1983,552 by the time Congress
revisited the issue again in 1987, the administration began to voice more serious
concerns. Assistant Attorney General John R. Bolton challenged the constitutionality of
the Act during hearings, arguing that all prosecutors were properly considered executive

548

Ronald Reagan, Memorandum of Disapproval on a Bill Concerning Whistleblower
Protection (Oct. 26, 1988), in 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1391, 1392.
549
Id.
550
Id.
551
Id. For a complete description of the Act and particularly sharp criticism of Reagan’s
pocket veto, see Rosenberg, supra note 278, at 662-88; see also Devins, supra note 156, at 267-68. For a
more sympathetic assessment of Reagan’s actions, see Kmiec, supra note 466, at 342-43.
552
Ethics in Government Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 96 Stat. 2039 (1983).
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officers who thus had to be subject to the direction and control of the President.553
Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper sounded similar themes..554
Reagan concurred, declaring that “[a]n officer of the United States exercising
executive authority in the core area of law enforcement necessarily, under our
constitutional scheme, must be subject to executive branch appointment, review, and
removal. There is no other constitutionally permissible alternative.”555 However, in light
of the fact that the matter was being litigated before the D.C. Circuit and “[i]n order to
ensure that public confidence in government not be eroded while the courts are in the
process of deciding these questions,” Reagan decided to “tak[e] the extraordinary step of
signing this bill despite [his] very strong doubts about its constitutionality”556 while at the
same time pressing its opposition the independent counsel statute in its briefs before the
D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court in the litigation leading up to Morrison v. Olson.557
In his brief in the Morrison case, Solicitor General Charles Fried argued that the Vesting
and Take Care Clauses of Article II demanded that the President be able to control the
actions of, and remove, independent counsels. The argument section of Fried’s brief
began by saying:

553

FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 427, at 147, 156-57 (citing Independent Counsel
Amendments Act of 1987: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 42933 (1987), and quoting Oversight of the Independent Counsel Statute: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1987)).
554
Letter from Assistant Attorney General Charles Cooper to Leon Silverman (_), reprinted
in Independent Counsel Amendments of 1987: Hearings on H.R. 1520 & H.R. 2939 Before the Subcomm.
on Admin. Law & Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 100 (_).
555
Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of
1987 (Dec. 15, 1987), in 1987 PUB. PAPERS 1524, 1524.
556
Id.
557
487 U.S. 654 (1988). For the Reagan Administration’s support for the unitary executive,
see Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 5-16, 29-41, Morrison v. Olson
(No. 87-1279); Brief on Behalf of Amicus Curiae United States, In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (Nos. 87-5261, 87-5264 and 87-5265), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988),
reprinted in 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 97, 101-02, 104, 112-16, 126-30 (1987).
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Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution declares: “The executive Power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” Section 3
of the same Article then charges the President with the corresponding
duty: “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” The
independent counsel statute violates the plain meaning of those words by
taking an important part of the executive power, and of the concomitant
duty to see the faithful execution of the laws, away from the President and
assigning it to a person unaccountable to the President in her selection and
her performance and her tenure. The statute vests executive power other
than in the President, in direct contravention of Article II, Section 1’s
“grant of power.”558
The brief goes on to assert, “Whatever limits Congress may constitutionally
impose on the President’s various means of holding other officers to account, it may not
deny his power to remove purely executive officers like an independent counsel.”559 The
brief went on to distinguish Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener by saying that those cases
concerned entities that were quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial and here the function of
prosecuting high level wrongdoing was a core executive function. All in all, the brief
was a ringing defense of the unitary executive, which was unfortunately to lead to a
disastrous Supreme Court decision. The Court in Morrison v. Olson divided seven to
one, with Chief Justice Rehnquist writing for the Court in upholding the constitutionality
of the Ethics in Government Act.560 The worst part of Rehnquist’s decision was his
apparent conclusion that even officers performing such core executive functions as
prosecution could be insulated from presidential removal.561 Justice Scalia wrote a
forceful dissent in which he berated the majority not only for what he believed was its
erroneous interpretation of Article II, but for even failing to follow Humphrey’s Executor,
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Morrison v. Olson, Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at
5-6, Morrison v. Olson (No. 87-1279) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926)).
559
Id. at 29.
560
487 U.S. 654 (1988).
561
Id. at 688-91.
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which itself did not purport to apply to core executive functions like prosecution.562 The
Reagan Administration lost the battle in the Morrison case.563 Even though the
Administration’s arguments failed to convince a majority of the Supreme Court, the fact
that the Administration advanced them is sufficient to overcome any claims that the
executive branch acquiesced to the institution of the independent counsel as a deviation
from the unitary executive.
Reagan also joined his predecessors in objecting to the legislative veto, which
continued to command significant interest on Congress.564 Although Reagan primarily
based his attacks on the bicameralism and presentment requirements of Article I, section
7,565 Reagan also condemned legislative vetoes “because of the potential for involving
the Congress in the day-to-day implementation of the law, a responsibility allocated
solely to the President under the Constitution.”566 As Reagan further noted:

562

Id. at 705-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Interestingly, subsequent court decisions have
indicated that holdover officials, such as Humphrey, do not fall within the scope of the “for cause” removal
provision. See Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1996). It is thus now clear that under
modern doctrine, Humphrey’s Executor would have been decided the other way.
563
Interestingly, a number of leading scholars, including a number of leading critics of the
unitary theory of the executive, have suggested that the issue is far from settled by acknowledging that
nothing in Morrison precludes a president for removing a member of an independent agency for failure to
follow a presidential policy directive. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 10, at 110-11; Strauss, supra note
5, at 615; cf. DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note -, at § 2.5, at 46 (pointing to criticism of Humphrey’s Executor in
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), as suggesting that the issue has not yet been resolved);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-10, at 254 n.45 (2d ed. 1988) (noting the lack
of clarity as to what may constitute proper cause for removal).
564
Much as had occurred during the Ford and Carter Administrations, the Senate had passed
legislation that would subject all agency rules to a legislative veto. See FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 142 & n.113.
565
See Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing International Security and Foreign Assistance
Legislation (Dec. 29, 1981), in 1981 PUB. PAPERS 1202, 1203; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing a Bill
Concerning the Establishment of Alcohol Traffic Safety Programs (Oct. 25, 1982), in 1982 PUB. PAPERS
1378; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Union Station Redevelopment Act of 1981 (Dec. 29,
1981), in 1981 PUB. PAPERS 1207; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing a Student Aid Bill (Oct. 14,
1982), in 1982 PUB. PAPERS 1312; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing a Bill Amending the Indian
Judgment Funds Act (Jan. 12, 1983), in 1983 PUB. PAPERS 44.
566
Reagan, Statement on Signing International Security and Foreign Assistance Legislation,
supra note 565, at 1203.
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These provisions can be expected to inject an unnecessarily disruptive
element by subjecting proposed programs to disapproval, congressional or
even committee, even after they have been examined by the executive
branch and found to be compatible with congressionally adopted standards
and supportive of the national interests of the United States.567
The Reagan Administration backed up its rhetoric by successfully challenging the
legislative veto in the Courts of Appeals and by pressing the case before the Supreme
Court, in which it argued that that the legislative veto impermissibly allows Congress to
participate in the execution of the laws.568 These efforts culminated in the landmark
ruling in INS v. Chadha569 holding that the legislative veto violates bicameralism and
presentment requirements of Article I, section 7. The fact that the Supreme Court
resolved the case on alternate grounds does not change the import of the Reagan
Administration’s assertion of the unitary executive for the purposes of coordinate
construction. Indeed, Reagan continued his opposition in the face of Congress’s refusal
to recognize the import of Chadha by continuing to pass legislation containing legislative
vetoes. Reagan’s signing statements approving this legislation consistently indicated that
the unconstitutional provisions would be ignored.570
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Id.; see also Reagan, Statement on Signing a Bill Concerning the Establishment of
Alcohol Traffic Safety Programs, supra note 565, at 1378 (objecting that the legislative veto
“unconstitutionally involves the Congress in the executive functions of promulgating regulations under
authority previously conferred, in violation of the principle of separation of powers”); 5 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 294, 297, 301-03 (1981). The Reagan Administration did occasionally allow a legislative veto to
be enacted without registering any protest. _, Pub. L. No. _, § _, 96 Stat. _, 1870 (1982); see also FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 143.
568
Brief for the Immigration and Naturalization Service at 44-56, Chadha (No. 80-1832).
569
462 U.S. 919 (1983).
570
See Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization
Act of 1984 (July 17, 1984), in 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1052, 1053; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the
Department of Housing and Urban Development—Independent Agencies Appropriation Act, 1985 (July
18, 1984), in 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1056, 1057; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing a Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Appropriations Bill (Oct. 30, 1984), in 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1686; Ronald Reagan, Statement on
Signing the Department of Housing and Urban Development—Independent Agencies Appropriation Act,
1986 (Nov. 25, 1985), in 1985 PUB. PAPERS 1419, 1420; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 (Nov. 14, 1986), in 1986 PUB. PAPERS 1557,
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The Reagan Administration even revived the objections raised by Wilson and
Franklin Roosevelt571 to permitting the Comptroller General to have any role in the
execution of the laws. For example, when signing the Gramm-Rudman Balanced Budget
and Emergency Deficit Control Act, which gave the Comptroller General the authority to
issue the sequestration order that would initiate a series of mandatory budget cuts,
Reagan noted that “under the system of separated powers established by the Constitution,
. . . executive functions may only be performed by officers in the executive branch.”
Thus, Reagan concluded, the “significant role” the bill assigned to the Comptroller
General raised “serious constitutional questions,” because the Comptroller General was
an agent of Congress who could not properly wield such executive power.572 Although
Reagan signed the legislation, he emphasized that he was “in no sense dismissing the
constitutional problems or acquiescing in a violation of the system of separated powers
carefully crafted by the framers of the Constitution.”573 Therefore, notwithstanding his

1558; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Federal Triangle Development Act (Aug. 22, 1987), in
1987 PUB. PAPERS 973, 973-74; Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Department of the Interior and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1989 (Sept. 27, 1988), in 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1228;
Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
Amendments of 1988 (Oct. 5, 1988), in 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1284, 1285-86; Ronald Reagan, Statement
on Signing a Bill Providing for the Leasing of Property to the District of Columbia Chapter of the
American National Red Cross (Nov. 8, 1988), in 1988-89 PUB. PAPERS 1485.
After Chadha, the Reagan Administration did enter into some informal agreements with Congress
which served much of the same purpose as legislative vetoes. See Fisher, Legislative Veto, supra note 86,
at 286-90; Fisher, Interpretation Outside the Courts, supra note 86, at 84-91. The fact that the executive
branch at times may voluntarily choose to keep Congress informed, however, is not in any way inconsistent
with the unitary executive or any other provision of the Constitution. See City of Alexandria v. United
States, 737 F.2d 1022, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Fisher, Interpretation Outside the Courts, supra note 86, at
86.
571
See Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _.
572
Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Bill Increasing the Public Debt Limit and
Enacting the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (Dec. 12, 1985), in 1985 PUB.
PAPERS 1471, 1471. Reagan also harbored constitutional concerns about a provision in the Act requiring
Comptroller General approval of all presidential terminations and modifications of defense contracts.
Reagan noted, “Under our constitutional system, an agent of congress may not exercise such supervisory
authority over the President.” Id.
573
Id. at 1472. See generally FISHER & DEVINS, supra note 427, at 143-45, 148-53.
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approval of the Act, the Reagan Administration challenged Gramm-Rudman in court,
arguing among other things that it improperly encroached upon the President’s Article II
power to execute the laws.574
For the same reasons, the Reagan Administration also challenged the provisions
of the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) that permitted the Comptroller General to
resolve protests entered by unsuccessful bidders for government contracts.575 Reagan
“vigorously object[ed] to certain provisions that would unconstitutionally attempt to
delegate to the Comptroller General of the United States, an officer of Congress, the
power to perform duties and responsibilities that in our constitutional system may be
performed only be officials of the executive branch.”576 Accordingly, Attorney General
Smith and OMB Director David Stockman issued orders to the executive agencies not to
comply with CICA, and the Administration subsequently refused to comply with a
district court order upholding CICA’s constitutionality.577 Although the courts did not
ultimately accept Reagan’s objections to CICA,578 the fact remains that the Reagan
Administration protested Congress’s efforts to assign the Comptroller General a role in
executing the law as being inconsistent with the unitary executive.
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Brief for the United States at _, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (Nos. 85-1377,
85-1378, 85-1379). These arguments, of course, ultimately prevailed. Bowsher, 478 U.S. at _.
575
CICA was enacted as part of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, tit.
VII, 98 Stat. 494, 1199.
576
Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 (July 18, 1984),
in 1984 PUB. PAPERS 1053; see also Kmiec, supra note 466, at 349 (nothing the Justice Department’s
objections to CICA).
577
May, supra note 289, at 979, 984 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 308
(1985)); see also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 339, at 130; Rosenberg, supra note 278,
at 691.
578
See Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988); Parola
v. City of Monterey [Weinberger?], 848 F.2d 956 (9th Cir. 1988); Universal Shipping Co. v. United States,
652 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1987), vacated as moot, No. 87-5120 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 1989).
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The Reagan Administration also asserted the President’s authority to control the
execution the laws directly. For instance, Reagan also took firm control of the federal
government’s legal affairs, expanding the Federal Legal Council, using opinions issued
by the Office of Legal Counsel to centralize control of governmental litigation in the
Attorney General,579 and even assuming a role in the positions that his Administration
would take before the Supreme Court.580 The Reagan Administration also repudiated
several informal, nonstatutory understandings regarding the division of responsibility
between the executive departments and the independent agencies581 and even challenged
one such agency’s efforts to file amicus brief in federal appellate court.582 In fact, the
Reagan Administration went so far as to question the very constitutionality of these
agencies supposed “independence.”583
The Reagan Administration also asserted the President’s authority to control the
execution the laws directly by continuing and expanding upon the regulatory review
program initiated by his predecessors.584 Executive Order 12,291 directed all executive
agencies to employ cost-benefit analysis in implementing their regulations. The order

579

Devins, supra note 156, at 266 (citing 6 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 47, 61-62 (1982); 6 Op.
Off. Legal Counsel 180, 187-88 (1982)).
580
Id. at 284; Harvey, supra note 156, at 1585.
581
Devins, supra note 156, at 268.
582
Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent
Agency Independent?, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 273, 285-98 (1993) (describing the Reagan Administration’s
efforts to prevent the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission from filing an amicus brief in Williams
v. City of New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984)).
583
As Attorney General Meese noted, “Federal agencies performing executive functions are
themselves properly agents of the executive. They are not ‘quasi’ this or ‘independent’ that. In the
tripartite scheme of government, a body with enforcement powers is part of the executive branch of
government.” See Verkuil, supra note 5, at 789 (quoting Stuart Taylor, A Question of Power, a Powerful
Questioner, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1985, at B6); see also id. at 779 n.4 (noting that Meese suggested that “the
entire system of independent agencies may be unconstitutional”); Miller, supra note 333, at 411 & n.66
(noting that Meese questioned the constitutionality of independent agencies).
584
For a complete description of the Reagan regulatory review program, see Percival, supra
note 357, at 147-54; see also Bruff, supra note 425, at 549-51; Cross, supra note 423, at 496-98; DeWitt,
supra note 357, at 773-76.
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further required them to submit all rules to OMB for prepublication review and to prepare
Regulatory Impact Analyses (RIAs) of all major rules explicitly laying out the anticipated
costs and benefits of the rule, the alternatives considered, and an explanation, if
appropriate, of the reasons why the most cost-effective means of achieving the
anticipated benefits was not adopted. OMB would review the proposed rules and the
RIAs to maximize the “aggregate net benefits to society.”585
Reagan supplemented Executive Order 12,291 with Executive Order 12,498,
which empowered OMB to take formal control of the regulatory planning process by
requiring agencies to submit to OMB a “draft regulatory program” describing “all
significant regulatory actions” to be undertaken that year.586 OMB would then resolve
any inconsistencies between the draft regulatory program and the Administration’s
policies and would consolidate them into the Administration’s overall regulatory plan.
These two orders extended the White House’s control over the agencies to a greater
degree than ever before by dictating substantive criteria that agencies had to employ in
issuing regulations and by permitting OMB to postpone indefinitely the publication of
regulations of which it disapproved.587 Reagan did not invoke any particular statutory
authority for issuing these orders, instead relying solely on “the authority vested in [him]
as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America”588 as had so
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Exec. Order 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981 compilation).
Exec. Order 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985 compilation).
587
See Percival, supra note 357, at 149-50. The Reagan Administration, like the Carter
Administration, considered including the independent regulatory commissions within its program of
regulatory review, but declined to do so. See PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF
POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS _ (1996).
588
Exec. Order 12,291, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at _; Exec. Order 12,498, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at _.
Courts reviewing these orders apparently agreed. See Prof’l Drivers Council v. Bureau of Motor Carrier
Safety, 706 F.2d 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming application of cost/benefit requirement of Executive
Order 12,291); Envtl. Def. Fund v. Thomas, 627 F. Supp. 566, 570 (D.D.C. 1986) (“A certain degree of
586
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many of his predecessors.589 Reagan specifically disclaimed any intent to direct agency
decisionmaking, noting that nothing in the order “shall be construed as displacing the
agencies’ responsibilities delegated by law.”590 Even opponents of the unitary executive
theory recognized that the regulatory review program did in fact have a direct impact on
regulatory outcomes and represented one of the most sweeping invocations of the unitary
executive yet seen.591
During his second term, Reagan designated Meese to lead the Justice Department
by appointing him Attorney General. Meese became very firmly committed to the theory
of the unitary executive as well as to the authority and duty of all three branches to
interpret the Constitution. Meese explicitly questioned the constitutionality of
independent agencies in a major speech, which was widely noticed at the time.592 He
also made a speech defending departmentalism—the notion that all three branches of the
federal government are co-equal interpreters of the Constitution—that was worthy of
Thomas Jefferson or Abraham Lincoln.593 Meese’s so-called Tulane speech defending

deference must be given to the authority of the President to control and supervise executive policy
making.”); see also Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees, Local 1622 v. Brown, 645 F.2d 1017, 1022 (D.C. Cir.
1981) (“Within the range of choice allowed by statute, the President may direct his subordinates’
choices.”).
589
See supra notes 112, 261, 311 and accompanying text; Yoo et al., supra note 24, at _.
590
Exec. Order 12,291, § 3(f)(3), 3 C.F.R. 127, 130 (1982 compilation); see also
Memorandum from U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (Feb. 13, 1981), reprinted in Role
of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong. 486 (1981) (indicating that the OMB’s then-proposed
oversight role was “advisory and consultative” and did not authorize it to reject an agency’s judgment as to
matters delegated to it).
591
See Percival, supra note 359, at 990-93; Rosenberg, supra note 524, at 1200-01.
592
Howard Kurtz, Agencies’ Authority Challenged: Justice Department Seems to Side with
Conservatives on Regulatory Power, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1986, at A17; Stuart Taylor, Jr., A Question of
Power, A Powerful Questioner, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1985, at B8.
593
Edwin Meese III, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987).
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departmentalism is every bit as ringing as Abraham Lincoln’s similar speech responding
to Dred Scott.594
Reagan was decisive when it came to matters of foreign policy. When the
question arose whether to invade and liberate the tiny Caribbean nation of Grenada,
Reagan tersely ordered “Do it.”595 In the key arms control negotiation of his presidency
with Gorbachev at Reykjavik, Iceland, Reagan took personal charge of the negotiations,
and when Gorbachev tried to force him to abandon the Strategic Defense Initiative,
Reagan dramatically walked out of the Reykjavik talks.596 Jimmy Carter’s National
Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski was later to mention Reagan’s walkout at
Reykjavik as the key moment when the Cold War was won.597 Even after the disastrous
Iran-Contra scandal broke Reagan took the decisive action of appointing a three member
board of inquiry headed up by former Senator John Tower to thoroughly investigate the
scandal and get to the bottom of what happened. Reagan was in short a very decisive
leader who always knew what direction he wanted policy to go in.
Another strong point of the Reagan presidency was ability to use the bully pulpit
of the presidency in a series of striking speeches to call attention to his policy views. In
one striking speech, Reagan called the Soviet Union an “Evil Empire” which he predicted
would be buried on the ash heap of history.598 In another important foreign policy
address, Reagan stood in front of the Berlin Wall and called on Mikhail Gorbachev, the
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Calabresi & Yoo, supra note 21, at 719-20.
MORRIS, supra note 532, at 501.
Id. at 599.
Id. at 658.
Id. at 474.
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leader of the Soviet Union to “tear down this wall.”599 These speeches clearly
accelerated the demise of the Soviet Union and gave hope to the long oppressed peoples
of Eastern Europe and of the Baltic states. Together with Reagan’s support for anticommunist insurgencies in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua and together with his
Strategic Defense Initiative, Reagan’s speeches helped to bring about the fall of
communism.
Our review of the historical record thus reveals that Reagan represented a
steadfast proponent and supporter of the unitariness of the executive branch. Thus even
if one agrees with Attorney General Smith that the Reagan Administration could have
gone to greater lengths to protect the prerogatives of the Presidency, it is clear that
Reagan’s efforts on behalf of the unitary executive were at least sufficient to override any
suggestions that the Reagan Administration followed a sustained and systematic pattern
of acquiescence to congressionally-imposed deviations from the unitariness of the
executive branch.
IX.

GEORGE H.W. BUSH

More than almost any other President except for William Howard Taft, George
Herbert Walker Bush staunchly defended the unitariness of the executive branch.600
Thanks in large measure to his exceptionally able White House Counsel, C. Boyden
Gray, and his superb staff, Bush defended the unitariness of the executive branch with
almost academic rigor.

599

Id. at 624.
See Devins, supra note 600, at 1043 (“Bush, more than any other president, embraced the
‘unitary executive’ theory of White House control over government operations.”); Lund, supra note 529
(detailing the Bush Administration’s efforts to defend presidential prerogatives).
600
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The Bush administration began with the somewhat astonishing decision that after
eight years of Ronald Reagan, it was time to clean house. John Robert Greene, Bush’s
biographer, reports that “[f]ar from the ‘friendly takeover’ that many members of the
press, and later, one influential scholarly book viewed it to be, Bush sounded as if he
were taking the office away from a president of the other party.”601 Greene notes that
superficially the cabinet seemed to belie this since seven Reagan cabinet members
continued in the Bush administration, but since “Bush had absolutely no intention of
dispersing power back to the departments,”602 what really mattered was his complete
overhaul of the White House staff. Greene notes that “As the administration carried on,
cabinet meetings became more infrequent. Though he made it clear to his staff that any
member of his cabinet could see him at any time, Bush reserved the policy-making role
for his White House staff.”603 Key staff appointments went to the smart but overly-clever
Richard Darman and to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. Scowcroft made it
clear at the press conference announcing his appointment that “I want to have a new look.
We’re going to formulate our policies.”604
Early on in his administration Bush encountered a major battle with the
Democratically controlled Senate over the nomination of former Senator John Tower to
be the new Secretary of Defense. Tower had been very supportive of Bush’s career in
Texas politics, and Bush stuck with him loyally and doggedly to the very end. When
Tower’s nomination was finally rejected on a 53 to 47 vote, it became the first cabinet
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602
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JOHN ROBERT GREENE, THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE BUSH 48 (2000).
Id. at 49.
Id. at 50.
Id.
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nomination to fail since the last years of the Eisenhower administration in 1959.605 Bush
immediately recovered by appointing the exceptionally capable Dick Cheney to be
Secretary of Defense in place of Tower, and Cheney was easily confirmed. Bush’s
willingness to support Tower against all the odds sent an important signal to subordinates
in the executive branch that loyalty would be a two-way street in the first Bush
Administration.
Bush was a vigorous, hands-on leader, and his attention to detail was appreciated
by the public after concerns in Ronald Reagan’s later years over his inattention to detail.
As Greene reports:
Despite Americans’ latent affection for Ronald Reagan, long before 1988
they had become troubled with his hands-off, detached approach to
presidential leadership. In George Bush they found Reagan’s polar
opposite. Bush’s style of executive leadership was characterized by
indefatigable energy. Indeed the words “energetic” and “hyperactive”
damn Bush with faint praise; by any definition he was a workaholic. . . .
Bush’s staff continually complained (or boasted, depending on whom they
were talking to) about the long hours and the phone calls in the middle of
the night from a boss who just wanted to talk.606
George Bush was clearly in charge of his administration and was very attentive to details.
Almost immediately after his inauguration, Bush expressed his concerns about
“the erosion of federal power.”607 In response to these concerns, Bush embarked upon
the most aggressive defense of the President’s prerogatives the republic had ever seen, as
Bush used a plethora of vetoes and signing statements to protect against any invasions of
the constitutional authority of the Presidency that he perceived.608 For example, Bush
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Id. at 57
Id. at 141.
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See Lund, supra note 529, at 36.
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Id. at 41-42, 44. Professor Lund has suggested that Bush’s signing statements were so
scrupulous about the separation of powers that at times they became “almost comical.” Id. at 44.
606
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charged that permitting executive agencies to present to Congress views differing from
those of the administration infringed upon his “constitutional responsibility to supervise
my subordinates and to ensure that the executive branch speaks with one voice.”609
Therefore, Bush indicated that he would “interpret these provisions in a manner
consistent with my constitutional authority, as head of a unitary executive branch, to
resolve disputes among my subordinates before their views are presented to the
Congress.”610 Bush also protested that statutes purporting to prohibit the President from
changing any decisions made by executive officials “must be interpreted in light of my
constitutional responsibility, as head of the unitary executive branch, to supervise my
subordinates.”611 Bush raised similar objections to statutes that attempted to guide the
manner in which he controlled the executive branch.612 As Bush noted, “When a member
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George Bush, Statement on Signing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act of 1991 (Dec. 19, 1991), in 1991 PUB. PAPERS 1649, 1650.
610
Id.; see also George Bush, Statement on Signing the President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (Oct. 26, 1992), in 1992-93 PUB. PAPERS 2004, 2005
(objecting that a provision requiring an agency to report simultaneously to both the President and Congress
“would intrude upon the President’s authority to supervise subordinate officials in the executive branch”);
George Bush, Statement on Signing the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 (Oct. 28,
1992), in 1992-93 PUB. PAPERS 2060, 2061 (noting that section authorizing executive official to submit
“‘reports, recommendations, testimony, or comments’ to the Congress without prior approval by ‘any
officer or agency of the Untied States’ raised “constitutional difficulties”).
611
George Bush, Statement on Signing the Energy and Water Development Appropriations
Act, 1991 (Nov. 5, 1990), in 1990 PUB. PAPERS 1561, 1562; see also George Bush, Statement on Signing
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (Dec. 19, 1989), in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 1718, 1719
(objecting that insulating subordinate officials of the Department of Health and Human Services from
presidential review deprives the President “of his constitutional authority to supervise their actions”);
George Bush, Statement on Signing the Bill Modifying the Boundaries of the Alaska Maritime National
Wildlife Refuge (Nov. 21, 1990), in 1990 PUB. PAPERS 1664, 1664 (noting that use of “‘independent’
appraisers, who would not be subject to supervision by the President” was “contrary to Article II of the
Constitution”).
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When faced with a provision purporting to determine how the President would resolve a
dispute between the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator of AID, Bush concluded that the provision
must be interpreted “consistent with my inherent constitutional authority as head of the executive branch to
supervise my subordinates in the exercise of their duties, including my authority to settle disputes that
occur between those officials through means other than those specified in the statute.” George Bush,
Statement on Signing the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (Oct. 24, 1992), in 1992 PUB. PAPERS 1962, 1963; see
also George Bush, Statement on Signing the Treasury, Postal Service and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1993 (Oct. 6, 1992), in 1992 PUB. PAPERS 1766, 1767 (objecting that provisions
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of the executive branch acts in an official capacity, the Constitution requires that I have
the ultimate authority to supervise that officer in the exercise of his or her duties.”613
Clearly, if any President aspired to a “zero tolerance” policy with regards to
infringements on the unitary executive, it was Bush.
The Bush Administration also backed up these words with action. It ignored the
failure of the Reagan Administration’s challenges to the Comptroller General’s role in
executing the Competition in Contracting Act614 and ignored the fee-recovery provision
of the Act for similar reasons.615 Furthermore, the Bush Administration pressured
Congress into enacting a version of the Whistleblower Protection Act that omitted the
constitutionally objectionable features that led Reagan to pocket veto the initial
version.616 Specifically, the revised Whistleblower Protection Act dropped the previous
attempt to give the Office of Special Counsel independent litigating authority. As Bush
noted in his signing statement, this change
addresse[d] the chief constitutional concerns raised by earlier versions of
this legislation. The most substantial improvement in the bill is the
deletion of provisions that would have enabled the Special Counsel, an
executive branch official, to oppose other executive branch agencies in
court. Under our constitutional system, the executive branch cannot sue
itself.617

concerning regulatory review by OMB could be interpreted to interfere with my authority under the
Constitution to supervise the decision-making process within and management of the executive branch).
613
Bush, Statement on Signing the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992 ,
supra note 610, at 2061.
614
See supra notes 575-578 and accompanying text.
615
A federal court did not reach the merits of the issue, dismissing the case on ripeness
grounds. United States v. Instruments, S.A., Inc., 807 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1992); see also May, supra
note 289, at 979 n.549.
616
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16. See generally
Kmiec, supra note 466, at 343-44.
617
George Bush, Statement on the Signing of the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989
(Apr. 10, 1989), in 1989 PUB. PAPERS 391, 392 [hereinafter Bush, Whistleblower Protection Act Signing
Statement].
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The amendment also resolved one of the other problems with the original legislation by
providing that any materials submitted by the Office of Special Counsel to Congress
would be submitted “concurrently” to the President, dropping the clause providing that
such materials would be submitted without the President’s review.618 Bush’s signing
statement construed these provisions in a manner consistent with the unitary executive by
stating, “I do not interpret these provisions to interfere with my ability to provide for
appropriate prior review of transmittals by the Special Counsel to the Congress.”619
Bush also asserted his control over the executive branch by continuing the
regulatory review program established by Executive Orders 12,291 and 12,498 during the
Reagan Administration. Bush supplemented these Executive Orders by creating an
interagency task force known as the Council on Competitiveness. which was charged
with coordinating regulatory policy and mediating disputes arising between OIRA and
the agencies during the regulatory review process.620 Through this mechanism, the Bush
White House was able to exert its control over the entire executive branch in an
extremely effective manner. For example, in one incident Bush partially overruled both
OMB and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approving a modification to food
labeling requirements proposed by the FDA over OMB’s objections, but changing its
substantive scope of the FDA’s proposed rule by exempting restaurants in partial
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§ 3(a)(13), 103 Stat. at 28.
Bush, Whistleblower Protection Act Signing Statement, supra note 617, at 392.
620
See Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: The
Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 165-73 (1995); see also Herz, supra note
357, at 223-26; Percival, supra note 357, at 154-55; DeWitt, supra note 357, at 776-78. Bush also issued
executive orders requiring agencies to consider the effect proposed regulations would have on the family
and on federalism. See Exec. Order 12,606, 3 C.F.R. 241 (1993 compilation); Exec. Order 12,612, 3 C.F.R.
252 (1987 compilation). See generally Moreno, supra note 94, at 492-93.
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accommodation of OMB’s concerns.621 It would be a mistake to construe Bush’s
willingness to compromise as suggesting that the decision was anyone’s but the
president’s to make. As FDA Commissioner Daniel Kessler acknowledged, “If the
decision went against, I could no disobey an order from the President. For me as
apolitical appointee, the only response to defeat was to leave.”622 Indeed, when Deputy
Chief of Staff Bob Zoellick informed Kessler of the final outcome, he flatly stated, “This
is the President’s decision.”623 It is true that Bush found himself unable to mandate
OMB’s preferred solution. Bush noted somewhat surprisedly, “I can’t just make a
decision and have it promptly executed, that the Department can’t just salute smartly and
go execute whatever decision I make.”624 Some critics of the unitary executive have
mistakenly taken this statement as a reflection of limitations on the president’s sole
authority to execute the law.625 Closer inspection reveals any such conclusions to be
erroneous. Bush’s inability to impose OMB’s proposal did not reflect any substantive
restrictions on the president’s authority to execute the law, but rather on the procedural
requirements imposed by the Administrative Procedure Act: changes of the magnitude
proposed by OMB would have to be subjected to the notice and comment requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act, which would delay the decision by at least six to eight
weeks and leave the final decision to the Clinton Administration.626
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Bush also attempted to assert his control over the independent agencies when he
directed the U.S. Postal Service to withdraw its suit against the Postal Rate Commission
“pursuant to the President’s authority as Chief Executive and his obligation to take care
that the laws are faithfully executed.”627 Bush backed up his order by threatening to
remove members of the Postal Service’s Board of Governors who refused to go along
with his order.628 That the courts eventually refused to back up Bush’s order629 does not
blunt the fact that the Bush Administration’s position did represent a strong assertion of
the unitariness of the executive branch.
Confronting from day one a Democratic majority in both the House and the
Senate, Bush realized from the start that he was going to have to wield his veto power to
great effect, if he wanted to play a role in policy-making. Bush was to achieve
astonishing success in using the veto. In “four years Bush vetoed forty-four bills, and his
veto was upheld forty-three times.”630 The only Bush veto ever to be overridden was on
the Cable Television Protection and Competition Act of 1992.631 Greene reports, “As a
result of his successes with the veto, Bush was able to use the threat of it to affect how
legislation was constructed. As of 25 July 1991, the White House Press Office had
recorded thirty-eight threats of a presidential veto of legislation; the vast majority of the
legislation on the list did not ever become law.”632 In this way, Bush was able “to put a
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Memorandum of President George Bush to Postmaster General Marvin Runyon (Dec. 11,
1992), quoted in Devins, supra note 600, at 1045.
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See Devins, supra note 600, at 1043-46; Lund, supra note 529, at 79-82.
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632
GREENE, supra note 601, at 62.

135

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art12

conservative cast on legislation that was, in its original form at least, marked by the
liberal slant of the Democratic Congress.”633 Perhaps the most important example for our
purposes is the Ethics in Government Act, which was scheduled to expire in 1992. In an
April 3 speech, Bush indicated that he would veto any extension of the independent
counsel statute unless significant changes were made.634 At a luncheon with reporters,
Attorney General William Barr reiterated the Bush Administration’s dissatisfaction with
the Ethics in Government Act and confirmed the likelihood of a veto of the proposal then
pending before Congress.635 This veto threat, when combined with a filibuster organized
by Senate Republicans, doomed the reauthorization legislation and caused the Ethics in
Government Act to lapse.636
There was one major removal of the Bush years, and it involved Governor John
Sununu, Bush’s first White House Chief of Staff. Sununu was brilliant, hard-working,
and a real street fighter, but he ultimately became a big liability to Bush. George W.
Bush and Andrew Card, Sununu’s Deputy, ultimately persuaded Sununu that Bush
wanted him to resign, and he finally did so on December 3, 1991. There is no question
the resignation was a forced one for the angry Sununu did not want to leave.
In addition, Bush continued to oppose the legislative veto as an impermissible
violation of the separation of powers.637 Accordingly, Bush announced that he would
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“treat them as having no legal force or effect in this or any other legislation in which they
appear.”638 Although the Bush Administration did enter into at least one informal
agreement with Congress that would have much the same effect as a legislative veto,639
as noted earlier such informal arrangements did not raise the same constitutional concerns
as true legislative vetoes.640
But even an Administration as conscientious about protecting presidential power
as Bush’s did on occasion disregards its duty to protect the unitariness of the executive
branch. When Congress enacted a statute permitting members of Congress to exercise
control over the management of Washington National and Dulles Airports, the Bush
Administration failed to challenge its constitutionality before the Supreme Court when
given the opportunity to do so.641 The Bush Administration did not suffer for its mistake,
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as the Supreme Court nonetheless struck down the legislation in part because it
represented an impermissible exercise of executive power by members of the legislative
branch.642 The Bush Administration’s failure to defend the unitary executive in this one
regard simply underscores the propriety of requiring that a presidential practice be
systematic, unbroken, and long standing before it can form the basis for inferring
acquiescence for the purposes of coordinate construction. It should not undermine the
other, ample evidence that President Bush determinedly defended the President’s
authority to execute the laws throughout his Administration and that he almost invariably
acted to protect the unitariness of the executive branch against any and all congressional
attempts to encroach upon it.
X.

WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON

Although Bill Clinton has emerged as one of the most controversial presidents of
the Twentieth Century,643 all agree that Clinton’s intelligence and knowledge of policymaking details was very impressive. Joe Klein, Clinton’s biographer, notes that the
president’s abilities awed his staff:
The awe was inspired by Clinton’s intelligence—particularly, his
encyclopedic knowledge of policy questions—his perseverance and his
ability to charm almost anyone under any circumstances; he was, without
question, the most talented politician of his generation. At close range, his
skills could be breathtaking: He was always the center of attention; he
filled any room he entered. . . . [Clinton’s] staff was intensely loyal, with a
deep sense of political mission. There had not been a truly successful
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Democratic administration in a very long time; Clinton was the first
Democrat to win reelection to a second term since Franklin Roosevelt.644
Klein adds that Clinton “seemed to know everything there was to know about domestic
social policy.”645 Others echo these conclusions with regard to Clinton’s knowledge of
policy making details. Klein quotes one observer as saying that Clinton was “[j]ust
remarkable. You call him up and ask, ‘Who’s doing interesting things in housing?’ And
he can tell you what everyone is doing—every last housing experiment in every state.”646
Harold Varmus, Clinton’s Director of the National Institutes of Health, remembered
Clinton grilling “AIDS researchers for several hours, asking questions so detailed and
sophisticated that most of the participants were shocked by his mastery of the issue.”647
Clinton seemed to promise so much with “his intelligence and remarkable political skills,
. . . his detailed knowledge of almost every government activity, . . . his very
presence.”648 In sum, there can be no doubt about the force of Clinton’s intelligence or
about his mastery of the details of policy-making.
In addition, Clinton was an unusually hard-working president who was deeply
immersed in the policy-making details of his Administration. Clinton demanded total
control over the workings of the executive branch—and this attitude filtered into his
decisions in appointing and dismissing as well as controlling subordinates:
Clinton’s problems stem not from his oft-reported love of detail, but also
from his desire to reach down into his administration to make minor
decisions best left to others. Consider the delays in filling important jobs
in the administration. Clinton demanded that he be involved in “signing
off on the appointment of every assistant secretary, and sometimes deputy
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assistant secretaries.” The desire to be involved in every level of
administration and in the many detailed debates of his policies reflects
more than a quest for excellence; it suggests a need for control. The
element of control has been little noticed in Clinton’s psychology but is
evident in his presidency. By setting up a freewheeling staff system
without clear lines of authority, by allowing lines of authority to be
blurred, and by attempting to act as his own chief of staff, Clinton not only
retains a large measure of control but remains the focus and the center. By
appointing a cabinet that reflects both strong left-of-center leanings
(Donna Shalala, Henry Cisneros, Robert Reich) and strong moderate
leanings (Lloyd Bentsen, Janet Reno), Clinton has done more than ensure
he will get conflicting views; he has set himself as the center, as the
person to be convinced, the person toward whom all debate is
addressed.649
Much like Lyndon Johnson, Clinton wanted no disagreement, indeed, no
independent forces within his executive department.
Both Bill and Hillary “have a greater need than is good for them to have
people around them whose loyalty—and lack of independence—wasn’t in
question.” When it came to selecting his first chief of staff, “Friend after
friend of Clinton said Clinton didn’t want a Jim Baker (Reagan’s strong,
and cunning Chief of Staff). He wanted someone with whom he was
utterly comfortable, whom he could completely trust, who had not agenda
of his own, and who wouldn’t get in his way” because “to his own great
detriment, Clinton wanted to be his own Chief of Staff.”650
Clinton even violated his own policies in order to achieve a staff that deferred to
his executive authority. “After his election, Clinton began his administration’s transition
by announcing it would be guided by a stringent set of conflict-of-interest guidelines.
Yet almost immediately they were relaxed to allow the president’s close friend Vernon
Jordan to join the transition team as an adviser.”651 In addition, Clinton did not hesitate
to exercise his authority to remove executive officials. In October 1993, following a
major battle in Somalia and a major blunder in Haiti, National Security Advisor Anthony
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Lake and Secretary of State Warren Christopher both offered to resign. As it turned out,
Defense Secretary Les Aspin, who was “less prompt with his tender, was the one who
was asked to leave.”652 The effective dismissal of Les Aspin was probably the most
visible removal of the Clinton Administration.
In addition to determining the composition of his administration, Clinton
employed a wide array of institutional arrangements to ensure that he retained control
over the execution of the law, which have been capably documented in a recent article by
Dean Elena Kagan.653 For example, Clinton preserved the system of OMB regulatory
oversight instituted during the Reagan and Bush Administrations largely intact.
Specifically, Clinton continued to require agencies to participate in a regulatory planning
process and to submit major regulations for OMB review.654
After the criticism leveled by Democrats at OMB involvement in the regulatory
process,655 that Clinton would continue this program might be regarded as something of a
surprise. Clinton did institute some changes in the program to mitigate the more
deregulatory bent of the Reagan-Bush program of regulatory review. Although Clinton’s
scheme continued to evaluate rules through the lens of cost-benefit analysis,656 it
broadened the inquiry to allow consideration of other factors, such as “equity,”
“distributive impacts,” and “qualitative measures.”657 In addition, the Clinton program
regularized many of the procedures surrounding regulatory review, requiring disclosure
652
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of all ex parte contacts and written communications between OIRA and the agency658 and
placing limits on the time available for OMB review.659 In addition, the executive order
implementing the scheme listed as one of its goals the “reaffirm[ation of] the primacy of
Federal agencies in the regulatory decision-making process” and averred that “the
regulatory process shall be conducted with due regard to the discretion that has been
entrusted to the federal Agencies.”660
What did not change was the commitment to the unitariness of the executive
branch underlying the institution of OMB review. Clinton’s executive order clearly put
the president in the position of resolving any interagency disputes that emerge from OMB
review.661 “At the end of this review process, the President, or the Vice President acting
at the request of the President, shall notify the affected agency . . . of the President’s
decision with respect to the matter.”662 Centralized regulatory planning and oversight
continued to give the president a powerful tool for exercising control over his
administration, and casing the president as the person to resolve any conflicts
“constituted a striking assertion of executive authority.”663 Indeed, although centralized
regulatory review was criticized as a largely deregulatory-oriented institution during the
Reagan and Bush Administrations, the experience under the Clinton Administration
revealed that its importance transcended mere partisan politics. Instead, it is driven by
the more fundamental and enduring issue of the proper balance of power within the
federal government and the most effective way to ensure effective execution of the law.
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In some ways, Clinton expanded the regulatory review process far beyond that
employed by Reagan and Bush. For example, unlike Reagan, who asserted that he had
the authority to include the independent agencies within OMB review, but declined to do
so as a matter of discretion,664 Clinton required the independent agencies to participate in
the regulatory planning process.665 Policies proposed by the independent agencies that
were in conflict with other agency action or “the President’s priorities” would be required
to participate in “further consideration.”666 Clinton’s belief in the president’s authority
over the independent agencies was also evident in his response to legislation turning the
Social Security Administration into an independent agency headed by an Administrator
who was removable only for “neglect of duty or malfeasance in office.”667 When signing
the bill into law, Clinton noted that the removal provisions raised significant
constitutional questions.668 Clinton also sent letters to independent agencies requesting
that take action on particular issues, although it has been suggested that these
communications more resembled requests than orders from the head of the administrative
state.669 As Kagan notes, the inclusion of the independent agencies within the regulatory
planning process “signified a strong commitment to presidential oversight of
administration” that exceeded even that asserted under Reagan.670
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Clinton also demonstrated his support for the president’s authority to implement
the laws by issuing directives to other federal officials about how they should exercise
their discretionary authority across a wide range of areas.671 In short, “[g]he President
. . . asserted his right as head of the executive branch to determine how its internal
processes and constituent units were to function.”672 Although both Reagan and Bush
had employed this device in the past, Clinton took it to a completely different level. Not
only did Clinton issue far more such directives than his predecessors;673 Clinton’s
interventions went far beyond the more managerial issues that had previously been the
subject of such directives, such as the administration of the national park system, the
armed forces, and federal contracting. Instead, Clinton’s orders had a broad impact on
nongovernmental actors and rights customarily viewed as private.674 Such authority was
extremely helpful with respect to issues that transcended the classic departmental
boundaries or required significant coordination.675 Presidential authority became all the
more important after the Democrats lost control of Congress.676 Clinton’s domination of
the lower agencies “sa[id] something significant about the nature of the relationship
between the agencies and the President—to say that they were his and so too were their
decision.”677
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Clinton’s close association with regulatory policy was apparent not only in his
willingness to assert control over the agencies, but also in the manner in which he
communicated about those policies with the American people. As Kagan notes:
In this administration, . . . nothing as too bureaucratic for the President.
IN event after event, speech after speech, Clinton claimed ownership of
administrative actions, presenting them to the public as his own—as the
product of his values and decisions. He merged in public, and to the
public, as the wielder of ‘executive authority’ and, in that capacity, the
source of regulatory action.678
The manner in which Clinton used the bully pulpit to control the direction of his
administration and to mobilize public support for his regulatory program “sent a loud and
lingering message: these were his agencies; he was responsible for their actions; and he
was due credit for their successes”679 Indeed, so great was Clinton’s domination of his
administration that one Senator accused Clinton of “debasing the constitutional
structure.”680 Using language reminiscent of similar criticisms leveled at Andrew
Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Andrew Johnson,681 Congressman J.C. Watts criticized
Clinton for “pretty much . . . acting as the king of the world.”682
Another major initiative launched by Clinton was the attempt to reinvent
government to be smaller and more efficient. Vice President Albert Gore was charged
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with being the point man on the “Reinventing Government” reform portfolio.683 Klein
describes Gore’s involvement in the project as follows:
The Reinventing Government project was perfect for [Gore], very worthy
if eminently vice presidential: Presidents usually have more important
things to worry about than how the government actually works. But
Reinventing Government was a particular favorite of New Democrats,
who loved the idea of a direct assault upon the ancient paradigm of federal
bureaucracy. . . .684
Many aspects of this program would prove quite successful. The federal
workforce would be reduced by about 350,000 and an estimated $157 billion saved.
Equally important, 16,000 pages of bureaucratic regulations would be tossed—including
some of the more famous government snafus, like the purchasing regulations at the
Pentagon that resulted in $700 toilet seats and $150 hammers.685 Ultimately, however,
the plan to “reinvent government” became sidetracked by political exigency. Clinton’s
efforts to reinvent government would eventually be undone by his desire for new
programs in health care and housing. That Clinton was unable to marshal the resources
to carry through on this initiative should not be taken as any belief that he lacked the
authority to do so.
The Clinton Administration ended in January of 2001 with quite a bang.
President Clinton chose to depart office after “granting 177 presidential pardons and
commutations of sentences on his last night in office.” As Klein reports
There was a libidinous crudeness to all of this. It was a final act of selfindulgence, a total loss of control. Other presidents had granted last
minute pardons, had signed last-minute executive orders, had staged
bathetic farewell tours—but the rapacious enormity of these conceits and
absolutions seemed to recapitulate Clinton’s most loathsome qualities.
683
684
685

KLEIN, supra note 644, at 65
Id. at 66.
Id. at 67.

146

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

And the Marc Rich pardon, at once incomprehensible and instructive, was
the worst of all.686
The only bright spot about the pardons was that they illustrated the extent to which, that
for better or worse, the Constitution puts the President squarely in charge of the law
enforcement process.
Although there is always room for disagreement as to the substance of Clinton’s
policies, in retrospect his commitment to the unitariness of the executive branch cannot
be gainsaid. As Clinton himself noted towards the end of his presidency, “I think if you
go back over the whole reach of our tenure here, I have always tried to use the executive
authority.”687
XI.

THE CLINTON IMPEACHMENT AND THE DEATH OF THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT
ACT
The Clinton years also witnessed one of the most climactic moments in the

history of the unitary theory of the executive: the demise of the Ethics in Government
Act and the institution of impendent counsels. The events began when Clinton directed
Attorney General Janet Reno to investigate the mounting allegations of improprieties
regarding the Arkansas Whitewater Development Corporation. On January 20, 1994,
Reno appointed Robert Fiske, a moderate Republican and prominent member of the New
York Bar who had served as U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York during
the Carter Administration, as special counsel to investigate Whitewater.
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While the investigation was underway, Congress repassed the Ethics in
Government Act, which had lapsed during the Bush Administration.688 The three-judge
court designated under the statute to oversee the independent counsels immediately
dismissed Fiske on the grounds that because he had been picked by the Administration to
investigate Whitewater, he was insufficiently independent. In a fateful move, the threejudge court instead tapped Kenneth Starr, a former federal circuit judge and Solicitor
General during the Bush Administration. Starr’s inquiry kept expanding as more and
more new subjects opened up for him to investigate, including firings in the White House
Travel Office and even the suicide of Deputy White House Counsel Vince Foster.
Eventually, the Starr investigation collided with a sexual harassment suit brought
against Clinton by Paula Jones, who alleged that Clinton had exposed himself to her and
had demanded oral sex after seeing her managing the registration desk at a conference.
Jones sued Clinton, who claimed an executive privilege to the effect that a sitting
president is not subject to civil suit for events that took place before he took office. This
issue went before the Supreme Court, and the Clinton Solicitor General’s office argued
that the Court should find a privilege such that Jones’s suit would be postponed until after
Clinton left office. The Administration’s brief began with the claim that:
To require that the President defend against private civil lawsuits in state
and federal courts during his term of office would intrude impermissibly
upon the President’s performance of his constitutional duties, in violation
of separation of powers principles. In both constitutional and practical
terms, the demands placed upon the President under Article II are
unceasing. A sitting President cannot defend himself against litigation
seeking to impose personal financial liability without diverting his energy
and attention from the exercise of the “executive Power” of the United
States. A judicial order requiring the President to participate in the
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defense of a private civil suit would therefore place the court in the
position of impairing a coordinate Branch of the government in the
performance of its constitutional functions.689
The Supreme Court ruled unanimously against Clinton,690 although Justice
Stephen Breyer wrote what can best be described as a Clinton-friendly concurrence.691
One great point of amusement about the Court’s opinion in Clinton v. Jones was Justice
Stevens’s statement, hilarious in retrospect, that the case was “highly unlikely to occupy
any substantial amount of [Clinton’s] time.”692
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Clinton v. Jones, Jones’s attorneys
deposed the President, asking him about his not-so-secret affair with Monica Lewinsky.
When confronted with the Lewinsky allegations, Clinton denied under oath having a
sexual relationship with Lewinsky, which in turn led Starr to investigate the perjury and
obstruction of justice charges that formed the basis of Clinton’s impeachment by the
House of Representatives on December 19, 1998 and subsequent acquittal by the Senate
on February 12, 1999.
Although some scholars have predicted that the Clinton impeachment would a
weaken the presidency in the same manner as the failed impeachment of Andrew
Johnson,693 other scholars have pointed out that such arguments overlook a fundamental
difference between the two impeachments.694 Although there was certainly a partisan
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element to both impeachments, as Keith Whittington has eloquently demonstrated, “The
Johnson impeachment was centrally about presidential power,”695 particularly with
respect to which branch would control Reconstruction696 and Johnson’s conception of the
president as the direct spokesperson for the people and the sole head of a unitary
executive branch.697 The impeachment was thus in no small part a battle between
Congress and Johnson over the proper role of the presidency in the constitutional order.
Indeed, it is no accident that the “high crime” that provided basis for the impeachment—
the removal of Secretary of War Edward Stanton in contravention of the Tenure of Office
Act of 1867—was unique to the presidency and could not have been committed by any
other individual.698 Nothing less than the very structure of the federal government hung
in the balance.
In stark contrast to the Johnson impeachment, the Clinton impeachment focused
on the particular individual holding the office of president and not the presidency itself.
Indeed, as Whittington notes, “The Clinton impeachment was so unsatisfying in part
because it seemed so constitutionally unimportant.”699 Neither the president nor
Congress used the impeachment process as a platform for advancing a vision of the
president’s place within the constitutional order.700 As a result, it is unlikely to have

GEO. L.J. 1, 6 (2002) (“[U]nlike the other instance—the impeachment of Bill Clinton—at the center of the
Johnson impeachment was a fundamental power struggle between the two branches on the most critical
issues of the day.”); Laura Kalman, The (Un?)Bearable Liteness of E-Mail: Historians, Impeachment and
Bush v. Gore, 4 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 579, 602 (2003) (“In fact, Clinton’s impeachment bore few parallels
to Johnson’s.”).
695
Whittington, supra note 694, at 426.
696
Id. at 427-31.
697
Id. at 438-39.
698
Id. at 443.
699
Id. at 459.
700
Id. at 455.

150

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

significant implications for the distribution of power between the legislative and
executive branches.701
In the end, the most important consequence of these events for the theory of the
unitary executive was that it led to the Clinton Administration’s abandonment of its prior
defense of the Ethics in Government Act. Clinton was not the only person dogged by an
independent counsel investigation. Fully five members of Clinton’s Cabinet were
investigated by special prosecutors.702 When the Act came up for renewal, the Clinton
Administration dropped its support for the Act. The first indication of this change in
position appeared in Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder’s testimony during House
subcommittee hearings on reauthorization.703 Clinton’s Attorney General, Janet Reno,
offered similar testimony before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs about
the Act:
After much reflection and inquiry, we [at the Justice Department]
have decided—reluctantly—to oppose reauthorization of the Independent
Counsel Act. . . . In 1993, as many of you know, I testified in support of
the statute. . . . However, after working with the Act, I have come to
believe—after much reflection and with great reluctance—that the
Independent Counsel Act is structurally flawed and that those flaws cannot
be corrected within our constitutional framework . . ..
Our Founders set up three branches of government: a Congress
that would make the laws, an Executive that would enforce them, and a
judiciary that would decide when they had been broken. The Attorney
General, who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate,
is publicly accountable for her decisions. . . .
In contrast, the independent counsel is vested with the full gamut
of prosecutorial powers, but with little of its accountability. He has not
been confirmed by the Senate, and he is not typically subject to the same
sorts of oversight or budgetary constraints that the Department faces day
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in and day out. Accountability is no small matter. It goes to the very heart
of our constitutional scheme. Our Founders believed that the enormity of
the prosecutorial power—and all the decisions about who, what, and
whether to prosecute—should be vested in one who is responsible to the
people. That way—and here I am paraphrasing Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Morrison v. Olsen—whether we’re talking about over-prosecuting or
under-prosecuting, “The blame can be assigned to someone who can be
punished.” It was for this reason that the American republic survived for
over 200 years without an Independent Counsel Act.704
Both the first (Archibald Cox) and the last (Kenneth Starr) of the modern
independent counsels asked Congress to let the statute die.705 Senators Howard Baker,
Robert Dole, and George Mitchell706 as well as a bipartisan array of former Attorneys
General707 and independent counsels708 also called for restoring control over prosecution
of senior government officials to the control of the executive branch.
The Clinton Administration’s opposition to reauthorization dealt a final death
blow to the Ethics in Government Act. Republicans still upset about Lawrence Walsh’s
investigation of Iran-Contra joined with Democrats outraged by the Starr investigation of
Clinton to bring an end to the independent counsel statute. The statute was allowed to
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lapse, and subsequent regulations gave the attorney general the authority to appoint and
supervise special counsels charged with investigating top government officials.
The abruptness with which support for the Act collapsed was somewhat shocking.
At the end of 1997, the statute still enjoyed broad support, although many commentators
and legislators believed some adjustments might be necessary. By the end of 1998,
political support had almost completely evaporated.709
Thus, as we predicted,710 the rise and fall of the Ethics in Government Act
ultimately paralleled the rise and fall of the Tenure of Office Act of 1867 chronicled in
our prior work.711. Both statutes were enacted by imperial Congresses at a time of great
presidential weakness: the Andrew Johnson Administration in one case and the postWatergate Carter Administration in the other. Both statutes lasted roughly twenty years,
during which time they worked very badly. Both statutes were then finally repealed in a
show of bipartisan determination to return to the system of presidential removal power
which the Framers so wisely bequeathed us.
CONCLUSION
We thus come to the end of our four-part survey of the presidents from George
Washington to Bill Clinton to determine the constitutional practices with respect to
presidential control over the execution of the law. Just as we found in each of the
preceding periods, we conclude that every president between 1945 and 2001 defended the
unitariness of the executive branch with sufficient ardor to rebuff any claims that
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institutions such as independent counsels and independent agencies have been foreclosed
as a matter of history. From Harry Truman’s removal of General Douglas MacArthur to
Bill Clinton’s removal of Les Aspin, each president during in this period has proved to be
a vigorous defender of the unitary executive. The consistency with which presidents
have asserted their sole authority to execute the law is made all the more important by the
Supreme Court’s recognition in INS v. Chadha712 that the fact that every president since
Woodrow Wilson had objected to the legislative veto was sufficient to prevent the issue
from becoming an established aspect of our constitutional order. Clearly, the same
reasoning dictates that the issue remains open as a historical matter and must be resolved
on the basis of legal and normative arguments.
The main controversy during this fourth quarter of American history that bore on
the unitary executive was over the constitutionality of the special prosecutor regime set
up by the ethics in government act. The important point to note about that controversy is
that, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s approval of the institution of independent
counsels in Morrison v. Olson,713 the Ethics in Government Act was allowed to lapse in
June of 1999 after both Democrats and Republicans had grown to appreciate its flaws.
This rejection of the Ethics in Government Act some twenty years after it was first
enacted is quite reminiscent of the repeal of the Tenure of Office Act under Grover
Cleveland, which also occurred some twenty years after that statute was enacted. In both
case, Congress was tempted to experiment with unconstitutional limits on the president’s
removal power, and in both cases the unconstitutional regime did not work out and was
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eliminated. The story of the rise and fall of both the Tenure of Office Act and the Ethics
in Government Act are eerily similar and stand as stark reminders of the dangers that can
occur when the power to execute the law is placed outside of presidential control.
That the unitary executive would emerge from this era as an open constitutional
question is rendered all the more remarkable in light of the radical expansion of
presidential power during this era. This serves a stark refutation of those who have
argued that the increase in executive authority justified sanctioning greater legislative
intervention in the execution of the law.714
We do not expect, however, that the demise of the independent counsel law will
forestall further controversy surrounding the unitariness of the executive branch. Indeed,
many of these issues have begun to play themselves out once again during the
Administration of George W. Bush. The question about the proper scope of presidential
control over the execution of the law arose when creating the new Cabinet-level
Department of Homeland Security. Given the sensitive nature of the antiterrorism work
to be conducted by the Department, Bush was adamant that the president have the
unilateral power to remove Department officials at will. Disagreement by Senate
Democrats led to an impasse that would ultimately be settled by the 2002 midterm
elections, in which the Republicans successfully gained control of the Senate. It is thus
likely that we have not yet seen the last of the debates surrounding the unitary executive.
It is our hope that in reviewing the history of presidential practices with respect to the
execution of the law, this project will help provide the historical context in front of which
the relevant legal and normative issues can be discussed.
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